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abstract

This thesis attempts to investigate the nature
and extent of popular influence on Canadian foreign policy,
as expressed through the Members of Parliament, the
political parties and the House of Commons.

The intro

duction cursorily delineates the setting of Canada’s
foreign policy so as to show the inflexible, enduring
factors which tend to restrict the degree of latitude
this country has in shaping a foreign policy#

The main

factors and the institutional elements in the policy-making
machinery are related to one another in a political systems
analysis, which links the domestic political system to the
international political system#

The degree of representative

Impact on foreign policy is assessed from two perspectives}
first, more restrictively, as crystalized in the constit
utional practices of Canadian government and the procedural
methods of th© House of Commons ; second, more broadly,
from the dynamic interplay between the political
institutions and the social and political influences
external to the House of Commons#

From the data examined

and an assessment of relevant political and social theory
the thesis estimates the impact which the representative
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element does have on current Canadian foreign policy*

In

conclusion, some current trends within Canadian society
and the international environment are studied to assess
hew they might expand or diminish the role of the Commons*
The thesis points out what may be some of the present
Inadequacies in our political system which serve to
hamper the representatives in playing a larger role*
Finally, some specific changes are discussed which might
lead to the Commons talcing a more active and constructive
part in foreign affairs*
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Internal!anal Political Svste;
fh© setting for foreign policy is the International
society of nation states#

fo comprehend any foreign policy

we tmst have some conception of the nature of this inter
national ‘society*.

The ter® society would seem appropriate

when applied to the collectivity of nation states, because
it denotes their continuous contact and interdependence in
the modern world*
The use of the term should not mislead us into
conceptualising the society of nations as a cohesive com
munity, analogous with the more closely knit societies
found within, nation states.

International society is

uniquely decentralised and loosely tenit, with none of the
authoritative central organs of law-making, concensus
formation and coercion, of the national society.

The concept

of sovereignty implies that each nation state is its own
supreme decision-maker and acknowledges no higher authority.
The lack of a central deciding authority for the
society of nation states has led one school of international
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- : 2 s relations theorists to emphasize the role of ‘power*
as an explanatory concept of the behaviour of states*
This approach naturally concentrates on the states as
actors and sees international relations to a great extent
as the relations of the various foreign policies,1
Other writers such as Talcott Parsons have drawn
attention to the amount of Interdependence between states
and to the development of order and community in the international social system*

2

They have emphasized the widely

ramified system of private associations and solidarities
across national boundaries which they believe constitutes
the beginning of an international nor native order.

This

group would emphasize the fact that the nation state is
an unsatisfactory instrument for satisfying the welfare and
security needs of its citizens*

There has been strong

tendency for the nation state units to organize themselves
into blocs and unions to achieve more efficient economic
development, greater security against their enemies and a
greater exchange of information about their needs and aims,

Allans 1. Morgenthau, Politics .Among, nations... Alfred A.
Knopf, lew York, 195^, pp* 25-32*
%alcott Parsons, “Order and Community in the Inter
national Social System," in James N, Rosenau ed., Interm..ti.onal P.olit.ic.s..^and Por.fiim.._£olicy., The fTee Press, New
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Both these approaches contribute valuable insights
into the understanding of international behaviour, but each
alone is Inadequate to explain fully all the variables
in the behaviour of a state in the international environ
ment*

The main criticism of Morgenthau*s theory is that it

depends upon a mechanistic analogy and implies a closed
system*

All political realities are reduced to terms of

power which is analysed in terms of its various elements
such as population, geography, technology etc*

The problem

lies in trying to determine which elements are important
and what the relationship among the various elements is*
These elements are held to be isolated for the purpose of
study so that no other element can enter and influence the
process*

This is unrealistic in that a political system is

not isolated from its environment but constantly exchanges
information with it and depends on a feedback of information
from its environment to give It some indication of its
performance*
By abandoning the closed system assumption we
arrive at the generalization that final outcomes
are not determined by initial conditions but
rather by conditions of outflow and inflow over
a period of time* The final outcome in a sequence
of development may b© reached by many ways from
many types of beginning circumstances*3

^Charles A* McClelland, "Applications of General
Systems Theories in International Relations,” in Rosenau,
ibid.* P. **15.
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• sk s•
An approach to the explanation of international
relations which attempts to overcome some of the drawbacks
of the power principle is one which uses a system
perspective.

According to this perspective all states

are regarded as belonging to an international system
"which is considered to exist in an environment and to
be composed of parts which, through interaction, are in
relation to each other,

Consequently this system has a

structure and encompasses processes through which it is
L,
either sustained or changed.”
The systems approach allows
us to focus upon the actions of tho nations as components
of the system.

We may also examine the structure and

functioning of the system as it results from the interaction
of nations or upon the environmental factors which condition
the actions of the nations and the operation of a system,
The systems approach may be quite conveniently
linked' to the communications approach adopted by Karl
Peutseh,

The states as units of the international system

are linked by a network of communication*

The analysis of

transmission, reception and evaluation of information
transmitted through this network provides us with an

^Hosenau, ibid*, p* 72,
% a r l Deutsch, The Nerves of Government* The Free
Press, Hew York, 1963, passim.
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Insight Into the nature of a control centre for the
transmission and reception of this information*

The actions

which are taken as a result of the information are subject
to feedback both from the international environment and from
the domestic environment of the state*

The scheme which

w© wish to us© to explain this is very simply set out in
Diagram 1 below*

6

The effects which influence the system

w© may call the inputs which may b© divided into demands
and support*

Inputs may be defined as any ©vent external

to the system that alters, modifies or affects the system
in any way*

Demands are those statements proposing that

some kind of authoritative allocation ought to be undertaken
by the political system; supports are those elements both
in the intrasocietal and extrasocietal environments which
help to sustain the political system in satisfying these
demands *

The Inputs enter the political system and may

be regarded as being subject to the conversion process
which results in outputs from the political system*

The

outputs of the conversion process have the characteristic

^David Easton has expounded the application of
systems theory to political analysis in the following major
works *
P ^ r£AlUsal,Ja,l,M» Alfred A. Knopf Inc., Mew
York, i953*
4 BayaayoEkJfap. PoiitlcAl Analysis * Prentice Hall,
Prentice
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* i7 **
of feeding back upon the system and shaping its subsequent
behaviour.

To apply this more concretely to Canada, we

can see Canada as a state, part of the international
political system*

It is subject to the restraints of

International society as a whole, but also undertakes
certain obligations and duties as a member of certain
blocs such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and
the Commonwealth of Nations*

While Canada's foreign

policy must be shaped within the constraints offered by
these organizations and groupings, these organizations and
groupings also offer opportunities for widening the scope
of Canada's foreign policy*

In combination with other

powers Canada will find Itself able to achieve certain
aims which it could not achieve on its own.

The opport

unities which international organization offers for the
exercise of Canadian diplomacy will be treated at greater
length later.
Whereas Canada has entered into a large number of
formal commitments, Canada's modes of thought and its
attitude towards other members of the international system
are to some extent shaped by informal communications which
cross its boundaries and communicate directly to individuals
and groups within the state.

Thus Canada is a part of

North American civilization and an outgrowth of Western
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-

European civilization with strong connections at the
present time with western European nations, notably
Britain and France,
To return to our communications model, which we
briefly hinted at earlier, it can be elaborated as seen
in Diagram 2 -which indicates the flow of information
which goes between the intrasocletal and extrasocietal
environment.

We can see from the diagram that much

information flows between the intrasocletal and extrasocietal environment directly, but a great deal of it
flows at the official level between the other members
of the International system and the executive part of
the Canadian government.

The agency of the government

which has been set up especially to channel information
from the other members of the international system is
the Department of External Affairs,

This also is

responsible for forwarding official Canadian communi
cations to the governments of the other states.
The Department of External Affairs can be regarded
as key agency for the evaluating of information, what
many analysts have called the ’decision making’ executive
agency.

This thesis will not be concerned with the

relationship between the Department of External Affairs
and the Prime Minister and his Cabinet.

It may be
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suggested that it is at this level that all the lines
of communication from the intrasocietal and extrasocietal environment are resolved and some authoritative
decisions are made which concretely express themselves
as Canadian foreign policy.

Whether or not these

decisions are arrived at with a minimum of interference
from the intrasocietal environment through Parliament,
opinion leaders, mass media and interest groups is a
problem for further exploration.
Factors of National Power
The elements of national power, mentioned earlier
in connection with Morgenthau's ideas, obviously have the
effect of limiting the aims which any state can pursue
7
in its foreign policy,'
The stronger those elements are
for any state the more it can pursue a policy independent
of the constraints of the international political system.
The weaker those elements are then the more it must be
constrained by the demands of the stronger powers and
the international system as a whole.

The author does not

subscribe to the view that foreign policy is solely determined
by a state's capabilities to demonstrate and exercise power.
The concrete factors will determine the range of opportunities.

^Morgenthau, op. clt.. pp. 102-154.
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«* s XI * Til© as® which is made of these opportunities will be
determined by the decision-makers* outlook which in turn
will have been shaped by their own society and their
socialisation into the roles which they are presently
q
playing# Harold and Margaret Sprout talk about a
statesman's psychological environment, which means th®
world as he sees it, which may or may not be the world
as it really is#

The actions and policies pursued by

these decision makers is determined by their own assess
ment, not only of th© international environment but of
their own resources within their own intrasocietal
environment#

This brings up the whole question of

ideology and that certain states in the past have neglected
th© concrete realities of power and have emphasised the
important factor of will as a determining factor in being
able to achieve one's foreign policy's aim, for example
France in 191^-18 war*
Morgenthau has listed as the concrete specifics^
by which we measure power the following: geography, natural
resources, industrial capability, military preparedness,

^Harold and Margaret Sprout, Milieu M l a t l onshlp
Center of International Studies, Princeton University,
Princeton, 1956, pp» 72*101#
9
'Morgenthau, ibid*
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- : 12 t population# national character, national morale, and the
quality of diplomacy.

Other writers may differ slightly

in how they would categorize these specifics, but generally
they would not differ a great deal from these basic categories
mentioned by Morgenthau,

Without going into detail in

enumeration of just where Canada stands in relation to
these specifics we may say that she does not rank at
the present time as a great power in respect to all of
these elements.

In area, potential natural resources,

level of technology and military equipment Canada would
rank with the most modern and powerful states in the world.
With regard to population, the size of its military
establishment, economic capacity at the present time,
Canada does not qualify as a great power.

Canada conceives

of its role in the world as that of a middle power.

The

exact nature of this role has been determined to some
extent by strategic necessity, by being at the northern
end of the North American continent, lying between the
two great rival powers of the United States of America
and the Soviet Union,

Its own national traditions have

also played a very Important part in determining just what
the kind of role will be.

The author has chosen to discuss

this particular role under the heading of Political Culture.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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This term has attained widespread usage in many
recent works on comparative polities, especially in
connection with the study of th© newly developing .nations.
It attempts to probe th© deeper nature of the political

process beyond th© constitutional and institutional facade
which can often conceal th© real political forces.

The

concept refers to the orientations and attitudes that
people have to the political process and it recognises
that these attitudes are related to th© general value
system prevailing in that society.

An investigation of

th© .political culture would involve, among other things,
examining th© family patterns, the educational process,
the attitudes to authority, the class structure, dominant
religious beliefs and patterns of communication.
This concept nr..y prove useful in assessing the
attitudes of th© general public to the elite and vice
versa.

Xu other words, how much do those who are entrusted

with the shaping of foreign policy feel that they ought to
ascertain the treads in public opinion?

Furthermore, does

th© electorate at large feel they should assert their views
on foreign policy issues, or are they willing to defer to
the elite groups whom they feel might be expected to have
unique experience and expertise?

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

- t lH- t Closely related to the orientations which the
people and th© ©lit© groups have of their domestic political
process is the vision which the ‘decision-makers1 have
of the rest of th© world and the part they believe their
nation is fitted to play in it#

To some extent we may

expect that th© ‘decision-makers1 will reflect the pre
vailing values and outlook of their society, partly
through th© pressures of public opinion, but mainly by
’internalizing * these values through the socialization
process#

The outlook of th© decision makers because of

their greater exposure to inter.national influences, their
higher education and possibly their class selection may
differ in some important respects from
the population generally#

the outlook of

They may well be less insular

and more aware of self-denying policies in the long term
interests of their nation#

Thor© is, for example, consider

ably more support for foreign aid among officials of the
departments concerned with foreign affairs than there is
among legislators and the population in general#*0
The examination of value systems as the underlying
basis of the social and political system has been the subject

*°James Eayrs, C ^ p d a
Afirgi£&October 1955June 1957. Canadian Institute of International Affairs,
Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1959, pp. 20^-213#
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- * 15 * *
of quite intensive investigation in the United States in
recent years,

The values of their own system and liberal

democracy in general have received particular attention,^
Canada has not been as intensively studied, although several
recent works have attempted to delineate differences between
the two neighboring countries which superficially would
seem to have little to differentiate them, except perhaps
their political institutions#
Some of these writers, who have discerned subtle
but significant differences in Canadian and American value
systems and orientations towards the outside world would
not justify these differences solely on grounds of
differences in power or political institutions.

To

appreciate fully the nature of the present value system it
is important to relate it to its origin in the birth of these
societies as offspring of another society,

Louis Hartz

12

in his two books dealing with this problem points out

^■The following are some of the better known con
temporary writings on American society and its values as
they affect politics t
Vance Packard, The Status Seekers : David Riesman,
The Lonely C rowd : C, Wrlgnt M i l s , The Power Elite
and
Max Lerner, A mer ica as.a
Civilization; Eric Larrabee, The Self-Qonsclous
Society: S. M, Lipset, The First New Hation,
12
Louis Hartz, The.M.{pral Tradition ,|n America,
Hareourt, Brace and Co., New York, 195?*
The Founding of New Societies, Hareourt, Brace
and Co., New York, 19&*> •

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

«• s 16 i that th© ideology of the new society will depend on

what value® the dominant group import from the old society*
That group did not, he maintains, hear the whole spectrum
of values, hut only a part*

Canada and the U.S.A., he

declares, are heirs to the Lockean tradition of ’baurgeouis*
liberal individualism*
Gad Horowitz*^accepts th© Hertzian view of the
importation of liberal individualism into the United
States and its subsequent impermeability to further
ideological development into socialism*

He does not accept

this as a sufficient explanation of Canada*s Ideological
diversity at the present time.

The United States, he

portrays as a one myth political culture in which no
other ideological tradition has ever gained legitimacy,
Canada, on the other tend, acquired, and still possesses,
the ’Tory streak* which is responsible for non-liberal,
un-American attributes of English-Canadian society.

Some

historians have attributed Canadian toryism to the loyalist
migrations and to Canada’s origins as a counter-revolutionary

* % a d Horowitz. "Conservatism, Liberalism and
Socialism in Canada i An Interpretation, "
&a&xL£a2AEAsa.
«d. J u g h Thorbura, Prentice Hall, Toronto,
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Ik

Horowitz Is not entirely in sympathy with this

thesis and points out the continued large-scale migration
of people from the British Isles in the early 19th century,
who bore with them the tory values of the organic,
corporate, hierarchical community,

Once liberal

individualism and tory traditions exist in society
there is then th® opportunity for the growth of socialism
’’which combines the corporate-organic-collectivist ideas
of toryism with th® rationalist-egalitarian ideas of
liberalism.*
this analysis has been corroborated by those who
find that the central values of th© Canadian political
system have been distinctly different from those of the
U,S,A,

George Grant emphasises the continuity of a British

tradition which constituted, "an inchoate desire to build ...
a society with a greater sens© of order and restraint than
freedom-loving republicanism would a l l o w , T h e

conser

vatism of th© early leaders "was essentially the social

% r t h u r 1. M, lower* Colony la faiiMi, Longmans,
Green and Co,, Toronto, 19*k >, pp, 119-121,
15Horowitz, M t c.4|,, p, 56,
l6leorge Grant, ^ m m t £or__a Mat,Ion, McClelland
and Stewart, Toronto, 1965, p* o9.
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doctrine that public order and tradition, in contrast to
freedom and experiment, were central to the good life#”
W* L. Merton points out the contrast between th©
"Declaration of Independence” which promised ”life, liberty

and th© pursuit of happiness” and the .preface to the
B#M#A. act which aspired to establish "peace, order and
17
good government,”
He adds that this has meant in
s

practice greater appreciation of strong government,
greater deference towards leaders, greater willingness
to let them govern and more respect for the law than is
found in the B#S.A.
U p s e t associates the persistance of elitist values

la Canada and a lack of universal value criteria in the
social system with greater tolerance for political deviance#
This is not necessarily due, he suggests, to greater
tolerance throughout the whole population but more a
deference to the opinions of the leaders who appreciate

the diversity of their society and the necessity of
compromise,
MeCarthyisia and like movements are not typical
of Canada but are more likely in countries where th©
authority structure is based on populist values #

.
h
Mo^ ^ » Ite.S . m q j t e .ItiaftfcUgf University of
loronto, foronto, 19ol#
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In democracies, the rights of the minority
oust be respected* Populism has a tendency to
deny these rights, to assume that those whose
values do not agree with the basic consensus
of the society should b© driven out*"*
The concomitant of the need to treat everyone
according to a single universalistic criteria is the
"melting pot" philosophy which holds that ethnic and
cultural diversity should be broken down and these
groups should be brought into full participation in a
common cultural heritage*

Canadians have held to

particularistic values and, in the words of Vincent Massey,
10
see their^ society as a "mosaic" 7 which grants the right
in theory "to sustained collective individuality,"20 Thus
there is in English Canadian society a greater sense of
relativism than exists in American society; which, when it
comes to seeking to discover a national identity, leads to
perplexity and'doubt#
Horowitz points out that English Canada is not a
one myth culture*
l8S. M* Upset, The First M m . .iatlon* Basic Books,
Hew Xork, 1963, p# 11#
19Vincent Massey, Canadians and the^Coamonwealth.
Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1961, p* 21#
20Kaspar Naegele, Canadian Society ” Some Reflections
in Bernard Blishen et al, Canadian Society, Macmillan of
Canada, Toronto, 1961, p*M»*
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In'English Canada •.. Ideological diversity has
not been buried beneath an absolutist liberal
nationalism
English Canada does not direct
an tmcoraprehending intolerance of heterodoxy,
either within its borders or beyond t h e m * 21

The preceding analysis is essential to gain an
understanding of both the conduct and form of Canadian
foreign policy in very general terms*
John Holmes, a former high official in the
Department of External Affairs, typified the Canadian
approach as pragmatic*

Its "characteristic endeavour

(was) to find theories to fit the facts of international
life and at the same time justify a Canadian role rather
than to impose moral abstractions on an untidy world*tt22
The viewpoint which he stated can be seen as an
accurate reproduction of the outlook and values which are
a result of Canada's own historical evolution.

The under

lying preconception® of Canadian foreign policy are
expanded more fully as follows *
Each nation was seen as unique, its history
and geography as well as its size giving it
some special part to play ad hoc in world
affairs* The world did not consist merely
of great powers on the one hand and small
powers on the other* Nor should it be

21Horowitz,

P* 62*

22

John Holmes, “Canadian External Policies Since
19**5fn International Journal. Vol, XVIII, Mo, 3,
SprIng 1963, p, 137*

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

** f

21

I -

divided arbitrarily into blocs, western,
communist and uncommitted, or into good
guys and bad boys, binds and white.
The international scene would be more
manageable if relationships remained
flexible, if we were not driven into
rigid blocs and regions. Canada became
the persistent advocate of flexibility
in international as s.
00la tions, constantly
worried about what seemed a too categorical
approach in Washington.23
Alastair Taylor points out that in searching
for a national and international identity there is an
organic relationship between the two.
In both areas there must always be room for
flexibility, namely, that problems invariably
must be made subject to a process of solution
finding within a political spectrum - infinite
in its gradations*
For Canada is neither a great nor a small
power - it is middle. Consequently we are in
a favourable position to play a full,
affirmative role in strengthening those
forces, both at the regional and global
levels, that are breaking down the dicho
tomies of Cartesian conceptualisation.2^
It would appear that both the above formulations
would reflect fairly accurately the thinking of the
officials of the Department of External Affairs and the
leading spokesmen for Canada since the war - especially
Lester Pearson and now Paul l&rtin*

In some respects

23lIolme§ ibid*, p. IbO.
2l|Alastair Taylor
Canadian Institute of
1963, p, 6h.
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tli© Conservative spokesmen, notably Biefeabaker and
Howard Green, m y have differed in their personal views
but they did not take much action to steer the department
away from the course that had previously been charted#
This formulation is essentially elitist in that
its preconceptions .and subtleties are not widely shared
by the public and their representatives in the legislature#
fhe deference which the people as a whole show to the
makers of foreign policy las all w e d these policymakers to
perform their tasks free from populist clamour for a crusade
against anti-christ*

There has not on the whole been that

insistent demand from organised sections of the public
for quick neat solutions to complex international prob
lems , which has been evident in the U.S.A.
The deference of the public has been matched by
the heavy involvement of the senior civil servants in
policy making#

Many observers have noted that the

influence of the top layer is as great as that of similar
administrators in any democratic country in the world.
Bayrs points out that elite group is small and intimately
related, having frequent social contacts and exchanging
v i e w over the whole spectrum of government policy#2-’

2% a w e b Bayrs, .The Aft M AM...,PMS.lb% University
of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1961, Ch. 2 * The Bureaucracy#

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

- s 23 i -

Professor Wheare has pointed oat that it is
inevitable that a senior civil servant should become
involved in politics*
In the formulation of policy a Higher Civil
Servant is advising and assisting a Minister
not only to carry through a policy which is
the policy of the majority party in the House
of Commons, but also to defend that policy
against criticism and attacks of the parties
in opposition*2®
In recognition of their political role deputy
ministers are appointed not by the Civil Service Coramission as are all other civil servants, but by the
Governor-in-Cour.cil on the advice of the Prime Minister*
There was a great deal of suspicion by some Conservatives
as to the neutrality of the top civil servants when they
27
regained power after 22 years in opposition in 1957*

C* Wheare, Civil Service in the Constitution.
Oxford University Press, London,' 1 9 5 % pp. 27-23*..
^Several students of Canadian politics have observed
and commented on the apparently close relationships among
the political corporate and civil service elites during the
long period of liberal government from 1935 to 1957* John
Porter states,
At times all three groups would join in a symposiaon
some version of the theme ‘Canada: Nation on the
March* *•* they constituted an effective team in
which it was difficult to tell who at any particular
time was carrying the ball.
he Vertical Mosaic. University of Toronto Press, Toronto,
pp. 452-^53*

f

Se® also <J* E. Hodgetts, “The Civil Service and Policy
Formation." in Canadian Public Administration. J.E.Hodaetts
and D. C* Corbett, eds*, Ifecmillan; Toronto, i960,pp.tf38-l+51.
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The Department of External Affairs had grown largely
under Liberal administrations and under King it had
enjoyed a large measure of autonomy*

St* Laurent had

worked very closely with Lester Pearson as Under-Secretary
and Pearson’s “assumption of the senior political post
served to confirm the idea that foreign policy was a
23
task for professionals.”
While the Conservatives made no radical changes
in the personnel of the department they made little
impact on the independence which it enjoyed,

Discussions

with some civil servants convey the i-apression that
M e*. Green was an apt pupil and could be depended upon
faithfully to present the carefully considered views of
his department in most cases.

This is not to say that

the department made policy irrespective of the desires of
the politicians*

Obviously the Conservatives had quite

strong things to say on South Africa, the Common Market,
disarmament, nuclear weapons and communism which would
not necessarily reflect the outlook of the department.
The department was entrusted with the implementation
of policy and was in a position to transmute

policies

to fit in with the previously described philosophy.

2%Ueharc! A. Preston, Canada in World Affairs,
Oxford University Press, Tor onto, 1 9 w , p. 9 •
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Complaints have been made over the years that the
Department of Internal Affairs Is Insular and aloof and

does not readily welcome publicity*

The main source of

information !ms been the minister concerned whose answers

on many questions, both in the House and outside, have
been bland and non-ccmaltal*
Stanley Burls® complained that the department in
1959 had continued to operate waa a diplomats diplomatic
service, a highly qualified, highly regarded, intergovernment service operating -with little communication
with the public, either at hoiae or abroad*
This attitude of the senior officials in the
department and the general assurance which they feel

would tend to support the findings of John Porter as to
the strength of bureaucratic power.

This is based m

their solidarity as a group and the lack of competing

elites who rival them in expertise and are therefore able
to mount effective criticism*

Foreign Affairs is not a

field where corporate, labour or political elites have
acquired great experience and competence as they have in
some West European countries and to some extent in the
U*S,A*

The newness of Canada’s contacts with the rest of

21010 s
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the world has-, allowed the few experts to become concentrated
in the government service, while the rest of the community
is slowly catching up*^0

.IM.

to examination of the purely constitutional and
formal structures of government is inadequate in attempting
to explain the network of inter-relationships between

various sections of the polity., showing how they enter
into the formulation of foreign policy*

It is therefore

proposed to- start at the widest and most diffuse orbit and
work inwards to the .more concrete and specific agencies which
have the most clear-cut functions to perform in relation
to foreign policy*
Canadafs democratic system of government has been
profoundly influenced by "British law, traditions, and
habits of mind, and by precepts and example in the
United States,
has shown*

as the section on Political Culture1

fhe important feature of democracy is that it

responds to the will of the .people*

At a time when govern

ment activities have become so numerous and complex there

30

Porter, pp.*. ..cit*« 9* h-31*-.

McOregor Dawson, the Government of Canada*
University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 19bV, p, 3 *
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- s 2? * is some concern that this is becoming more and more
difficult to achieve*.-'

The chief means by which the

preferences and ideas of the people are transmitted to
the .government have been the political parties, but some
observers now feel that they are becoming less effective*

33

Political parties most obviously seek to gain the
approval of the public by contesting elections every few
years and. presenting a programme, which includes foreign
policy proposalsf for the electorates approval*

But the

interaction between the government, politicians and the
public is not confined to elections*

The government is

^SToha Porter echoed the findings of the elite
theorists of other countries when ho e>:.r.aines the ’power
structure1 of Canada in his book the Vertical Mosaic*
Porter states. “Canada is probably not unllite other
western industrial nations in relying heavily on its
elite groups to m k e major decisions and to determine the
shape and direction of its development* The nineteenth
century notion of a liberal citizen participating democracy
is obviously not a satisfactory model by which to examine
the process of decision making in either the economic or
political contexts* p* 558*
«T* E* llodgetts has said, "there are numerous
indications that parties are losing their power to
mobilize majorities drawn from all sections, thereby
diminishing the integrating and articulating functions
required of them by our political system.”
"Regional Interests and Policy,” gmffigfl
SCQflMllS^^^
Vol. m i x , Ho* 1,
February, T9oo, p. 6,
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seeking to find out the mood of the electorate and to
shape opinion in favour of its proposals continuously,
with a view to gaining a strategic position for the next
election*

Various groups with special interests, and

individuals with specialised knowledge, are also con
tinuously presenting their views to the public and to
the government, attempting to influence them in favor
of their policies#
¥© roast be careful not to let the collectivity
termed 1public opinion* mesmerize us into accepting the
existence of a monolithic creature that speaks with one
voice - the strivings of the demos#

The consensus among

the people of Canada at large is extremely broad and
basic#

Gabriel Almond comments,
There are inherent limitations in modern
society on the capacity of the public to
understand the Issues and grasp the signi
ficance of the most important problems of
public policy# This is particularly the
case with foreign policy where the issues
are especially complex and remote* The
function of the public in a democratic
policy-making process is to set certain
policy criteria in the form of widely held
values and expectations• It evaluates the
results of policies from the point of view
of their conformity to these basic values
and expectations.3^

^Gabriel Almond. The American Peoule and Forelan
Policy. Praeger, Hew gor&.'Tfeff;"ppj"g:'g . -----------
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- : 29 i Very little empirical research has been conducted
into the nature of Canadian opinion,

Gallup Polls have

investigated the broad cleavages on very basic issues for
a number of years, and political parties have turned to
opinion surveys as an aid In electioneering.

Almost no

probing in depth has been attempted, as in the United
States*

The nature of Canadian opinion regarding world

affairs is not likely to differ substantially from that
in the United States, when we consider that the pattern
of the mass media, educational standards and the continental
span of the country are not significantly different.

It

may therefor© be appropriate to quote from some findings
for the United States,
Martin Irelsburg, in an investigation of U,S,
opinion at the time of the Marshall Plan found that
approximately 30$ of the population were unaware of
any event in foreign policy; h$% were aware but
uninformed and 25$ were aware and sufficiently informed
to give a reasonably accurate statement of the purpose
35
of the Marshall Plan,
On the controversial proposal
to limit the treaty-making power - the fBrisker Amendment1,
a survey revealed that 81$ of a random survey had not

^Martin Kreisburs, "Dark Areas of Ignorance",
m -Public Opinion
ed. Lester Markel,
Harper, New York, 1949, p. 51*
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heard or read about it, 9Jf were in favour, 7% opposed
%£>
and 3$ had no ©pinion#
Based upon these and other surveys commentators
have differentiated between a minute attentive or informed
public and a mass public who have neither the inclination
nor the opportunity to participate in the opinion-making
process*

Rosenau distinguishes between the mass public

(75-90$), the attentive....public, (about 10-25$) and the
oBinioa-imkers (less than 1$)*

These figures are at the

most crude guesses for they vary from issue to issue and
time to tim©#3^
Only the most acute crises manage to penetrate the
vision of the mass public and even when something does
grasp its attention it "does not listen to the content of
the discussion but to its tone,"33

The mass public is

capable of being aroused and creating a great ferment
throughout the whole policy-making structure, but because
it is ill-interned it is likely to be unstable, emotional
and irrational*

36V #o. Key, Jr.,...................... .
Groups. Crowell,.lew York, 1952, p# dh-#
37
James I* Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy.
Random House, lew York, 1961, pp. 27-^2.
38 '
Gabriel Almond, "Public Opinion and Rational
Security Policy",
Vol. 20,
Summer 1956#
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As a passive m s e, ... the mass public lies
virtually outside the oplaion-policy relationship.
Its only taction is that of setting, through
the potentiality of its more active raoo&s, the
outer limits within which decision-makers and
opinion-»nakers feel constrained to operate and
interact#39
The important segment of public opinion so far
as the decision-maker .and opinlon-nakcr is concerned is
the attentive public*

Hot only does this public con

stitute one of the key links in the vertical channels of
communication between elites and mass publics, but,
more important, the attentive public serves as a critical
audience for opinlon-makers as they discuss and debate
L.n

foreign-policy issues#
Opinion makers may be divided into two large groups first those who by virtue of their leadership roles in
business, in special interest .groups, associations, in
government, have privileged access to the media or
directly to certain groups; and second those whose pro
fession it is to influence the public or segments of
it such as professional educators, journalists, editors and
writers* The former will be dealt with later as articulate

Rosenau, o ^ c l t . , p* 36.
ho
Ilihu .Katz, "The Two-step Flow of Communication:
An rTp-to-date Report on m Hypothesis", Public Opinion
Quarterly. Vol. 21, Spring, 1957, PP. 61-/3.
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private citizens and interest groups and the latter as
media of mass communication.
Any attempt at fitting Canada into the above
scheme is hardly more than calculated guess-work, but at
least we might point the m y to further study#

Canada’s

experience with an independent foreign policy is not yet
50 years old .and for at least half of that period the
hi
Canadian attitude was that of a suspicious recluse*
There is therefore no well established tradition of public
interest, discussion and curiosity about world affairs#
This is reflected in the paucity of special interest
groups involved in International affairs, a paucity of
books and magazine articles on Canadian involvement in
.international affairs, and only the recent beginnings of
serious study of international relations in the universities*
It would seem that Canada would be weak in that
middle layer of an attentive public who read extensively
ifl
John Holmes gave this description of Canada’s pre1939 outlook as it affected Canada’s stance towards the
rest of the world;
Until the Second World War, Canada’s external relations
were tentative and circumscribed, limited in later
years not so much by colonial status as by a lingering
colonial mentality - a mentality even more character
istic of liberal nationalists like Mackenzie King
than of the traditionally imperialist Conservative
Party* King *•* cherished the view that Canada was
a remote and uniquely peace-loving area, too much
burdened with domestic problems to be drawn into
the struggles of an obstreperous world.”
John Holmes, „m* oft*, p . 137#
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in magazines and books on foreign affairs, may have had
some formal education,in the field and belong to voluntary
associations whose sole or partial aim is the promotion of
some point of view la international affairs#
group will be mentioned later#}

(The leading

Without an active and

extensive middle group the mass public lacks guidance and
the decision-makers lack forthright and informed criticism#
The limitations of Canada*s power also lead to
a restricting of the field of interest*

Canada cannot

.have much infXuene© on events in far corners of the world
and although their outcome in the long-run may have serious
repercussions for the western democracies few Canadians

are likely to understand or appreciate this*

The average

citizen’s horizons are limited by his vital interests and
so. the iferitime fisherman is unlikely to show much concern
over the problems of the Saskatchewan wheat farmer#

Thus

the Rhodesian crisis, the future of the ’Warsaw Pact” and
the health of Ifeo-Tse-Tung are not likely to arouse much
coneern amongst the mass public of. Canada*
Canadian opinion is likely to be quite concerned
where its vital Interests or its emotional attachments are
involved*

The most sensitive issues are quite likely

those of an economic’nature and these usually involve
relationships with the United States*

These issues are

also closely tied in with domestic politics and quite
significantly impinge upon the interests of an entrenched
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Some of the issues recently arousing much attention

are - the Columbia River Treaty, United States investment
in Canada, water problem and policies, and wheat sales#
Hot all issues which excite the public are economic#
Emotional attachments often based on long-established
traditions, can have even more widespread effects#

Ho

issue has probably aroused all segments of the Canadian
public more, since the war, than the Anglo-French inter
vention in the Sues land area# This brought out latent
anti-Soviet, anti-American, pro-British and pro-French
feelings #
It is not all of the public which gets aroused
when such issues develop#

Toting studies reveal there are
lj-2
some to whom no Issue has a significance#
The rest may

h2
The' classic voting studies which explore basic
voting attitudes are t :
A, Campbell et al., TftgJfaBEfe8tiLJtetefc» John Wiley
and Sons, Inc#, Hew York, i960.
E# Burdick and A# J* Brodbeck, American Voting
Behaviour, The Free Press, Hew- f o r H T I ^ W
I; l# Berelsori, P.F. Lazarsfeld and W. N, MePhee,
Votings A Study of Opinion F o r m ti an in an
university of
ChicagQ Press,7 Chicago, 195^-*
In Canada.voting studies are in their Infancy#
Two pioneers .are John Meisel a n d Peter Eegenstrief,
John Hals el |
flfi.. 1 2 2 2 >
University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1962#
—

„

*

University or Toronto Press, Toronto, 196*+#
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fee grouped Into what Rosenau calls 'Attentive groups*.
They consist of people who are aroused on certain issues
and who become structured and articulate when these issues
develop*

fhey could be unorganized segments or members

of existing groups*

fhus East Europeans may hastily

gather to demonstrate against visiting Russian dignitaries
or an existing labour group may urge the revision of an
auto-parts agreement with the 11*8* government*
We have already mentioned the opinion-making public
which constitutes the important layer as far as policy
formulation is concerned*

fhey comprise

those Individuals and groups who are the nation*s
opinion leaders because they strongly influence,
as well as a M e u ^ e and represent, the opinions
of the mass public and because they have various
types of access tp the policy-making process and
to policy-makers **6
All the above functions may be carried on by on©
person or group or they may carry on only one or two*
It is quite apparent that those whose profession is
thediscussion of foreign

affairs in the mass media are

able to influence the m s s public, the attentive public
and even the decision makers *

It may be less obvious

that considerable Influence m y be exerted by leaders of

^Richard C. Snyder and Edgar S. Fruiss, Jr.,
Rinehart and Co., lew fork,
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organized groups or fey articulate private citizens who
develop a following for their views because of their
prestige*
The elite leaders of an interest group can exert
considerable influence within the restricted sphere of the
group*s main interests#

They have privileged access to

the attention of the group and because of the authority
which their position gives them they are likely to be
Influential, at least within their own .group, but possibly
beyond it#

Thus labour, agricultural, professional and

business leaders can exert influences over wide areas.
Their influence is likely to fee greatest where they speak
upon a policy matter which is obviously closely related
to the activities of the group they speak for and much
less where they speak cm a more remote topic*
¥© may roughly separate groups into those who
stand for some special interest, such as labour, agri
culture, business, mining etc. and those who are interested
in the pursuit of some altruistic aim such as world
government, nuclear disarmament etc.

The latter we

may designate as civic Interest groups and tho former
as special interest groups#
A group*s influence is related to the amount of
political pressure it can bring to bear on the authoritative
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centre of decision making,

s*

A group will be more

influential if it is cohesive, large, or has a high
status in society.

Labour groups may exert considerable

influence in those natters in which the members feel
important considerations of their own well-being are
at stake, such as an international agreement which may
expand or restrict their own future opportunities.

Labour

groups can exert considerable electoral power if they
can be harnessed*

On general matters outside of their

immediate attention the hold on the rank and file is
negligible*

The inability of the leadership to swing p

the bulk of their membership behind the Hew Democratic
Party would seem to offer proof of this*
The same generalization may be made about other
groups*

Business groups stand in special relationship to

the government although it might not be true to claim
that they enjoy exclusive and special privileges.

The

status of business is high in our society, many important
members of the business community occupy high political
posts and they enjoy a close liaison with the political
elites.

They feel they have a special interest in

perpetuating Liberal and Conservative governments, as
evidenced by their generous financial support of those
two parties.

There is no doubt that on matters regarded
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as of vital importance to their Interests in relation
to foreign policyf they are able to eomrauntcate directly
with the highest levels of the government and at least
receive a reasonable hearing*

It would be a mistake,

however, to regard business as a monolithic group, there
are divisions within its ranks 5 secondary versus primary
industry, old versus new, Canadian owned versus foreign
owned etc*
The civic interest groups are much weaker; they
do not enioy as high a prestige, they are not as cohesive,
their membership is small and above all their aims are
far-reaching and diffuse.

These groups are not particularly

numerous in Canada and they do not exercise ouch influence
over the mass public, which is largely ignorant of their
existence#

The three main groups are the World Federalists,

the United nations Association and the Canadian Institute
of International Affairs#

There is also the small, vocal

collection of associations originally associated with
nuclear disarmament, who have now turned their attention
i+i*
to the Viet-Nam War#
The C.I,I,A# may be classified as an interest
group in only the most general terms whose announced aim
kk

The two most notable and well organised groups
with something approaching a continuous existence are
the Student Union for Peace Action and the Voice of Women,
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- .* 39 : is to help ’create an informed public opinion about
contemporary inter,national political and economic affairs
and Canadian external relations in particular,’ As an
association it does not express an opinion but only
promotes discussion through its research, publications,
conferences and branch meetings*

Xt has not at the

present time offered a sufficient counterweight to the
Department of External Affairs In that .many of its
speakers, permanent officials and closest supporters have
strong links with the Department,

In time it might

become a strong forum for independently critical views
on foreign policy.

At the present time it is doubtful

whether this is so.
Insofar as groups do attempt directly to influence
policy their main efforts are directed at the Cabinet or
the Minister of the Department concerned,

On some issue

of immediate and urgent concern it is realised that it is
not the most profitable course to address the mass public
or to attempt to influence legislators*

Where most

governments in. Canadian history have enjoyed clear majorities
mnd have had the support of disciplined parties, it has been
quite futile to try a flanking attack on the government
through its support.

In the long run of course campaigns

of general education m y have some impact., when they can
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percolate into party programmes through a general climate
of opinion and through the interests of party members*
The raass-iae&la of comiaunication, including the

press, radio and television may be regarded as a channel
of eomnanication for individuals and groups, but it is

also of itself an .initiator of opinions about international
affairs*

Its editors, correspondents and commentators

hold a privileged position in influencing mass and
attentive publics and offering the only really sustained,
lj-5
authoritative criticism of the government’s foreign policy.
Of the mass-media the press is regarded as being

the most vital force politically*

In a country such as

Canada it suffers from some disadvantages in its development
of a strictly Canadian view of international ©vents*

All

Canadian papers are local In scope and none possess a
national circulation*

This means that all are to some

extent biased towards local news and give a local slant
on all other news*

There Is no paper with the authoritative

national viewpoint of the London Times or Le Monde of Paris,
Also very few news pa .pers can afford, or can obtain, high
calibre Journalists to interpret International events, or
l+£%
'The Department of External Affairs is careful to
follow a cross-section of opinion on external policy by
maintaining an extensive file of clippings from a wide
sampling of the country’s press*
^ J o h a A, Irving ed* Mass Media in Canada, Eyerson
Press, Toronto, 1965, pp. 13-23*
""
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- I ^X i maintain an extensive network of

correspondents in the

key centres of the world - as does the Hew fork Titaes.
Of necessity such of the international news that
the Canadian newspaper carries is derived from foreign
owned wire-services - ta&ialy Reuters of Britain or the
Associated Press of the United States*.

Interpretive

articles are purchased from leading overseas newspapers
and magazines such as'the lew Yaaric Times . Washington Post.
London Observer,, guardian and the Economist.. Syndicated
columnists are also non-Canadian such as Walter Llppraan,

Janes Boston, and Joseph Alsop*

Qualitatively this

material may be excellent but it was not written for

Canadian consumption or from a Canadian viewpoint,

This

can only serve to further conceal from the general public
Just what Canada’s concern might be over key problems

in the world*
The magazines are in an even weaker position,
The overwhelming competition of American mgazines has
had the most deleterious effect on Canadian magazine
circulation*

Of the top

96 magazines with a Canadian

circulation of over 10,000, 92 are American and only *t
are Canadian,^

Only three Canadian magazines have serious

**7 Ibid., p. 225.
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articles on foreign policy and circulate among the attentive
public - Saturday Night. Canadian Forum and the Commentator
and all are in a financially precarious position,

Thus

we see that even if there are Canadian foreign policy
critics, the vehicles for their criticism are quite limited.
The C,B,C, has been a chosen vehicle for the trans
mission of Canadian viewpoints and a rallying ground to
resist American cultural penetration.

Qualitatively its

news features and news coverage of world events have been
excellent but it is listened to by only a small fraction
of the Canadian population.

The greater part of the public

listen to Private Commercial Hadio which is hardly
distinguishable in content or quality from its American
cousin, and gives only the snippets of news,

A similar

situation exists in Television where competition from
three American channels is able to detach a large segment
of the Canadian audience from any news features carried
kg
by the C,B,C,
Canadian *dualism* poses an additional problem.
The French are able to isolate themselves from direct
contact with U.S, news, although translation of some

^Irving, o p , clt.. "Radio”, pp. 87-118, and
"Television**, pp.rl l 9 ~ W *
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it does mean though

that there is an additional harrier to national media
circulation, and generally English and French Canada have
their own distinct media with separate personnel - even
in large agglomerations where tooth English and French
Canadians are numerous, such as Hull-Gttawa and Montreal.
With the weakness of the media and the paucity of
civic-interest groups on© may begin to despair of ever
attaining an informed and critical public which can
enlighten and lead the masses beyond.

We must be careful,

however, that we do not misrepresent the process.

It is

important to point out the process whereby the public
informs itself and the sectors which may yield the
highest returns in an expanded educational effort,
Gabriel Almond makes the very pertinent point that
the problem is to introduce information and
critical intelligence into the stream of com
munication at key points in the political
process and in channels which conform to the
*social terrain*, at points where trust and
intimacy open the minds of men to new thoughts
and recognitions.^
The point is as far as Canada is concerned that
great gains can be made by improving what Karl Deutsch calls
the decisive 'middle-level','*0

These are the people who are

^Gabriel Almond, The American People and Forel&n
Policy. Frederick A, Praeger, New York, 1950, p. 7.
^°Karl Deutsch,

op.

clt.. p, 15*+.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

• I Ifh I interest group leaders, teashers, professional communicators,
and middle level executives whose opinions are listened
to not only In their professional capacities fcut as opinion
group leaders*

As coaaainications researchers have long

discovered the really vital contacts as far as influencing
deep-seated beliefs is concerned, are those in face to
face groups*

fh© opinion-group leader with his broader

knowledge and insight is able to sift and evaluate the
information for the primary face-to-face group, which he
hi-33elf has gained from the secondary sources, newspapers,
books etc*

fh© general public is not influenced by a

message merely because they have the opportunity to be
exposed to it#

They screen out messages which do not

confirm their basic attitudes and are usually only changed
by pressures from their peer-group, which in turn is
willing to accept cues from those individuals they
51
respect and wish to emulate#
Me can see then.that various forms of education in
international relations m y play a key role in developing
more participation by the public in the foreign policy
process*

Specialized departments of International Relations

are being developed in many universities and this trend can

, g & lIws
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- : *+5 : be expected to grow rapidly,

This in torn will produce

teachers, business leaders, journalists, civil servants
etc, with a more sophisticated knowledge of International
affairs.

Their interest and concern can contribute to

an expansion of the influence and an improvement in the
quality of these newspapers, journals and groups that are
promoting a Canadian viewpoint on international affairs.
We said at the beginning of this Section that
Canada has a democratic government which owes much to
British precedents and tradition, not the least of which
is a strong central executive.

In British constitutional

development the extensive prerogatives of the Crown to
initiate actions and laws on behalf of the country were
gradually whittled down by an encroaching power of the
Commons, representing the rising power of the middle classes
and later the enfranchised working classes.

The one

group of prerogatives which did not formally become the
responsibility of Parliament was that of declaring war,
malting treaties, appointing ambassadors - unlike powers
granted to the legislative branch in the United States,
When this is added t© the power of the executive to
initiate spending and practically all legislation it
really leaves parliament no position in the initiation of
policy*
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Clearly in oar present system of government the
centre of foreign policy making lies in the executive branch
in which we may include the Prime-Mlnister, the Cabinet,
the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Civil
Service#

It is not possible however to point to any one

part of the executive and state with absolute surety that
here lies the heart of the policy-making process*

The

centre of gravity has changed with personalities and
administration*
In the time of Haokensle King, particularly up to
19*4-5, the chief responsibility lay with him and his chief
advisors - first 0# D* Skelton and after his death Norman
Robertson#

King raised foreign policy matters in Cabinet

not so much to obtain their consensus on these natters but
to bring them around to his way of thinking.

Eayrs records

that during the last war pressure of business forced King
to devolve responsibilities on to his ministers and after
the war the Department of External Affairs had its own
minister - St, Laurent being the first#
When St* Laurent became Prime Minister he placed
a man of great experience as a senior official In the
Department as Secretary of,State - Lester Pearson,^3

James Eayrs, The Art of the Possible, pp. 8-12.
53 Ibid*
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» t k? t For the first tine the Secretary of State became the most
Influential person in shaping foreign policy.

Under the

Conservative administration from 1957-62} the Prime
Minister interested himself a great deal in External
Affairs and the two ministers Sydney Smith and Howard
Green never dominated the department as did Pearson,
Since the Liberals returned to power another Secretary
with long experience - Paul Martin, has become quite
strong in this field, although he is now faced with a
vastly expanded department and an experienced Prime
Minister in this field, both of which would tend to cut
down his influence*
Th© Cabinet mast perforce be of vital importance
for practically all aspects of foreign policy have domestic
repercussions and vice versa*

It is necessary that the

foreign policy aspects of other departments * activities
be cleared with External Affairs.

If they are saatters of

detail they can be handled at the interdepartmental
committee level among senior officials#

If they raise

important departures of policy or are questions with
political overtones the Cabinet will want to discuss them.
Some departments are obviously closely connected
with External Affairs such as Trade and Commerce, Citizenship
and Immigration and Defence,

Finance is interested in all
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departments and the Treasury Board can greatly affect
foreign policy matters through its decisions to approve or
disapprove departmental estimates*
Instead of having the whole Cabinet meet to discuss
these matters sub-committees can discuss them and some
committees such as Defence have a permanent basis*
It ,1s important to remember that Cabinets are not
merely composed of heads of government departments *

The

members are also party chieftains and representatives of
separate regions of the country*

It is important to bring

key foreign policy issues in front of the whole Cabinet to
ascertain what the feeling of the party and different regions
of the country will be*

By custom the Cabinet has a col

lective responsibility for government policy and they Mist
all stand behind it and publicly support it*

They are

pledged to secrecy and cannot divulge any disagreement
and should a minister feel a strong disagreement about
a certain policy his only recourse is to resign,

The above

necessity places great emphasis on the need to gain a
Cabinet consensus on most major policies,

A Prime Minister

who cannot do so r-;ns the risk, as John Diefenbaker did, of

having a rift in his government and allowing the opposition
to exploit his obvious weakness.

The Prime Minister as chief party strategist, overall
policy coordinator and leading public figure has a particular
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duty to balance the requirements of party popularity,
public mood., party cohesion, and efficient administration
against the demands of foreign policy.

He alone, from his

high pinnacle, is able to surrey the whole scene of govern**
meat and reconcile the many conflicting claims and adjudicate
them according to some over-riding purpose which, be sees in
his mind's eye*

Foreign policy should not be allowed to

be a disparate entity charting a course of its own, remote
fro® the needs of the main corpus of government policy*

Saving explored B o m of the principal forces which
com© Into play in the shaping of foreign policy we are now
in a position to make a more realistic assessment of the
prospective role which the legislative branch of government
could or should play in Canada*
Under the parliamentary system the legislature is
pre-eminently the popular arm, particularly the Lower
House - the House of Commons*

It is the elected branch

and holds its mandate directly from the people, each elected
member being directly linked with a constituency with its
own distinct group of people and interests.

These members

are not purely constituency representatives for by reason
of their professions and interests they also tend to
represent the views of groups • the lawyers, the doctors,
the farmers, labour, large-scale industry, banking, small
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business etc.

This latter type of representation is

purely by eii&nce and informal, though nevertheless real

and effective as any perusal of M*P. *s speeches and caucus
discussions would show.

Members also represent

certain

broad sections of the country apart from the special
interests of their m m particular constituency*

Irres

pective of party the demands of a particular region, are
likely to impose a certain regularity of outlook upon the
members from a certain region*

Quebec Is probably the

most pronounced case as is illustrated by the problems
which Quebec Conservatives faced in the case of the ‘flag

debate1, when they probably had more to common with the
Quebec Liberals than their Conservative colleagues*
Lastly M,P.‘s are also representatives of their party
and it is this which produces the greatest uniformity of

outlook and the tendency for members to adhere to a cohesive
and unified policy.

While Canadian parties are not clearly

split on ideological grounds, the basis of their support,
their regional strength and their traditions do lead to
important differences of emphasis*

To sum up then, the

Hons© of Commons is probably the single most important
mirror of the varied opinions and interests of Canadian

society and if it can efficiently articulate and
aggregate them it should be a most useful agent in keeping

a government responsible and efficient*

During the course
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- * 51 * of the thesis it is intended to investigate whether the
'loose of Commons is adequately fulfilling the role set out
for it*
While the claim might be made that the House of
Commons can serve the role of interpreting the intra-societal
environment to the government it is obviously much less suited
to exploring and interpreting the extra-societal environment.
Just why is a point for later examination.

It is apparent,

however, that professionals in the Department of External
55
Affairs are reasonably well-equipped.
They have usually
received extensive training in the social sciences, nowadays
usually to the M.A. level.

They spend extensive periods

living in the countries whose policies they have to interpret,
usually

getting to know the language, aspirations and

culture of the people concerned.

The Department is usually

in possession of extensive Information and intelligence
concerning crisis events together with extensive background
files, which if not entirely secret are not available to
even the most informed citizens outside.
Much of what the Department does and much of what
it knows about world events cannot be disclosed even to
members of Parliament,

The information is privileged

because it is not the Department*s to give, this

^Source :an interview with a former member of
Treasury Board who worked in this sphere*
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- I 52 8 Information is entrusted to it by its allies and friends
far its own policy guidance 5 but if this Information
was readily available to the potential enemy its whole
value would be lost*

Mackenzie King was wont to plead

the necessity not to upset delicate negotiations or
inflame already sensitive situations, when he denied
Parliament>s requests for details about ©vents in Europe
and the Far East in the years before World War II*
Such varied observers as Walter Lippman, George
Kennan and lord Strang have pleaded for less not more
democracy, keeping in mind particularly the public clamor
for peace at all costs in the pre-1939 period*

They

would affirm the statement made by De Tocquevill©
regarding democracy
a democracy is unable to regulate the details
of an important undertaking, to persevere in
design, and to work out and execute in the
presence of serious obstacles* It cannot
combine its measures with secrecy, and it will
not await their consequences with patience*?/
If we contrast the conduct of foreign policy in the Soviet
Union and the United States since the end of World War II,
the difficulties which a democracy sometimes faces might
become clear in the pattern De Tocquevill© observed so
long ago*

^Bayrs,

♦ P* H O *

^Alexis de Tocquevill©, Democracy in America*
Vol. I, pp. 236-7*
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The problem In a democracy is to strike a
balance between the need to gain popular assent for
the country1s foreign policies and the need to give
the expert officials sufficient latitude to conduct
their tasks expeditiously and efficiently while
retaining the confidence of foreign governments# The
thesis can only partially explore this problem, because
the workings of the Department of External Affairs and its
relationship with the Cabinet are outside its scop®.
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CHAPTER II

THE FORMAL MACHINERY

There are few statutory provisions dealing with
the negotiation and conclusion of treaties in Canada*
The practises followed are for the most part unwritten
custom.

The negotiation and conclusion of treaties is

formally a Royal Prerogative, nowadays carried out by the
Governor-General in Council on the advice of the Secretary
of State for External Affairs,
The present extent of the prerogative is well
described as
a right that remains in the Sovereign as one
of that bundle of discretionary common law rights
which were, at and by common law, exercisable
by the Sovereign in person, or through him by his
representative, and though that Prerogative may
now be exercisable In his name by his constit
utional advisers, and so only1
Parliament has never legislated to take away any of this
prerogative from the Crown and it is left untouched in
the hands of the executive*

^■James Mbleod Hendry, Treaties and Federal
Institutions. Public Affairs Press, Wash tngion,D*C ,,
-

i ^

i •
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The Department of External Affairs Act of 1927
(R.S.C. 192? c.65) states that the responsibility for the
negotiation and conclusion of treaties and other international
agreements is the responsibility of the Secretary of State
for External Affairs*,

A statement by the Canadian govern

ment to the United Nations Organisation gives as its
definite opinion that treaty staking is an executive act,
there is "no compulsion to refer to Parliament for approval
or ratification*

International obligations are entered

2
into in many instances without reference to Parliament,"
The above conception of executive power fits in
with the ♦dualistfc* doctrine of the relationship between
treaties and domestic law.

The ♦monistic1 doctrine, in

vogue in the rj,S,A« and many other states, gives treaties,
validly concluded, the force of municipal law.

According

to the dualistic view treaties do not become the law of

3

the land *unless by express Act of the legislative body."
Under the ♦monistic* doctrine it is implied that

treaties, ranking with general legislation, will come under

^United Nations Legislative Series ST/LEG/SER B/3,
Laws and Practises Concerning the Conclusion of Treaties,
New York 1953» P. 2b.

Boo.o..3SJ!f(UhTx%Xr. SS&24****•«••
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legislative scrutiny and in the United States a two thirds
majority of the Senate is necessary for ratification*

In

Switzerland a treaty requires the approval of the Federal
Parliament and a national referendum if its duration is
over fifteen years*
Treaties will he laid before the Canadian Parliament,
or acts based on the treaties may be introduced if the
performance of the treaty requires certain domestic changes
or obligations*

One legal expert lists the following

cases when legislation is required.
1) When treaties affect private rights or require
taxation,
2) When they involve changes in the law of the land*
3) When they involve actions - not within the
ordinary scope, of the discretionary power of
the executive.**
However as another legal authority responsible for
treaties within the Department of External Affairs has
shown this still leaves a great deal of scope for the
executive.
Hombreaux sont les accords internationaux conclus
au nom du Canada qui n*affeetent en rien le droit
statutaire ni celui des individus, Ainsi il est
reconnu qu*en vertu de la prerogative royale,
qui fait parti® du "common law", les traites
concernant des matleres adrainis tra tives ou
politiques, comm® par exeipl© les compromis
diarbitrage, les accords de visas ou de reparations
de guerre, les conventions d*armistice, certains
traites d ’aaiti®, d*alliance, de paix, d ’aide
hR. 1. Ifetas, "Treaty Making in Canada," Canadian
vol. 25, p . **62.
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. , 57 , financier®) de cooperation econocaique, militair©
ou scientiflgue, 1 ‘adhesion du Canada a des
organizations intergovernmental©® produi sent
hftbltoeileoMmt leur pie in effet des leur entree
envigeur, ala suite de leur approbation definitive
par 1© pouvoir executlf central* 5
The previously mentioned statement of the Department
of External Affairs to the United Nations on Canadian Treaty
Practice stated that the procedures for dealing with
treaties were largely customary,

W© have looked at the

formal powers of Parliament from the rather Indefinite
legal stipulations.

In order to get a clearer idea of

the real powers of Parliament and the extent of its actual
participation it is important to examine the evolution of
its dealings with treaties*
While the government is under no constitutional
obligation to submit treaties to Parliament, particularly
prior to ratification, there has been a steady growth of
Parliament’s assertion that all significant treaties
embodying far-reaching commitments should be laid before
Parliament for its consideration*
Mackenzie King, partly because of his reliance
on the Progressives for support of his government, professed
to desire full consultation with Parliament before making
any long-range commitments for Canada in the international

%©an-Yves Qrenon, MDela Conclusion des Traites
@t de leur Mis© en Oeure au Canada,” C m d l m , MSSfcBM*
Vol. rn9 No, 2, m y 1962, p, 151,
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sphere*

H a g maintained this position at th© Imperial

Conference of 1923

6

and introduced a resolution to this

effect on June 21, 1926, approving the recommendations of
the Imperial Conference and stating that in future th©
Government would "submit for parliamentary approval,
prior, and as a condition of, ratification by th©
Executive, important treaties such as Involve military
7
and economic sanctions•“
King himself did a great deal to conceal from
legislative scrutiny many commitments in the 1930*s.
In 1936 ICing was challenged on the floor of th© Commons
for having participated in imposing sanctions against
Italy by order in council, without r©feral to Parliament,
This was contrary to th© spirit of the 1926 resolution.
King defended himself by saying that the action was taken
under a commitment already made before the 1926 resolution
a'8
was passed,

A similar attack has been mad© by Wallace
Nesbitt of the Conservative Party,

He claimed that

sanctions have been made against Rhodesia without specific

7JS” S

P * 105,

Ibid,, p, 106,
3
Canada, House of Commons Debates. June 22, 1936,

pp.moo-^ioi.
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Paul Martin showed greater

sensitivity than did H a g by stating that there had been
need for quiek action and that ©lection w i t s having been
issued, Parliament was not in session.

He agreed that it

would have been preferable to have called Parliament and
9
obtained its approval.
An examination of the practice since World War II
confirms that successive governments have tended to follow
the procedure advocated in 1926-.

The United Nations Charter

was extensively discussed and debated, both in Committee
and in the louse of Commons, but not prior to ratification.10
9
Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on
External Affairs,„j t e j j a ,
No* 3*
May 5, 1966, pp. 121-122,
The conciliatory impression was gained from the
minister’s appearance in front of the committee. In the
House itself a sharp difference of opinion was manifested
between the Conservative and Liberal viewpoint regarding
the legality of the measures taken by the government,
Wallace Nesbitt - the chief opposition spokesman said ’the
measures taken against Rhodesia clearly do not come within
the terms of this statute (Sections 5 and 6 of the Import
and Export Permits A c t ) R a t h e r than take action by order
in council under the act Me, Nesbitt maintained the govern
ment should have called parliament into special session
on December 15 and 16, 1965*
Paul tfertin - the minister, defended his action as
being pursuant to a resolution of the Security Council and
being ’an intergovernmental arran gement’within the terras of
the act.
This whole episode would confirm that the power to
make far-reaching commitments in the international sphere
lies with the executive, but that parliament is sensitive
about being overlooked prior to the action and is asserting
ever-taore vigorously its right to be consulted and to give
formal approval to long-term commitments.
^Canada, House of Commons Debates. October 16-19, 19*+5,
pp. 1185-133^ passim.
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The Treaties of Peace with th© East European countries and
Italy were approved by resolution, again after ratification*

11

Th® first major treaty to be extensively discussed and voted
on prior to ratification was the Morth Atlantic Treaty*
St* Laurent was then Prime Minister and Lester Pearson the
Secretary of State for External Affairs*
In February of 19^9 Bfe* Pearson outlined to Parliament12
the procedure that would be followed for the drafting and
approval of the treaty*

He emphasised th© importance of

developing public interest and comment on the treaty and
that it would be submitted to the legislatures of all member
countries for approval or rejection.

On Mhreh 18, 19^9

the Prime Minister tabled the Draft Treaty in the House of
Commons and had it printed as an appendix to Hansard,1^
He "hoped that the.situation in Parliament will permit a
brief discussion of this resolution before the date fixed
for this meeting in Washington, so that the sense of the
House may be obtained,*’ This was a resolution endorsing
Canadafs approval of the draft treaty.

Both the leader of

the Progressive Conservatives, Mr, Drew, and the leader
of the Social Credit Party, It** Low, approved of this step
and mentioned that this was the first time that this had been

u IbiA.. June 30, 19**7, pp#-**819-»*836.
^ I b i d , . February

19^9, P# 238,

11Ibid,. March 18, 19^9, P* 1605*
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done*

The Secretary of State, Mr. Pearson, went through

each article explaining its significance to the House.
In connection with Article 11 on ratification he assured
th® House that ratification would not foe deposited "until
Parliament has had the opportunity to consider .in detail
and at length the term® of th© treaty and give

its

approval ... so far a® Canada is concerned this government
regards those constitutional processes (involving rati
fication) as requiring both Parliamentary approval and
ik
government action#"
The most extensive consideration ever given to
any treaty in Parliament was that given to th© ‘Columbia
Biver Treaty1 in April and Kay l}6fo,

The reason for this

is probably that the matters contained in the treaty
impinged heavily on domestic interests and the topic had
been the subject of a long and often rancorous public
discussion for more than ten years previously.
also been a considerable difference

There had

of opinion about the

treaty between the Social Credit government of British
Columbia and th© Conservative government of Mr* Dlefenbaker.
The liberals on taking over from Mr. Diefenbaker in 1963
resolved to settle the problem quickly and after negotiating

llfIbld.. Mireh 23, 19*+9, p. 2099*
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- I 62 I a new draft with th© Americans the Liberal government had
Parliament submit the draft treaty to the Commit tee can
External Affairs*

The Committee held 50 meetings between

April 7 and Hay 21, 196N-*

The Committee called several

ministers and past ministers, government officials and
various experts including General MeHaughton - the former
Canadian representative of th© International Joint
Commission, who was bitterly opposed to th© draft treaty.
The main opposition to, and criticism of, the treaty came
from the N.D.P. which submitted many amendments in Committee,
all of which were defeated despite the fact that the
government did not enjoy a majority on the committeo.

The

treaty passed through the Committee and three readings of
the louse of Commons without any changes, other than those
of a minor technical nature.

Th© exhaustive hearings have

created a precedent for adequate discussion and ventilation
of matters concerning any treaty which proposes any major
changes affecting a substantial number of Canadians.
Another matter resembling that of treaty ratification
is that of a declaration of war, in that it is a major
foreign policy decision which makes heavy, long-term
commitments for the country.

Before the 1920*0 this

decision was not in Canada*s hands at all.

A declaration

of war by Britain committed the whole British Empire,
although ©any Canadian priae-ministe s had made it clear
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that it would be a decision of their government as to how
far they would be committed#

In the case of th© Boer

War and World War I Canada found itself at war auto
matically when Britain was at war, but it was only the
pressure of public opinion - as expressed by English speaking
Canadians - which pushed Canada into active participation#
A notable departure from this practice occurred
during the Chanalc Incident in 1922.

The British prime

minister, It?# Lloyd George, requested Canada to send troops
to hold back the Turkish advance into territory allocated
to Greece under the peace s©ttleisent#

King replied that

"public opinion” In Canada would demand authorisation on
the part of Parliament as a necessary preliminary to the
15
despatch of a contingent.
Mackenzie King followed this
up with a statement to Parliament on February 1, 1923,
which has now almost become enshrined as a cardinal
principle|

parts of the world, and it is neither right
nor proper for any individual nor for any groups
of individuals to take any step which in any
way might limit the rights of Parliament in
a matter which is of such great concern to
all the people of our country#!®

.McGregor Dawson, Milllam Lyon... Mackenzie .King.
18?^«.I9gjL University of Tor onto wess, 19J8, p. hll.
:
Canada, House.of Commons Debates. February 1, 1923,
P. 33.
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» i 6b- s During the 1930fs whenever Sing was asked about a
possible Canadian commitment to assist. Britain in the
contingency' of a general European war, he would reply
that Parliament "mast be free to decide its attitude in
the light of the circumstances as they m y exist at th©
17
time." '
When Britain declared war on Germany on September 2,
1939 Canada did go through the formal process of debating
its position and taking a vote in the House of Parliament.
Canada*s declaration followed as a result of Parliament’s
decision on September 10, 1939*

Kenneth McSfeught points

out that this was an empty sham in that the government
had already taken, during the previous week, most of the
measures which would give Canada belligerent status.^
This m y be the case but the formal calling of Parliament
was an important step in establishing a tradition that
important decisions of war and peace should be taken only
after a full expression of the views of the people.

In

the case of World War II there was an almost unanimous
consensus of the desirability of Canadian participation.
In the eventuality of a more contentious war, as for

17Ibid.. January 25, 1937, p. 2^3,
ia
K* W* MCKaught, "Canadian Foreign Policy and
the Whig Interpretation of History 1936-39," Report of the
Sjumfliaa Historical Association. 1959, pp . 51-53.
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example a decision to participate In the Viet Names© war,
who can say that Parliaments role would not bo decisive?
{fetters of war and peace arouse the conscience of even
the most torpid member and they threaten the constraints
of party discipline*
The controversy over the adoption of certain types
of nuclear weapons fey the Canadian anaed forces might serve
as an example to show how aroused the members and party
leaders can get over what many regarded as a matter of
conscience*

She motive of the liberal Party and its

leader Mr* Pearson in adopting a stand in favor of
accepting certain nuclear weapons in their 1963 election
campaign has never been clearly established*

It does not

seam clear, however, that it was solely based upon their
belief that Canada was- conscience bound to live up to
its 1957 commitments*^
T* C. Douglas, th© leader of the New Democratic
Party, in a very acrimonious debate on the Speech from
TQ
Mo authoritative study has yet been done on the
significance of th© nuclear arias dispute in helping to
topple th© minority Conservative government in 1963 • It
does s@e«a clear that the indecision of ffe* Dicfanbaicer,
the sharp differences of opinion between the American and
Canadian governments about th© nature of th® agreements
concerning nuclear weapons, and the Gallup Poll figures
concerning Canadian opinion on the issue, all played a part*
The Gallup Poll published in late December, 1962,
showed
favoured and 32$ were against th© acquisition
of th® nuclear arms* la attacking I** Diefenb&ker*s refusal
to acquire nuclear weapons and his inability to get along
with tfa0hlngton9 the Liberals seemed to be following sound
electoral strategy*
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- * 66 t the Throne, accused Prime Minister Pearson of over-riding
th® rights of Parlia saent in accepting such weapons
20
without a prior vote in Parliament, The Liberals,
Douglas continued had no mandate to take such a decision
in that they were a minority in the Commons and had
received only

of the popular vote,

H© then moved a

sub-amendment to the Conservative amendment regretting the
intention of acquiring nuclear arms,
MSp* Pears chi in his reply seemed quite sensitive
to this charge and defended hi!®elf on two accounts first that parliamentary approval had already been given
in 1957 when NATO had first adopted a nuclear role and
th© Prim© Minister at that time had reported it to the
House, second that this was an executive agreement between
two countries and "unless that agreement takes a formal
character in the shape of a treaty or an agreement which
has to be ratified and submitted to Parliament before
ratification *«• no formal Parliamentary approval is

21

necessary, **

Mr, Pearson pleaded that an adequate opportunity
had been afforded to discuss the question during tho

20

Canada, House of Commons Debates, May 21, 1963,
pp, 86-109,
21 Ibid., p, 109#
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defeat© on th© Address and th© sub-amendment moved by
T# C# Douglas#
The sub-amendment moved by the N«D#P# leader was
only narrowly defeated#

The government was saved fey

absence of some Conservatives and the support of two
Conservative members and four Social Credit members from
th© West#
The bitter struggle over this issue in two succes
sive parliaments, the defeat of on© government and the
near-defeat of another demonstrated that on this sensitive
issue there was & precarious balance of forces and that
th© Commons could and did exert real influence.
Me*. Pearson clearly had qualms about the governments
handling of defence policy and wished to take some actions
to at least partially restore the frayed unity on this
fairly fundamental matter of national security#

In the

1963 election campaign he had urged the setting up of a
defence committee with far-ranging powers and in June of
1963 he announced the setting up of th© committee to th©
House#

Its tasks and impact will be discussed later#
Th© participation of Canada in th© Korean War is

also exemplary of Parliament1® association with the
decision to commit Canadian forces#

In June, 1950 when

th© Korean conflict first developed and the tf.H# Security
Council condemned Horth Korean aggression and inaugurated
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a tJ.If. Fore® to counter this attack, there was a general
debate in the Commons#

All parties in th© House affirmed

their support of th© principle of U.N. intervention in
Korea#

At this time no commitment to send Canadian

forces was made#

Prim© Minister St, Laurent promised

that "if the situation in Korea or elsewhere, after
prorogation should deteriorate and action by Canada beyond
that which I have indicated should be considered, Parliament
will immediately be summoned to give the new situation
22
consideration#
On August ?, 1950 St. Laurent announced the
formation of a special volunteer force to go to Korea.
It was authorized by an order in council (PC 3360),
Parliament was not reconvened until August 29, 1950 to
deal with two emergencies * a railways strike and th©
Korean War#

M e*# Coldwell, the C,C.F. leader and Mr#

Brew, the Conservative leader, were critical of the
government for not reconvening Parliament sooner#

Mr,

Coldwell asserted Parliament would probably not have
met until th© end of September had it not been necessary
to rush through emergency legislation to deal with the
railway strike.

Certain legislation was needed for the

22Ibid.. June 30, 1950, p.

5 •.
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prosecution of the Korean Mar - A Defence Appropriations
Act to authorize the necessary funds for the forces,
the Canadian Forces Act to place the forces on active
service and the Essential Materials (Defence) Act for the
control and regulation of production, distribution and
use of essential materials and services#

These acts

gave large powers to the Governor-in-Council and really
derogated from Parliament’s power for the duration of
the war, though they were subject to full discussion and
debate prior to their passage*
The examples quoted would seem to show that although
Parliament is unable to initiate action in regard to
treaties and decisions on war and .peace it has steadily
asserted its claim to approve all such measures and govern
ments have on the whole given Parliament more opportunities
to discuss and approve measures taken*

Parliament’s need

to confirm the activation of Canadian forces was given
statutory recognition in an amendment to the
Defence Act in 1950 which stated that whenever the Governorin-Council places Canadian forces on active service,
Parliament shall meet within 10 days to give approval if
pk
it is not already in session*

^3Ibid.. August 31-September 5, 1950 (special
session) pp. 98*300 passim#
2b

oa^cij., p . i
o
6*

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Although in the strictly legal interpretation of
constitutional powers Parliament is not required to
ratify and approve treaties, it would seem that usage
has Implied Parliamentary discussion and formal approval
by resolution or enabling legislation of all significant
treaties and agreements.

Any government which attempted

to implement any long-range, extensive commitment without
prior submission to Parliament would Invoke a considerable
storm of criticism and disapproval*
Procedures of the House of Commons
An exa nination of the procedures of the House of
Commons as they affect the discussion of external affairs
is not a mere appraisal of technics, it is a means of
penetrating to the very core of the House*s concern with
foreign policy.

A study of the ©volution of procedures

in this regard clearly shows how the balance of the
House1® attention has swung from an almost resolute
indifference to an almost equally resolute conviction of
the significance of external affairs*

1?hls is not to say

that each and every member has such an interest, but
only that the adjustment of procedures has allowed a much
greater ventilation of the subject by that active minority
that is concerned.
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The procedural rules at any particular time in
Parliaments development represent a compromise between
the demands of the government for expeditious and efficient
dispatch of business, for guarding the confidences entrusted
to it by foreign powers and the needs of the opposition
to have access to information, to have time to scrutinize
government policies and to have opportunities to make of
parliament a forum for their views#
Quite clearly the growth of government business,
including matters of external1policy, has placed great
burdens on Parliament, with which the old procedures could
not cope#

There has been a striving for greater efficiency

to get through the greater amount of work and yet not
sacrifice the scrutiny which is the right of the popular
branch of government#

External affairs have been subject

to recognizable procedural patterns which crystallize a
convergence of the thrust of public interest, international
pressures and the demands of government business.
Fr©-1939
External affairs have always occupied a unique
position as far as the individual member is concerned in
that they belonged, for the most part, to an ethereal
level of attention remote from the practical, day to day
interests of his constituency#

In those days before 1939
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when Canada seemed remote and unaffected by the great
conflicts of distant areas the average member of Parliament
would gain few kudos with his party or his constituents
by using his opportunities for addressing the House to
deal with external affairs•
If we examine the occasions when members initiated
their m m topics before 1939 * the debate on the address,
motions to go into committees of supply or ways and means,
private members days and question period we find an almost
complete lack of reference to external matters•

On those

occasions when the government raised matters relating to
external affairs, chiefly in connection with the estimates
for labion&l Defence and External Affairs, the discussion
was desultory, brief and confined mainly to matters of
2'
administrative

detail rather than a discussion of policy*

fhe members of the Conservative and liberal parties exerted
no great pressure to have their leaders raise such matters

% e e James Eayrs, Art of the Possible,no. 108-110,
who called this period "a curious and unedifylng chapter
In the history of Canadian democracy’* when "twenty-seven
minutes were devoted to external affairs in the House of
Commons and over eight hours to a tariff on asparagus,"
%\ W, L, MacDermott summed up the mood as follows?
"Our Ministry of External Affairs on the whole, observes
Walpole*s motto, quiets non moveri,and* except when a few
restless spirits in opposition have forced a debate, our
Parliament has usually left external affairs severely alone,"
H* f°ward
et al, Oxford University Press, i’oronto, 19hl, p, 267.
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- « 73 * and it m s the policy of both Ifeckenzie King and Bennett26
not to raise matters of foreign policy in the House more
27
than they could help*
A strongly Innovative role in regard to the promotion
of discussion of foreign policy was played by the newly formed
C.C.F. party which elected s even members in the 1935
election,

this party had a strong

ideological orientation,

was very critical of the lack of any forthright declaration
of government policy and realised that the House of Commons
offered the best forum for communicating their views to the
public#

They were the first group who made a concerted

effort to raise matters of external policy in the House
against the positive disinterest of the government benches.
The C.C.F. party was first elected in 1935 and
mad® its first efforts to expand the discussion of foreign
policy in the 1936 session.

T. C, Douglas introduced a

motion on the league of Nations in private member*s time.
It was calculated to engender the most far-ranging discussion,

*uNot® the reaction of the two leaders to the
proposal of J. S. Woodsworth that a committee be set up
to deal with external relations p,9h-6 of this thesis.
2^Agnes McPhail, a highly energetic, articulate
member with broad interests commented rather forlornly
in 1937, "I have been in this house for 15 years and
Canada*s foreign policy for the most part has been too
Important or not important enough to be discussed.”
Canada, House of Cotaxaons Debates. January 25, 1937, p. 253*
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bat neither the prime-minister nor the two major parties
oft
would be drawn into' a discussion at that stage#
Sing left it to the end of the session to bring in
the estimates, when he knew that discussion would not b©
prolonged because the members were anxious to wind up the
session*© business.

He admitted that he had deliberately

suppressed discussion of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict
because it might tend to inflame a critical situation#29
Agnes McPhail expressed the C.C.P, *s disgust with
King's nanometres in stultifying the discussion.
It is impossible to go on at this times no one
feels like it and the cosmittee is not in the
mood for it. But at another session the
Importance of Canada*s external policy should
be recognized by allowing plenty of time for
discussion,30
In the following session of 193? the C.G*F. were
determined not to let King stifle discussion of foreign
policy as he had in the previous session.

They used all

the procedural devices they could for airing these matters#
They included the following:
1) An amendment moved by the C,€#F# on the Speech
from the throne# This produced a two-day debate,31

28Ibid,. .March 2. 1936, p# 667s
29Ibid.. lone 22, 1936, p. 3362,
3QIbld#. p, ^106#
^ Tbld.. January 25, 23, p, 237-330 passim#
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2) A private members resolution which resulted in
a farther day of d e b a t e . 32
3) An amendment on the motion to go into a
Committee of Supply* The four day debate which
followed was claimed by C.G. MaeNeil of the
C.C.F. to have been the largest continuous dis
cussion of external affairs in his fifteen
years in the Commons*33
By 1933 the worsening situation in Europe and the
Far East was causing an increasing groundswell of comment
and criticism in Canada,

It continued to be government

policy to make the least comment possible on events abroad.
The C.C.F. continued to be critical,^and on May 2k the
Prim© Minister made one of the most comprehensive surveys
of world affairs ever given by a Canadian leader,

Wordsworth

expressed his satisfaction • '’the debate today marks a
decided advance in the conduct of the affairs of our country.
I have known sessions when the estimates- were passed with
no comment whatsoever."3 ^
In 1939 the critical situation in Europe was
grounds for another comprehensive statement from the
Prime Minister, followed by a quite lengthy debate,

From

33ibid., February 15, 16, IS, 19, 1937, p. 376,
^Canada. Home. of...Commons..Debabea, May 2h, 26,
193S, p. 3175-3212,
3 % m .« p. 3212.
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that pre-war era to the present Canada has become so much
s part of the tide of world affairs that they could never
again be treated in the desultory fashion that they once
were*

Regular annual statements by the minister responsible

and some debate became a regular part of the annual business
of the House of Commons#
Post-19^5
There has been a slow ©volution of procedures for
dealing with external affairs since l9*+5.

A brief look

at the occasions when external .affairs are raised will
illustrate what these procedures are#
The Speech fro® the Throne delivered, by the GovernorGeneral at the comrae.ncement of each session indicates the
nature of th© matters to be raised in the forthcoming

session.

The Speech from the Throne briefly alludes to

the basic principles of the government’s foreign policy
and Indicates whether there will be any significant treaties
or negotiations entered into in the session ahead.
The Speech from the Throne is followed by the
debate on th© Address,

This is a wide-ranging debate

which gives the members freedom to air the topics they
feel are most significant*

Foreign policy usually occupies

a small part of th© members’ time unless the circumstances
bring an item of foreign policy to the forefront#
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- t 77 * Whether external affairs occupies a dominating
position in the debate on the Address depends more on
political tactics than on the Intrinsic merit of the item
.in regard to its topicality*

In 2963 the balance of the

opposing forces in th© Commons was such that the tf»D*P*
and the Conservatives were able to mount a very dangerous
attack on the government*

The N»D*P* moved a sub-amendment

on the government’s nuclear weapons policy, a tactic which
united th© majority of th© Conservatives, the N,D*P* and
tic Quebec Socreds,
attack.

Th® government narrowly survived this

It just happened that on that particular occasion

an external affairs question proved to be on© on which the
government see... i most vulnerable*^
In 19*f9 the matter of Canada’s participation in
NATO was on© of th© most significant items in the Throne
Speech and on® which th© government seemed interested in
discussing*

The Conservatives saw little political ammunition

in this topic and ignored it, preferring to concentrate on
federal-provincial relations which they believed might
yield a richer political harvest in view of the rift which
had been developing between Quebec and the Federal government.

Ibid.. May 21, 1963, pp. 86-109.
^ I b i d .. January 26- February

19^9,pp* 6o-12*f*
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Mention of external affairs is usually confined to
the party leaders and those who have a special interest
in these problems.

Individual members find that regional

or local problems are more politically rewarding in terms
of their constituency support.

On occasion local and

regional problems have had important repercussions for
our external relations ; such as the St. Lawrence Seaway
in the early 1950*s and the Columbia diver Treaty in the
early i9601s.
Generally speaking the debate on the Address does
little to focus the attention of the public or the members
on external affairs*

It is too diffuse and wide-ranging

unless a specific policy is made a matter of confidence
by the opposition*

The desire of the opposition parties

to adjourn th© debate on th© address so that a special
debate on Viet Warn, could be held in May I967, shows that
they prefer a much more structured occasion to discuss
nQ
external affairs*
The opposition would not agree with
the Prim® Minister that a satisfactory discussion could
be held during the debate on the Addrtss*

Too many

interruptions on other issues would destroy the continuity
of the debate*
ag
'■“*

~

' ”* *

Toronto, toy 6, 1967*
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- i 79 i Th© main discussion of external affairs in Canada
has followed after th© introduction of th© Estimates for
th® Department of External Affairs info th© Commons,

In

th© pre-1939 period discussion largely involved criticism
and questions on particular Items#

Mackenzie King began

th© practice of ranking a general policy statement on item 1 departmental administration, which was then followed by a
general policy debate#
In 19*fr9 after the setting up of the Standing
Committee on External Affairs and after a specific minister
had been given the Department of External Affairs as his
sole portfolio, a new procedure was inaugurated#

This

procedure expanded th© coverage of external affairs by
the Commons#

Early in the session the Secretary of State

made a motion to refer the estimates to the Standing
Committee#
this motion.

A general debate m

external policy followed

When th© estimates were reported out of

committee later in the session the Commons held another
debate following the presentation of Item 1#

At the second

debate the House of Commons had the advantage of having
before it the evidence adduced by the committee.

This

removed from the House the burden of investigating
administrative detail and exposed possible soft spots in
government policy for further probing by the Commons#
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Hr* Fleming, the former Conservative Finance
Minister, expressed his praise of this procedure during
a debate in 1955*39

He felt there was little excuse

for the House going off at a tangent because of erroneous
information if th© committee had done its work properly.
Others were jealous of the prerogatives of th© House and
felt that a committee had no business withdrawing matters
which should properly have been the business of the
House*1*®

it that time estimates were not generally dealt

with by committees*
Th© practise of holding two debates, before and
after referral of the estimates to committee, was abandoned
in 1963 after th© return to office of a Liberal government*
At the time there seemed to be too much pressure of other
business to allow the louse’s time to be taken up with
external affairs,

MT. Pears® seemed anxious to remove

discussi® to the committee ? several of his statements
kl
suggested this.
The pressure of other business during 1963-1965
meant that external affairs estimates were left until
the @nd of the session and rushed through with little
debate.

It seemed that unless more time could be found

that external affairs might be squeezed out altogether
39Ibid,. February 3, 1955, P. 9^9.
**°Ibld,T p, 9M u
hi
Ibid,, Hovembar 28, 1963, p, 5213-39,
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fro® the attention of the Commons.
In I96*f the gravity of the problem of dealing with
the heavy load of Commons business was recognised and
several all-party committees were set up to investigate
and recommend improvements in House of Commons procedures. *
Jfeny suggestions were mad© and some improved procedures
were Introduced on a trial basis in the 1)66 session.^
the reforms implemented in 1966 certainly seemed
to make the House more productive and allow more time for
discussion of external affairs.

A debate on item 1 of

the departmental estimates held early in the 1966 session
lasted 3 days, Involved a large number of members and
ranged over a number of topics*

The critics of the

government*® previous allocation of time to external
affairs, for once, seemed content with the treatment given.
Gordon Churchill of the Conservative front bench stated
that h© felt it had been th© best debate in years and
“without doubt there is a much greater interest shown in
the subject than there used to b e m o r e members participate
and more members attend to listen**1

^ I b l d .. November 5* 196b- and November 19, 196b-;
pp. 978tf-9801 and 10313-103%.
^ F o r a list of principal changes suggested see -•
Mr* Pearson's summation of the agreement reached after a
lengthy discussion in the House, June 3, 1965*
^ I b l d .« February 3* 1966, pp,630-92*f passim,
^*3M&*. P. 915.
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- * 82 i Sine© 19^5 th© opposition parties have rarely used
the procedural devices available to them to initiate
debates on external affairs,

the opportunities available

to them to raise questions of their own choosing have
nearly always been used to raise quest leans which they
probably deemed would have a more telling political
impact against the government,

Opposition parties have

also felt fairly unequal when it came to crossing swords
with the government in this field.

An occasion when a

supply motion was used would seem to bear this out,
la 1959 Mr, Pearson made a notion, seconded by
Paul Martin, on Canadian-!a»rlean relations.

Here were

two men expert in this field, only recently out of office,
facing a government vulnerable on this question and
novices in external affairs,

They were able to melee a

fairly effective critique of government policy in this
specific area,

This has been highly unusual in external

affairs,
Th® main device which the opposition has used
has been to move th© adjournment of the House to debate
a matter of urgent public importance under Standing Order 26,
The opportunities for the us© of this motion in regard to
external affairs have been quit© restrictive,

^Canada, House of.Commons Debates. March 16,
1959, p. 1967,
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A matter of "urgent public importance" has been
interpreted to mean a matter which, if th© normal
rules of th© House are foilowed, cannot be debated
at an early enough time to comply with the public
interest. Thus if th© matter can properly be
raised m a motion for supply, and a day has been
set for such a debate in the near future, th©
claim of urgency is not allowed**1"?
Mr, Speaker applied these criteria to a motion for
adjournment made fey Mr, Mefenfealcer on Ifey 25, 196 5*
Mr, Dlefsnbaker .maintained that a series of crisis
situation in South Viet Has, th© Dominican Republic
and with regard to France*s position in NATO were of
such an urgent nature that it was imperative that the
L.a
House receive a statement from the Minister forthwith.
Prime Minister Pearson agreed that the subjects
were important but disagreed on th© question of urgency, 1
"We have no evidence before us, Mr, Speaker, of the
worsening of th© situation in that alarming and critical
way to which reference has been made,"1*? He suggested
that the need for discussion could be met by setting up
a meeting of the Standing Committee on External Affairs
almost immediately or by calling the estimates of th©

W,

n n w s n r i . Pi-ort^irlnra i n

i>»

t h e G a n n < ? ± » n HgUgjg,

"1952

uanaaa, nous© or t;ommons uenai;es. m y d?, u^o5,
p, 1606,
^ i b l d ., p, 1607.
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of the Department the following week*

Mr. Speaker

confirmed the Prime Minister's contention and felt that
the .matters were Hnot of such recent origin, of such
recent urgency, that all the business of th® House
50
must be set aside."
The criteria were whether debate

on

th® matter in an effective way could be at another suit
able time*
Until th© 1966 session the ruling of th© speaker
was debatable and could fee appealed.

In 1963 on a motion

for adjournment fey Me. Pearson to discuss a U.S. govern
ment statement on nuclear weapons there was such an
appeal*

The speaker ruled it was not of sufficient

urgency and the three opposition parties combined to
over-rule the Speaker#s ruling fey a majority of 122-lOh51
and a debate was held.
This did not result in the defeat
of the government but it indicated a lack of faith in
th© government by the opposition parties which did
eventually result in a defeat in the House.

2his is a

very rare occurrence in Canada, particularly so on a
matter of external policy.

The adjournment motion is

likely to succeed when a genuine and sudden crisis

^ibia*. p. 1610.
51Ibid.. January 31, 1963, pp. 32>3-3330.
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emerges in which Canada is closely involved#

Such a

crisis was an outbreak of serious hostilities between
furies and Greeks on the Island of Cyprus on August 9,
196**.

Hr, Diefenbaker Moved the adj ournment,
in order to discus® a definite matter of
urgent public importance, namely the recent
turn of events in Cyprus which seriously
threatens the peace of th® world and gravely
endangers the solidarity of the NATO alliance
and also places in a critical situation our
Canadian contingent with th® United Nations
peace-keeping force in Cyprus#52

This time the motion was supported by the government and
all opposition parties and the Speaker put the motion
with unanimous support#

Th® debate continued most of

the day and at its termination the motion was withdrawn.
This was on® of the very rare occasions when this had
happened.

Members now appreciate the nature of the

circumstances when the Speaker is likely to rule in
favour of adjournment and the motion is sad© very
infrequently#

it*. Diefenbaker’s motion of 1965 was

probably more a tactic to draw attention to the government*s
dilatoriness in bringing up external affairs and force
them to arrange for a discussion soon, than a serious
attempt to get the adjournment#

This was possible because

the motion is debatable and many points of criticism can
b© raised during such a. debate.
52Ibld.. August 10, 196**, pp. 658*t~6628.
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the above Mentioned procedures are the main but by
no neans the only procedure® whereby external affairs
m y b© aired, the governments attitudes may be plumbed,
and useful information circulated to members,

Th© most

continuous exchange occurs by means of oral and written <
questions*

Ministers now customarily make statements

to th© House when they have attended some important
conferences abroad and th© ©ver-increasing flow of
distinguished international visitors not infrequently
results in a joint address to tooth louses of Parliament*
Private members too can initiate discussion through use (
of th© private members hour and can solicit information
by asking a motion for papers to be tabled relevant
to certain international problems*
Th© question period is an old-established institution t
in the Canadian parliament and one which has been increas
ingly used in recent years for raising natters of current
concern in international relations*

The growth of

questions concerning external relations has matched th©
growth of Canada*® contact® and involvements on the
international stage.

An examination of the 1938 House

of Commons Debates shows that there was barely one question
per week on external affairs at that time*

In a sample

period during September 196*+ there were k-7 oral questions
in 11 days concerning topics relevant to our external
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policy*

These were not questions solely under the

heading of External Affairs, they were also listed
in the Debates 'under United Hat ions, national Defence,
Commonwealth Relations, Trad® and Immigration, but they
all involved ratters of external policy*
The oral question period becomes at times almost
a running debate, especially when there is a persistent
crisis in which the House has continuous interest such
as Cyprus, the Congo or the Rhodesian declaration of
independence*

Numerous suppleraentaries are usually

asked so that each party leader eventually joins in
what becomes a minor debate.

Up to the present session

question time had been getting longer and this gave the
opportunity for long argumentative questions*

The

question period was reformed during the 1966 session by
setting strict time limits to the question period and by
much stricter interpretations by the Speaker of the
rules of order.

This has resulted in many fewer questions

relating to external policy and this may well result
in pressure for another avenue of discussion*
One new avenue has been opened up and that is the
opportunity for members to pursue a question at the
daily adjournment which they feel lias not been satis
factorily dealt with by the minister*

The member gives

notice that he wishes to raise the matter at the
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- i 88 i adjournment at which time he makes an extended statement
of his query*

the minister or more usually his parlia

mentary secretary, gives a more detailed prepared reply
than is usually possible in the oral question period.
Another important source of information for members
has been papers tabled in the louse*

As ¥* F, Dawson,

comments "most motions for papers are granted without
53
hesitation,"
Such has sot been the case with regard to
background papers of international negotiations involving
Canada and another country, or various authorities within
Canada being consulted about an international negotiation*
As a percentage of th© total requests for papers those
relating to external affairs form less than %

of the

total and most of these requests are refused*
fhe whole kernel of the problem was recently
disclosed during a discussion on a motion by Mr, Hales
of the Conservative Party for the tabling of
a copy of all letters and other documents
since the 1st day of January, 19$*, exchanged
between the government of Canada and the
government of the United States in connection
with the agreement providing for duty-free
trade within the automobile industry*^

May

5,

F* Dawson,
P* 3.62*
5L
Canada. House of Commons Debates. Motion Ho, 1,
1965, p* 95c*
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At th# time of th© motion the Minister of Industry,
Mr, Drury, refused to accept the motion, stating that the
documents in question were working papers relating to
successive drafts of the agreement and were therefore
privileged documents and ”it would neither be in the
public interest nor in accordance with the normal
practice to reveal such material,” When th© Conservatives
accused the government of withholding necessary information
and asked for a showdown vote, the minister requested th©
motion b© transferred for debate,55
The debate was held and Mr, 11ales mad© the following
points about the government*® attitude,56
1} The U,S, Congress was in possession of far more
information and in fact members were forced to
read Congressional documents to get adequate
background on the agreements,
2) Parliament was being denied pertinent information
for its own decisions,
3) More background information had been provided
on other negotiations ©,g, the Columbia River
Treaty, St, bawrenee Seaway tolls and northern
radar installations,
A spirited defence of th© government*s position was road©

by !&*, Haldasz - Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary

g? X M d .. p, 951#'
Ibid., May 20, 1965, pp. 1521-1529.
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of State who gave a forthright and fall explanation
of the diplomatic necessities behind such a practice*
He said that on rare occasions in the past the Government
approached other countries for permission to publish such
papers and has almost invariably been refused*
Among friendly countries a respect by each
country for the others confidences is a prime
requisite in the conduct of foreign policy.**.
If th© representatives either of Canada or
any other government expected that such pre
liminary exchanges were likely to be mad©
public in the future their entire approach
would be different ••• more formal and less
flexible*57
Other notable refusals in recent years were on a
request by the liberals in 1961 for th© text of th© speeches
by Mr*Fleming

and Ifr* Hees at th© Commonwealth Trade

Conference held in Ghana^

and a request by the

Conservatives far th© text of the letter sent by President
Johnson to Mr* Pearson supposedly requesting help from
Canada in the Viet lam struggle*99
As Canada extends its contacts with other nations
and international organizations ministers make frequent
visits abroad to attend meetings and conferences*

Ibid** September 25, 1961, p* 8829*
" i b i d .* February 3, 1966, p* 602,
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become an acknowledged part of the Commons procedure
that on the moat impartand of these occasions, such as
the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, the
appropriate mini*ter will make a brief statement to the
House regarding the significance of what was discussed
at the meeting for Canada*

the opposition has frequently

felt like discussing these statements, particularly if
they have contained any clement of controversy*

There

was a danger that this could get out of hand and consume
a great deal of th© House*© time*

The third report of

the Special Committee on Procedures suggested these
statements be governed by a Standing Order.

Under this

Standing Order statements are confined to announcements
or statements of policy? they cannot be debated, only
briefly commented on by each party leader*^0
The acid test of a private member•* interest
in foreign affairs .is th© extent to which he will devote
his time and energy to devising speeches, written
questions, resolutions and bills relating to this
subject#

Host of the procedures so far discussed are

used in the framework of th© clash of the parties in
the House and not to a meraber*© personal interests in
relative isolation from strictly party considerations*

60 Ibid.. fey 7, 196V, 196V-65, p. 300?.
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* ! 92 ! When we examine the private member1s approach
to external policy it is barren indeed#

For whatever

reason - ignorance, lack of political return, the
complexity of the field § there are hardly ever any private
member's bills or resolutions relating to external affairs.
Of course th© aim of these bills or resolutions is not
directly to commit the government to a certain action,
but only to air a matter, educate th© public and exert
some indirect pressure in a certain direction*

Fewer

than on® private member's bill or resolution per year

1

has been devoted to external affairs* topics since 19^5*
Most of those that did reach the floor of th© Commons
had difficulty maintaining a quorum of members during
their debate*
Procedure

ofthe

Committees

(a) The Establishment of the Standing
In this section It is not Intended mainly to
discuss the effectiveness of th© committees involved in
external relations, only to recount th© procedures
which these committees have developed for surveying this
field*

The main committees involved have been the pre-

19*f5 Standing Committee on Industrial and International
Relations, the present Standing Committee on External
Affairs, the Special Committees on Defence Spending and
th© present day Standing Committee on national Defence*
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- ? 93 * She earliest'committee appointed to concern
Itself with, external affairs was the committee on
Industrial and International Relations*

It had a divided

responsibility and one may be at a loss to explain why
the two topics should be lumped

together#

Mackenzie

King was able to reconcile the two in his mind*
When industrial and international relations
were referred to one committee, it was felt
that most industrial problems had beeone more
or less world problems, and equally that the
most perplexing of world problems were related
in one way or the other to industry#®!
Most members of the House by 19*0 were less sure of th©
value of subordinating external affairs to such a catch
all arrangement and there was considerable support for
a separate Standing Committee on External Affairs#

This

was evidence of th# general interest in the subject
at that time in contrast to the attitude prior to the
war*
The pre-war committee, like many of the other
House Standing Committees, met rarely and achieved little.

6?

61 Ibid.. September 12, 19*0, p. 110.

t2*
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For eight years it never met at all and only once
did it ever concern itself with a topic of International
significance and that was on the initiative of Agnes
McPhail, who raised a matter concerning the league of
Nations in 1930#

J# S, Woodsvorth, despairing of

getting much discussion in the House pushed for

referral

of external affairs to the Standing Committee on
Industrial and International Eolations.^

late in the

1936 session after berating the government for leaving
external affairs - !ia natter of such great importance"
to "the dying hours of a session”, he requested the
appointment of committee “charged with the definite
responsibility of studying Canada•s foreign policy#”

'

This would lead, he said, to greater public interest*
He also wished for the estimates to be placed before such
a committee*^
King’s reply was to suggest that “there is
nothing to preclude any number of members of the House
of Commons forming themselves into a study group" and
there was always the committee on Industrial and

^Canada, House of Commons Debates. March 2, 1936,
P. 675»
Ibid..June 23, 1936, p* kl2h.
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Woodworth retorted that

this was quite useless in that a committee can only
consider what a government allows to be referred to it
and of course they never referred anything to it*
Mackenzie King followed, with his real reason
1 make no apology to any honorable member
of this House for having dbne my utmost to
prevent premature discussion of questions
that were inflaming the minds and th©,^
passions of peoples in the old l a n d s * ® 5
The idea was not buried, however, for in 1937
the proposal was re-iterated by Wandsworth and endorsed
by a new young liberal internationalist - Paul Itotln*
Woodsworth outlined briefly what he thought its tasks
should include.
The whole range of external affairs
might
be referred to that committee. The members of
the committee would benefit very largely by
their study. Certain representations by the
committee might be mad© to the House. It would
have before it the Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs* who might at least outline
many of the problems that face us at this time.
There should be before the committee a detailed
report of what was done at the last assembly
of the league of Nations*®®

6fa>id.. p. IH25*

66

Ibid,. February 9, 1937, P. 700-701.
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Woodsworth shewed quite a degree of percipience,
for many of the things foreshadowed in his speech became
a regular part of the duties of the new committee set up
after the war*

At the time his suggestions were stoutly

resisted both by Bennett, the Conservative leader, and
by Prime Minister Mackenzie King*
Bennett felt it was not possible to have popular
control or interest in foreign affairs*

These matters

concerned other countries* interests and public bickering
could only make their settlement more difficult*
With the tremendous responsibility that rests
upon those who have to accept the duties of
office, to meet a committee of parliament and be
asked about matters which cannot be divulged
because they may be in a stage of partial
completion, would be impossible without creating
that very suspicion and unrest and distrust which
all governments endeavour to prevent or allay*®/
King said he agreed with Bennett and argued
if there is any time or occasion where the
doctrine of ministerial responsibility applies
to the full it is in these matters which relate
to the affairs of foreign nations* Under-secretaries
couldn*r, take the responsibility for withholding
information* It is much better for the minister to
stand before the House than a committee*63
It was quite obvious at this time that the main
political leaders in Canada could see no useful purpose
being served in encouraging wider public interest through

67lbid», p. ?02.
68Ibld. \
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experimenting with new parliamentary institutions.

Only

the C.C.F* with their democratic dogmas could be expected
to see merit in wider discussion and public interest in
this field.*
The war seoiited to transform the situation.

With

the widened horizons from travel, the idealism engendered

by hopes for a better post-war world, the speculation about
a new international organisation; it was inevitable that
Canadian politicians should seek new avenues to express

their interest in foreign affairs*
In September,

I9k$f it. was the Conservative leader

John Bracken who suggested splitting up the former industrial
and international relations committee to give each of these
69
fields more attention, King's reaction was to give the
suggestion ‘careful consideration* and
the cabinet he reads a motion to set

afterconsulting

up the new Standing

Committee on External Affairs with a membership of 20
and a quorum of 8*

Caldwell complained this was too few

in relation to the number of interested members and ling
agreed to increase the membership to 35 and the quorum
no
to 10.

6?lbid.. September 12, !9*f5,

p. 109.

^ I b i d .. September 18, 19^5,

p* 2¥+,
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Powers of the Committee
There seemed to fee a great deal of confusion at
first in the minds of the members of the committee, as
well as in the minds of the ministers concerned, as to just
what the committee should be doing and what should be the
limits

to its powers*

The Chairman1® words at the second

meeting epitomise this confusion:
At the first meeting of the Committee we had all
the members express the view that we had to have
an order of reference* It is true, that our new
Committee may have to cover such a wide scop© that
I, .myself, feel baffled as to what exactly we are
going to put our teeth on directly, in our actions
from now on*71
The original resolution of the House setting up the
committee conformed to the standard pattern for all House
of Commons standing committees,

It stated that the committee

"shall b© empowered to examine and inquire into all such
natters and things as may be referred by the House. M

If

the House with it®' government majority chos© not to refer
anything then the coaaitte© could do nothing.
The first referrals to the committee were some
old conventions of the International Labour Organisation
drawn up under the League of Nations*

Some members were

71canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on
External Affair®, M nutei, offfioceMing® and,Evidence,
Ho, 1, October 25, W 5 , p. 1^.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

^

rattier perplexed and frustrated that they should be asked
to investigate something which involved the technicalities
of labour problems and tried to get referral to another
committee*

Whether these were referred to them to keep

them out of mischief, as Coldwell suggested, they did not
really seem to excite the interest of the members who had
anticipated something much more exotic*

Inquiries by the

opposition spokesmen - Graydon and Coldwell - revealed
that this legislation had an international slant and
involved the treaty-making powers of the federal govern
ment and were therefore worthy of the interest of the
Committee,

la connection with these conventions the

acting House Leader, Mackenzie, suggested that the
committee could accept or reject, or amend them, or make
suggestions to the House*^2
The Committee itself, including the Chairman, began
to fear that they might be restricted in their purview or
suffer fTora government neglect and therefore attempted to
widen the scope of their activities on their own initiative*
In its second report, tabled in the Commons November 16,
19^5, the Committee recommended "that it be empowered to
consider matters connected with externa1 affairs and

^Canada, House of Commons Debates, October 25, 19^5,
P. 13*f7.
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report from tl.ua to time any suggestion or recommendation
deeded advisable to the House of Commons*"

lvfr* St. laurent,

the acting Secretary of State for External Affairs in the
absence of actual Secretary, the Prime Minister, took
exception to this recommendation*

He moved that it be

referred back to the Committee for reconsideration in that
it violated traditional practises of committees acting
only under specific references from the House and would
73
give the Committee altogether too wide a power*
The matter
was left for the decision of Mackenzie King who agreed to
accept the compromise suggestion of a

Conservative spokesman,

Howard Green, that the estimates he referred to the Committee*
Green warned about the danger of crippling the Committee at
the outset*
The standing cotnmittee could get at the various
facts in connection with the estimates. It
could call officials of the department and hear
witnesses* It could help to keep the Department
of External Affairs more closely in touch with
the Canadian people,7**
King concurred with Green that it would be a suitable step*
He seemed to feel sure that this procedure would provide
sufficient activity for the .members without giving them
the free-swinging powers of a congressional committee.
clearly saw that the whole process could be controlled
by the government*
7JIbid*
^ X b i d .* December 17, 19^5, p. 3691.
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• s 101 i I think that what my honorable friend has in
mind is that if the estimates as a whole were
referred, to a committee it coaid bring before it
the officials of the External Affairs Department
and if they had any doubt as to the propriety of
certain matters arising in committee the matter
could be considered and dealt with by the minister
in the House#75
The estimates were first submitted to the committee
in the 19**6 session and it .has now become standard practice
to do so#

The committee, however, is set up by the House

at each session and must have a motion from the House each
session for it to consider the estimates.

It has the power

to send for persons, papers and records which, in theory,
gives it wide powers to obtain information and to develop
a forum for the conflict of clashing viewpoints#
as

In fact

we shall see later this ability has been quite circum

scribed#
(c) Development of the Committee Practices
The central focus of committee activity has always
been the consideration of the estimates, which has offered
a convenient opportunity to examine anything which came
within the scope of the Department of External Affairs,
The committee found itself delving into details in the
first few years, and while getting a great deal of

75M & * >

P. 3693.
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information and some education about the mechanis m

of

the Department, was hardly able to explore policy.

The

reason for this seems to have been the absence of the
Secretary of State for External Affairs from the Committee
for most of the time#

He appeared briefly before the

Committee in 19**6 and hardly seemed to know what role he
was supposed to play*

the Chairman, Mr. Bradette, though

having great designs for the Committee, also hesitated to
male© demands upon the minister.
The absence of any figure with political responsibility
for foreign policy proved rather frustrating for the Com
mittee#

They were constantly probing beneath the facts

paraded by the Department*© officials to know the whys and
wherefores, only to be told by the chair that they could
not ask-such questions or to be refused an answer by the
official*

Gordon Graydoa, the chief Conservative spokesman,

complained during a debate in 29^7 that
In the committee we hive not had the opportunity
of discussing government policy..,, I do not think
it was ever intended that the policy of the
department should be relegated to a secondary
position and that w© should spend most of our
time dealing with the question of,the administ
ration of the department itself*7«

76ibld>, July **, 19**?, p. 5100*
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* I 103 s Lester Pearson as under-secretary displayed a great deal of
authority in his statements and answers to questions*

He

did, however, refuse to answer questions on policy, saying
he had no views on those questions*

This brought a rejoinder

f^om Me*, Cote that “if this committee is to serve a useful
purpose I think we should discuss matters of foreign policy*
K p , Haeketb, a member of the Committee, made a key
point in the House during a debate in 19^3*
On several occasions when questions were asked
of these witnesses (department officials), the
ever vigilant and paternal parliamentary assistant
indicated to the coaaitte© that it might not be
fair to persist in certain questions,.. The
committee required that he (the minister) would
be there to answer questions on policy*73
The problem was resolved in 19^9 when St, Laurent,
having assumed heavy burdens in being acting .Prime Minister

77caaad&, House of Commons Standing Committee on
External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence.
May 10, 19*f3, p. 2 ^ 7
78
Canada, House of Commons Debates. June 19, 19*+8,
p. 55^2.
In the letter written to Walter Harris, the parlia
mentary assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Mr, Pearson makes mention of this difficulty* He .made the
following suggestion to him;
"In examining witnesses from the department,
members of the eoauttitte© may ask questions which
cannot appropriately b© answered by civil
servants* If that happens, perhaps Mr, Bradette
could suggest that those questions be held over
until a meeting at which you will be present*"
House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs,
..Minutes o f ..Proceedings and. Evidenggu May 17, 19*f3, p* 27.
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- i loM- # and Secretary of State, then became Prime Minister after
the retirement of Macteenasie King,

He appointed the under

secretary Lester Pearson, as Secretary of State and thus a
professional diplomat of great ability and experience took
over the top political post in external relations*
Pearson had exercised considerable leadership as
a civil servant, suggesting for example in 19M5 at a
meeting of the standing committee a complete schedule of
business which they might adhere to*

As minister he exer

cised even greater leadership and greatly enhanced the
treatment of external affairs given by the Committee*
He initiated the precedent of giving a quick
general survey of the whole international scene and then
submitting himself to questions, either on the topics he
79
raised or others developed by members,'
Pearson gave
considerable time to the Committee, attending between three
and seven meetings a year*

Sydney Smith and Howard. Green,

79
r Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on
External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and. Evidence.
June 8,. 1955* third R e p o r t . p . 533•
the committee reported that they had held twenty
meetings during that session of which three had been given
to statements and questioning of the Secretary of State for
External Affairs* In 1955 less time than normal was given
to the discussion of policy because of the attention given
to Sill 3 on International liver Development, The referral
of' a piece of legislation to the committee can therefor®
squeeze out consideration of other aspects of policy. In
1956 out of eighteen meetings with no legislation to con
sider, six were devoted to testimony from the Secretary of
State, (Ibid,, July 3> 1956)
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. -. s 105 * the two ministers daring the Conservative administration,
of 1957-1962, appeared backed by a cluster of high depart
ment officials and frequently ted to ask for time to
develop their answers or ask for notice of questions so
that they could appear adequately briefed*

The experience

of the minister thus makes a great deal of difference as
to the quality of the policy discussions*

Sydney Smith’s

and Howard Green’s tasks were made no easier by the fact
that they faced experienced ministerial timbre in tester
Pearson and Paul Martin as members of the Committee and it
was a strange sight tj see tester Pearson explaining to the
minister, $&•« Sydney Smith, what had happened or how certain
international positions had been reached*
Sine© the Liberal return to power in 1963 the minister,
Mr* Paul Martin, has felt quite able to deal with most
questions that the Coamittec has been able to present to
him, without .having close recourse to officials or having
to delay his answers until future meetings*
4s suggested above there was concern to discuss
policy and since the time that tester Pearson became minister
discussion of policy tea taken an over-greater place in
the Committee’s discussions*

The Committee has in recent

years become less satisfied with a once and for all review
and has become anxious to have a persistent and continuous
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This means keeping the

Committee sitting and not ending its activities once
the estimates have been passed*

It was the present

minister himself who suggested, while an opposition member
of the Committee, that it b© kept in session*
Our procedures la the House are such that
not withstanding the generous nature of the
honorable members. It Is not always possible
by interrogation to ©licit the hind and quality
of information we are able to obtain through
this particular instrument of the parliamentary
committee*••(it is) desired to keep the committee
open and get the Secretary of State later.1
30
The Committee accepted his suggestion and the vicechairman agreed to as?: the minister if he would appear
again, but the expected meeting was never held.
In the 1966 session important developments in pro
cedure have occurred.

It is difficult to assess whether

they will form a permanent departure from previous practises,
fhe Committee met very early in the session and Its chairman
appointed, in consultation with the whips, a sub-committee
m

agenda and procedure*.

This sub-committee has always

existed as a steering committee to organise future business
and discuss procedure.

This session it took its duties

80
Ibid., April 8, I960, p. 3 ^ .
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revised and consolidated pro-

cedural practices which had previously grown haphazardly*®*^
The sub-committee agreed that it would obtain a general
statement from the minister before planning its programme of
priorities, significant areas to explore and witnesses to be
called*
In considering the estimates it decided that under the
first item questions of a general nature only would be allowed
and questions on specific items would wait until later.

After

the discussion on the first item was over this item would
stand and subsequent items would be dealt with*

When all the

items tod been approved; the Committee would return to the
first item and deal with all unanswered questions and
unfinished business before passing it and writing their
report*®2
The first five meetings were concerned almost entirely

Slfhe sub-committce on Agenda and Procedure was always
an all party committee that held its meetings in camera and
represented the various party viewpoints regarding the order
and nature of business in the forthcoming meetings. The sub
committee in 1966 was quite small with only two Liberals
fft*, Dube the Chairman and H r* D. 8* Macdonald the Parliamentary
Secretary, The other members were Mr, Nesbitt - vice-chairman
(Conservative), Mr, Brewln (N,D,P,), and Ifr, Thompson (Social
Credit)* In 1 9 the sub-committee was equally balanced with
four Liberals and four opposition members and a Liberal Chairman
who could if necessary cast a deciding vote* This change
represents 3 decrease In the size of the committee from 35 to
2k t but it could also represent a move towards greater
efficiency and less partisanship. Ibid,. First Report of the
Sub-c
on Agenda and Procedure, March 25, 1966, p. 6,
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with policy and with the questioning of the Secretary of
State far External Affairs,

This formed almost two thirds

of all the minutes and evidence*

There mis only one meeting

given over to administration and the questioning of
officials of the department Itself,

There was consideration

of external aid, on© meeting, and the International Joint
Commission, one meeting, which have been standard items of
discussion, with their own separate estimate for many years.
The ninth and last meeting was again addressed by the
sinister to deal with unfinished business before item one
was passed.
This was a completely different order and emphasis of
topics than had occurred before, although it was observable
that the meetings had been trending this way for some years.
How the clear emphasis is on policy, and as if to underline
it and their Interest in following through on a more
permanent basis, the committee made this recommendation in
their second report 5 having approved the estimates the Committee
wishes to study further Rhodesia, Viet Iasi,
NATO, Canada-West., Indies relations and other
subjects and requests that the committee be
given authority herewith to meet to discuss
them from time to time and report them,“3
In previous years some members of the Committee have expressed
interest in continuing to follow the developments in the

^ Ibld», Second Report, June 17, 1966, p, 27*+*
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sain international events, even after the approval of the
estimates*

So far they have not succeeded mainly because

of the pressures of time and other business*

flow that pro

cedures have been reformed to give more time and the general
procedures of committees have been-improved it might become
possible for the Standing Committee on External Affairs to
be in almost continuous session and in constant touch with
the Ministor*

If this happens it could have great significance

in expanding Parliament*s knowledge and interest in external
affairs *
While the consideration of the estimates has formed
the main burden of the Coraraittee#s work, considerable time
has been devoted to the examination of legislation from time
to time*

The legislative matters and treaties have been

mostly of a minor nature? such major i t e m as the Peace
Treaties with East European countries, Italy and Japan
and the IAT0 treaty were reserved for the consideration of
the House of Commons*
The referral of some legislation to the Committee caused
it some perplexity in that Canada had already negotiated and
signed these conventions and they were supported by the

government with a firm majority in the House*
The significance of what the Committee was doing was
not really to affect the legislation in any way at that time.
It aired the problem, heard witnesses from the government and
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outside and possibly helped to erystaliz© and develop
opinion on particular issues*
That the Standing Affairs Committee could conceivably
veto and influence the rejection of an unfavorable treaty
■was demonstrated in the Treaty and Protocol for the
Extradition of Criminals between Canada and the U.S.A,
This Treaty involved the investment community and Canadians
who solicited funds for speculative ventures in Canada*
These Canadians might ba acting in contravention of United
States law, but not necessarily Canadian law, when they
gk
sought funds in the U.S.A.
The Committee summoned and was approached by a large
number of witnesses from the Investment comaunity in Canada.
They were almost unanimous in condeaning the treaty and the
Co-amittee endorsed their views in its report to the House,
85
recommending reconsideration of the treaty.
The treaty was allowed to lay dormant for many years
arid when eventually the U.S.A.* pressed for re-negotiation
makers were persistent in drawing to the governments
attention the findings of the Committee

The objectionable

8tfXbid., October 30, 1>H5, p. 22,
December 11, 19^5, Ho, 9 (Third and final report)
8 maSmUu&&, J,Sl
fX
t m W Bftfetttefo
' Canada, %
2J
gjM&Ssb March 3, 19k9,
p. 122h, and iferch 10, 1 W , p. 1331*
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principle of •dual criminality* was omitted from the re87
negotiated treaty#
The Committee was effective in changing the legis
lation in question because it proved to be a useful vehicle
for strong, well organised and Influential pressure groups#
Both major parties, but particularly the Conservatives, proved
susceptible to this pressure#

There m s no really strong

countervailing pressure within Canada#

The main opposing

pressure had come from the TJ#S. government and the pressure
groups could count on Canadian national sensitivities to
cancel out that influence#
The reception and passage of the Columbia River Treaty
provides an illustrative contrast with the above-mentioned
treaty.

This was a highly contentious piece of .legislation

much 'desired by the United States government and powerful
interests in the Herfch-Western !J#S,A#

Many vocal and well

organized groups in Canada ¥are opposed to the treaty, but
they were countered by many government experts, powerful
interests, and three of the four Canadian political parties#
The Committee became the battleground for the struggle
which was fought with statistics, documents, charts and
hundreds of pages of testimony#

The hearings were well

covered by the press and there is no doubt that the subject

^Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on
External Affairs, Minutes of .Proceedings and Evidence. May 13,
1952, p. 271#
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Much of the argument was at such

a technical level, however, and involved problematical
future results, that it is doubtful, whether more than a
very thin layer of the general public became concerned*
So overwhelming was the support for the treaty that
the various amendments offered by the N,D.P, opposition
were beaten down without effort*

Despite the weeks of

meetings and thousands of words of testimony the treaty
went through completely unscathed to its originally drafted
83
form,'
The N.D.P, were unable to make any impression and
get changes to what they stigmatized as a thoroughly unequal
treaty because they could not summon vocal and strong support
from large numbers of people who might conceivably have been
affected*

On the other hand, quite powerful interests in

British Columbia backed the treaty and quite clearly saw
the specific benefits it brought them,

The Committee has

shown that it can be a useful tool for well organized,
specific interests, but it is not so certain that less
well-defined and diffuse public long-term interests are as
well represented*
Early in its history the Standing Committee created
a precedent which had it been continued and expanded upon

^ X b i d .. June 3, 1955# Third Report, p. 512.
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In 19**6 when the

Palestine dispute was reaching serious proportions, one
committee member, Angus Maclnnis, suggested that the
Zionists and the Canadian Palestine Committee be heard*
Solon Low, then Soared leader, agreed providing Arab
representatives were also allowed to appear if they so
wished.

Two meetings were held in which representatives of

the two sides presented their cases and were closely
89
questioned*
This was the first and only time on which
the Committee invited two sides of a contentious issue in
international affairs to put their case before the Committee*
For the most part the Committee has had to get their inform
ation from department officials or the minister with all the
limitations involved.

In recent years there have been

requests for outside witnesses on such issues as Viet Nam
and Rhodesia but the chairman and government majority have
90
effectively checked this development.
St. Laurent, as Secretary of State for External
Affairs, announced in 19*f7 that he was favorably disposed to
the Standing Committee for External Affairs holding ’in

89Ibid.. July 12. 19^6, p. 201.
At the above meeting the chairman Me. Bradette was
aware that in allowing this suggestion to be acted upon he was
creating a precedent and offered it as an opportunity to
alert the public to a contentious question.
" i n 1965 Mr. Brewin mentioned that the ’World Federalists*
were interested in having their president Mr. Burehill appear
in I*ant of the committee. June 29, 1965, p. 203.
91Xn 1966 Mr. Nesbitt, complaining about the lack of inform
ation which was accurate and reliable from the press or the govern
ment, asked that outside witnesses be called.May 5,1966,p.121.
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St* Laurent felt that if these meetings

were held officials would be permitted to give the Committee
information which it would not feel free to state for
01
publication*
The Conservative party, through their chief external
affairs spokesman, Gordon Gr&ydon, let it be known that they
viewed unfavorably any attempt to hold ’in camera* meetings*
They seemed to think that it would be unfavorably received
by public opinion*
An informant, on the Committee during its first twelve
years, stated that he did not think that all members of the
Committee could be trusted to keep confidential highly
sensitive information*

They would attempt to use it to

ingratiate themselves with the press or for political party
purposes*

The Liberal government did not pursue this idea

any further before their defeat in 1957 and must eventually

1

have seen the advantages to themselves, politically and
diplomatically, in not allowing confidential information to ;
reach the Committee*

The change in attitude could be seen

in 19^9, when the Committee*® request to have the Canadian
Ambassador to China appear before it, was turned down on the

grounds that the public nature of the meetings would impair
the ambassador’s position in relation to any future government
of China*^2

92Ibid*. November 22, 19**9, p. 9*t*
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Defence.

It is quite impossible to confine oneself purely to
those activities labelled external affairs if we wish to
©over'-the total involvement of the House of Commons in
foreign policy.

Defence and foreign policy are two facets

of Canada*® outlook on the world and are indissolubly linked.
The role that Canada has chosen to play in the
world is inevitably reflected in our defence needs and the
policy towards the latter must logically follow from the
93
former. By the late 1150*s the implications of the latest
nuclear weaponry were forcing the Canadian government to
re-assess its defence needs in the light of the kind of
middle-power role it could realistically pursue in the world
that was taking shape*

Even a meaningful military contribution

to Canada*® security as part of the North American continent
seemed beyond its capabilities.
at

Pears on gave some indication of the official
outlook on the nature of the bond between defence and foreign
policy in a speech to the airforce veterans in November 19*+9#
"defence m e m reliance not on international strength
alone, but on collective policy and action inside a
coalition like NATO *,* defence now is the preventing
of wars through the solution of international problems
by pacific means."
as quoted by Paul Martin in House of Commons Special Committee
on National Defence,
Mfl.
June 27, 1963, p* 231*
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• s 116 % The crisis over

defence policy m s

instrumental in.

the fell of a government and became a major election issue
in 1963*

the new government without a commanding majority

had promised a new committee on defence which would review
the whole question of defence policy*

This was to be a

committee unlike any other committee which had ever been
created to look at defence matters*
Opposition members had long been frustrated by the
special nature of defence problems which prevented them
from getting to g r i p with them*
complex#

The new weapons were

She nature of our alliance commitments admitted

the minimum of exposure of their contents, the pretext of
security was used to conceal all but the most pedestrian
facts,

let the nation was being asked to foot an ever

mounting bill, and m s less sure that the money was being
spent effectively#
In 1950, with the great demands being mad© for the
Korean Mar, George Brew the Conservative leader demanded
more information on defence and requested a special committee
to look into the whole problem.^ St, Laurent*s reply was
disdainful of such a need#

^Canada, House of Commons Debates. September 1, 1950,

P. 11*H
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I would say that the members of the government
of Canada constitute what is in essence a defence
committee of this House of Commons ... and brings
rec ommendat ions to the House for the scrutiny of
all members.9?
Drew in replying to this claim stated
The Prime Minister well knows that there is no
effective procedure whereby the large number
of members in this House can consider matters
of this kind, bring witnesses before them and
obtain those facts which are so essential to an
understanding (of defence policy) *9©
The response of the government at that time was to set up
committees similar to those set up in the war on expenditures
<m defence.

Special committees on defence expenditures were

set up in 1951* 1952 and 1953 with quite limited scope
in timespan reviewed and subject matter.

They functioned

mainly as public accounts committees checking past
expenditures and not being concerned with current defence
expenditure proposals which would have involved them in
the realm of policy.

The 1953 committee complained in

its final report that it had been handicapped in its
investigation of 'waste, extravagance and inefficiency'
as documented by the Currie Report, by being denied
access to documents relating to expenditures before 1950.
The government could arrogantly deflect parliamentary

95lbid.. p. 118.
96
Ibid.. p. 306.
97
Canada, House of Commons Special Committee on
Defence Expenditures 1953* Final Report, p.
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demands for a clear look at its past actions and not
suffer the consequences*
After the Korean War interest in defence lapsed
until the problem of new defence commit ments and the aftermath of the CP 100 fighter fiasco called for a new investi
gation of our expenditures.

Another special committee was

established in i960 to examine expenditures from 1958
At

on*

the opening meeting Paul Hellyer, the Liberal defence

critic, asked that the committee concern itself principally
with proposed expenditures for the current year, which
would have brought its attention directly to policy,
We feel that this committee has a duty to
examine the objectives of the government of
Canada in defence matters
we prefer that the
public accounts aspect be dealt with by the
public accounts committee itself,93
He also suggested *in camera* briefings on intelligence and
the calling of special witnesses to give evidence.

Harold

Winch, N.D.P. critic, backed Hellyer*s position but suggested
that the defence expenditures be retained in committee, for
unless that committee examined them, they would be unlikely
to get much attention from the public accounts committee,99
fhus the opposition was now echoing the view of the
Conservatives during their opposition years in the early

" ibid.. I960, May 11, I960, p. 12.
"ibid.. p, 1 %
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~ * 1X9 t It might be expected that of necessity the opposition
will always ask for concessions that they themselves would
not grant as a government,

Such m s not the case with the

Liberals, as It?, Pearson demonstrated by his pleas for the
appointment of a special committee during the election.

He

confirmed it by swift action as soon as he took over the
government in 1963,
Shlc special committee on national defence set up
in 1963 was unique in defence matters and indeed in Canadian
parliamentary history,

is the Final Report made clear this

committee was the first ever set up with specific powers to
examine all aspects of defence policy, including future
trends.

It was set up at a significant time when in the

light of new strategic concepts the part the armed forces
loo
could play was being reconsidered*
As

to the scope of the committee, It?, Pearson in

introducing the resolution to set up the committee stated
there would be no limit on I ho right of the Committee to
make recommendations on any matter - I do not exclude policy.
He pointed out that this was a departure from the positions
taken by both Dlefenbaker and St, Laurent when they were
prime-rainisters•

It*, Pearson drew an analogy with the

100
Special Committee on national Defence, Final Report,
P* 79^+,
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Committee on External Affairs regarding the discussion of
policy in that questions on policy and exchanges of view
would be handled by the minister*

101

It*. Hellyer the new liberal Defence Minister in the
same debate, made a case for the new committee in terms of
creating a well informed parliament and public opinion.
He outlined his difficulties as opposition defence critic
in that he had to go to the reports of the U.S. Congress
and its
Mr.

committeesto get information on the Canadian forces,

Hellyer let the committee Know that they would be able

to study .anything they saw fit and interrogate witnesses
from all spheres of military service,

The only limits

would be considerations of military security.3,0*2
The opposition, particularly the Conservatives, was
extremely sceptical of the claim put forward by the govern
ment that the Committee would be able to influence policy,
Cordon Churchill « a former Conservative defence minister said so in the first meeting.
We hope that the policy for the future may be
determined by this committee, but we are very
aware that policy matters have to be determined
by the government and then examined by parliament
itself. This committee may - and I underline
that word - be able to assist in the formulation
of policy,103
~.. ,
"r"n

Isase of...Commons, Debates, Jfey 30, 1963, p. h-56.
102Ibld.. p, Wlf,

^0^Canada, House of Commons Special C o m i t tee on
National Defence 1963, M
i
a
j
f
ar4 IMflfflMUb
June 27, 1963, P* 9.
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Whatever hopes the government eventually had for
the Defeme Committee they clearly did, not intend to wait
for its report before 'formulating their own future policy.
Their own experts set about preparing a Whit© Paper which
would assess the problem and issue its own prescription,
end this it did early in 196%*
What the government hoped was that a full and
impartial Investigation of the facts by the Committee would
bring about a fairly unified view of future defence policy
which would closely approximate that of the government*

It

was a strategy of bringing the opposition along with it by
giving it some degree of

confidence and involvement through

the Committee,
The government was successful to a degree in bringing
over the opposition in that once the Committee started to
meet criticism was muted, and the Committee was not
excessively partisan in its questing feu? information, car
in its assessment of that information.

The whole Committee

quickly arrived at a unanimous point of view that some
drastic reorganisation was needed to keep down ‘housekeeping*
costs and prevent them from gobbling up the whole military
budget.

The

unification proposals of Mr, Hellyer grew

naturally out of this findings tout now a combination of
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political opportunism and old loyalties threatens to
10h
disrupt what unity there was on the Committee*
When we study the final report of the Committee we
certainly see that it lived up to its licenee to investigate
freely and make comprehensive recowBendations•

fixe Committee

baa a total of V? sittings in 1963 fro© June IS to
December 11, of which !**■ were in Europe, 2 in the U*S,A*
and the reminder in Canada including on© at NORAD
North Regional Headquarters at Worth Bay*

It not only

had statements from and questioned Canadian officials and
serving men, but also those of the British, U.S. French
and German defence establishments*

Briefs were submitted

fey independent organizations and outside witnesses with
no official connections and retired military officers
also testified*

The Canadian Institute of International

Relations was requested to prepare a comprehensive series
of report®, written by experts, m

various defence matters

for the enlightenment of the Committee*

Possibly the

only limitations for the Committee was time to digest
and speculate on the vast flood of statements, charts
lO^ihe matter referred to here concerns the disagreement
which-has erupted between the Minister of Rational Defence
Mr* Hellyer and certain of the senior .military officers and
retired, officers over the proposed measures to bring about
unification of the armed forces* This issue was never squarely
faced fey the Standing Committee on National Defence and it has
reached its peak sine© parliament recessed for th© summer in
1966, A discussion of the reasons that the committee failed
to take cognizance of the dispute is found in the Globe and
Mail, Thursday, August h-,1966 in an article fey Keith Spicer s
Why Didn't Canada*s Defence Watchdog Bark?
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and statistics with which they were surfeited*

However,

as a result of this exposure they became probably what was
the best informed Committee in Canadian parliamentary history.
The final report was 16 pages long and covered ©very
major phase of Canadian defence policy with specific
recoronendations regarding each .phase*

There was also a

12 point statement on what the Committee regarded as the
basis of Canadian defence policy.

This type of report is in

graphic contrast itfith the usual bland, brief repetition of
platitudes and ’safe1 suggestions*
Among their recommeridations were proposals for a
continuation of their work*

The Coramittee wished to be

reconstituted in the following session with essentially
the same membership.

They wanted the 1963 session’s

minutes and proceedings referred to it so that they could
pick up where they left off*

Upon completion of their

work they requested that a Standing Committee on National
Defence be appointed*
One of their most amazing recommendations concerned
their need for advice and assistance.

They

declared that

the ad hoc advice from the public service was not wholly
satisfactory*

The wide scope of the study and the

com

plexities of the problems of Defence, emphasise the
necessity of a continuing technical assistance*

They
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• s 12k t therefore suggested the creation of a technical
secretariat r.faaapftlHft.
.to the...committee,
These suggestions have been acted upon for the most
part.

The select committee resumed its work in 196**- and

examined those aspects of defence it had not covered in 19631
using ranch the same procedures as it had before.

In the

1966 session a Standing Committee m s appointed and now has
the estimates of the Department of Defence referred to it.
The only suggestion which has not been acted upon is the
one dealing with the technical secretariat.

This would

be a departure, which if carried through for other
committees, too, could radically transform the Canadian
parliamentary system,

A core of experts at the service

of the Committee could give it an independent base of
advice and power which could challenge the competence of
the minister and his department to a much greater extent
than has been possible .in the past,

Whether or not it would

undermine ministerial responsibility is a question that
will be discussed later.
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CHAPTER III
THE MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT
Chapter II examined the customs and practises
of the House of Commons as they related to the handling
of External Affairs.

This approach is strictly limited

in interpreting the underlying currents which govern the
quality and mode of concern which the Comiaons shows
towards external affairs*

To fathom this dimension it

is necessary to examine more closely the milieu in which
the House of Commons, the political parties and the
individual members operate*

In this and successive

chapters more attention is paid to the external political
process, whereby political behaviour within the Commons
is traced to social, cultural and regional pressures
upon members and parties.
In this chapter it is proposed to look more closely
at the individuals who collectively make up the House of
Commons, which for our purposes could be regarded as a
behavioural system.1

It is important to remember that the

-*-fhis chapter draws largely on a number of interviews
with members of parliament from the Liberal, Conservative
and New Democratic Parties which were conducted during
August 196*+ in Ottawa, The interviews were granted in most
cases on the understanding that opinions expressed would
not be attributable to the member being interviewed. Where
there has been no attribution for any statement made in this
chapter it is based on general impressions gained from the
interviews as a whole,
- t 125 ; »
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actions and attitudes of any member are conditioned not
solely by the prescriptions of the institution which he
serves| or by the demands of his party $ but also by the
personal, social, and cultural milieu from which he came.
It is little wonder that even within the same
party, or within a group from the same region and general
background, there is considerable diversity of opinion
as to the role of the member of parliament*

The breadth
}

with which an M.P, views his role affects the amount of
attention and significance which he places on external
affairs.

Even those who do take a broad view of their

role are faced by the limitations which the system imposes
upon them.
M.P.*s can be envisaged as extending from two poles,
from those who take the most restricted view of their duties
to those who take the most ambitious view of their tasks.
Those at the former end could be viewed as being most
submissive to the system and those at the latter end will
be interested in opposing the system.

By the system Is not

meant merely the rules and procedures, which do nominally
allow a role for members, but the whole gamut of pressures
from the party, the government, the constituents and various
lobbies which push the member towards certain lines of
action to the detriment of others.
Douglas fisher, a member of parliament from 19571965, has battled the system as much as most members.
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However| he concluded shortly before he left the House, that
our system dees not allow any real purpose
for a back-bencher* His responsibility is to
get elected on election sight* Then he must
s
be counted on to do so again at the next
©lection* In the interim, he vegetates and
looks after his sacred riding*2
On another occasion in assessing the role of the member,
Fisher remarked, "there is fundamental agreement on two
primary obligations s to b© a good party man and to get
re-elected".^
The party leaders and senior men in the Commons do
not regard with affection new members who attempt to become
national figures through being active in the Commons.

They

ar© particularly resentful of a member who kicks over the
party traces and such a member can expect little notice or
rewards from his party leadership.

The pressure to conform

is particularly incumbent on members of the government benches
who must take second place to the front benchers.

The

opposition benches have more latitude, but even they find it
difficult to project themselves above the *stars* who are
always first to speak from the front benches,
2
Canada, H a m a£ .fiflmwaae— gahfttfim. May 29, 1963, p. *+3b.
3
Douglas Fisher. "How Good or Bad is Your M.P,?",
F®wuary % 1966, p. 17.
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There appears to toe a vast gap between the expectations
and hopes of influencing the trend of national events, and

i

the reality of being a fhirly passive observer of the scene
who is expected to do his best to maintain party support in
his riding and vote obediently in the House*

Pierre Sevigny

in his recent book recounts how sanguinary were the hopes
of the great avalanche of new members who trailed In on the
coat-tails of John Diefenbaker in 1958*

They “wanted to do

things, execute programs, secure a new deal, a better way
of life for their constituents”,

They were soon disillusioned

and came to feel that “everyday life was dull, fastidious,
k
meaningless and irritating”,
The Conservative party had
increased its clientele and support so rapidly In 1957-53
that great numbers of people who were ’non-political* were
taken into Parliament,

They viewed with bewilderment the

slow and perplexing complexities of parliamentary procedure,
they were chagrined by the suave rebuttals and deflections
of their questions and suggestions by ministers backed up
by their civil service, and they were frustrated at their
seeming inability to influence or even communicate with
their front bench,
~ r“ rT" 'i* " 1 r" "..
Pierre Sevigny, The, d a m of Politics* McClelland and
Stewart, Toronto, 1965, p# 110-11%,
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It m y to© that the unique situation of 19 58 aggravated
to some degree the helplessness which members feel in facing
the system of Cabinet government and a powerful, complex
administration*

It brought out more clearly a situation

which had been apparent to close observers of parliamentary
government both in Canada and other parliamentary democracies
for some time*
The situation need not be so grim as it is painted
her®, but many members lack the political skill and perspicacity
to make it otherwise*

It is easier for many to concentrate

on thalr constituency and relate most of their activities in
the House to that purpose.

The selection and demands made

of most M,P*s is such that they take to this role naturally
and it is only the exceptional M*P* in terms of his party
affiliation, riding or personal background who attempts much
more*
Fisher himself expounds the active philosophy;
To my m y of thinking* the national issues are
what parliament is all about. An M,P, who
doesn’t talk, doesn’t question, doesn’t listen,
doesn*t advocate ideas he believes in and
doesn’t attack others he thinks are wrong, falls
short of even a modest standard of performance
to toe expected from an M , P , 5
It must be remembered that Fisher is a member of a
minority party - the H*H,P, - which lias never had the

^Douglas Fisher, m U $ M *
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opportunity of being the government of Canada,

They have

always indulged in the luxury of opposition and their group
has been small enough to spread around specialized areas
of interest among them*

Also, being a left wing party it

contains its share of enthusiasts of strong principles, who
are not on the whole devotees of brokerage politics,

Our

electoral system is hard on the third party, so the selection
system is more rigorous than for the other parties who
have greater numbers of ♦safe1 seats,

Thus the H.D.P. is

less likely to contain what Fisher calls ♦drones* than the
two main parties do,
there are strong pressures on the member to be
constituency oriented, both in the way in which the candidate
for Parliament is selected and in the way in which he is
expected to perform once he is elected*

The Canadian

member of parliament is, with few exceptions, from the
constituency which he represents*

The exceptions are usually

leading party members who are found safe seats, because
6
they could not get elected in their home ridings*
Hot only
Tommy Douglas after being elected leader of the newly
formed H*D*P* could not get elected to Parliament from his home
province of Saskatchewan and therefore had to travel to an
W.D.P. stronghold in British Columbia. Mr* Pearson in attempting
to regain cower in 1962 wished to have as strong a Quebec
contingent as possible, so that in the event he would be
asked to form a Cabinet he would have a strong enough Quebec
contingent to give them high level representation in the
Cabinet, B6% Maurice La raonta gne a for mar top civil servant
and academic ran in his own city of Quebec and was defeated
twice, 1958 and 1962, He then contested Outreraont-St.Jean
in Montreal and was elected in 1963.
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must they be dwelling in the constituency in which they
live, it would seem that in taany areas of Canada it has
been a telling ©lection point to have a candidate who was
born in the constituency or at least the province,

John

Me isel discloses that in the 195? election 98 elected
members were born in their own constituency, 70 more in
their oim province but not in the constituency, h-3 were
from elsewhere and the rest gave no information,^

This

tendency has been strongest in the fferitiraes and the rural
areas of the other provinces.

It will be noted that a

■much lower than proportionate representation of the
immigrant population is to be found in the louse of
Commons,'^
This would seem to indicate that local party
organisations feel that the person with strong local ties,
whom they feel has a vested interest in their own community
would be a candidate with the most appeal to the voters.
Attempts by the.central party organisations to foist
candidates on local constituencies or to disapprove a local
choice have usually been hotly resented,

Thus the British

practice of sending bright young men, who the party feels

7John Me is el, The.
M.2252*
University of for onto Press, Toronto, 1962, p, 14-5,

8
Morasan Ward, The Canadian House of Commons s
Representation« University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1950,
pp,'126-127,
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would be an asset, to submit themselves as potential
candidates to a constituency selection committee is
unheard of in Canada,

Few British members are actually

ft ora the constituency they represent, especially in the
top echelon of the party, and they therefore do not
feel it incumbent upon theimelves, nor do they naturally
incline towards, giving their constituencies their rapt
and undivided attention.
Having been selected partly because of his con
stituency orientation the elected member finds himself
besieged with demands from his constituency for action
on their behalf*

The member will feel that these demands

can only be Ignored or diverted at the peril of his seat
and many members even feel that they must exploit these
constituency demands in terms of favourable publicity to
enhance even more their hold on their constituency*

All

members feel the burden of their constituency work which
may consume up to fifty percent of their time.

It seems

the demands are particularly heavy in the case of French
members from Quebec*

Pierre Sevigny mentions the hordes

of people who descended on his house on Saturdays seeking
remedies to grievances, favors, solutions to income tax
difficulties, making claims against the government, paroles
from jail, and also many problems of a non-political
nature - such as unwed mothers seeking support for their
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children,*^

There were also the party activities and public

activities in the ridings necessary for sustaining the
support and morale of party workers,

Jfeny M.P.s inter

viewed for this study complained of this almost intolerable
drudgery which drained their energy and prevented them from
giving more attention to thinking, reading and study of
other problems,

Some appeared to relish it and it is

doubtful if they would occupy themselves with more elevated
matters even if they had the time.
The role they are forced to play tends to make
many Canadian members parochial rather than cosmopolitan
in outlook,

They tend to perceive matters largely through

regional and local perspectives,

Brady terms this phenomena

as "the endemic penalty of federalismM,^°

Me see it today

in the fragility of Canadian national unity and the lack of a
positive Canadian identity.

This lack of strong assertion of

identity inhibits Canadians from expressing clearly and forcibly
their viewpoint on the world.

There was a time when various

M,P,s expressed strongly derived views on the world.

The one-

time member for Broadview, Mr, Tommy Church, expounded the
virtues and merits of Canada’s upholding the British Empire,
French Canadians echoed the words of Papal Encyclicals and were
^Sevigny, op. cit.. p, 1^8.
i0Alexander Brady, Democracy in the Dominions. University
of Toronto Press, Toronto, x 9 W > p, 76*
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particularly hostile to c o w m i s m *

’These currents have

diminished now, If they have not faded away completely, but
they have not been replaced with an equally positive assertion
of a purely Canadian role in world affairs.
For many members the only occasions when they are
activated to express an opinion on an external matter is
when such a matter verges on local or regional interests.
Some members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs
would seem to be there because of their interest in the
International Joint Commission which is concerned with
boundary waters*

Constituents who live along these boundary

waters are directly affected by the decisions and investi
gations of this body and so M.P.s feel that this really
touches the realm of their own parochial interests.

Other

international problems such as trade agreements, fishing
limits and defence contracts are also followed closely by
members fro® the regions concerned.

Such interest emphasizes

rather than breaks down the parochialism of such members.
From the observations above we may conclude that it
is probably not ’functional* to the member’s central tasks
of representing his constituency and giving his party
support in the House, to become too articulate or interested
in external affairs.

11
On the contrary it may be ‘dysfunctional1,

11
*l*fhe concept of function has been adopted by sociology
from the biological sciences where It has been defined -
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The average member relies on his party leaders and the
government officials to provide them with a pictora of the
world on the sore esoteric subjects, of which external
affairs would be one of the foremost*

To accept ready-made

such opinions as are given out .in debates and general
discussions in caucus, is psychologically less painful than
the powers of striking out and creating one’s own impressions.
His colleagues are prone to look askance at a member who
makes a special hobby of world affairs which leads him to
©spouse Informed opinions which challenge strongly the
opinions of the established leadership*

A revolt in th©

party is usually based on some ideological alliance, as on
the medicare issue in the liberal Party, or on regional

"vital or organic processes considered in the respects in
which they contribute to th© maintenance of the organism."
Robert Merton defines functions in sociology as "observed consequences which make for the adaptation or
adjustment of a given system" and dysfunctions as - "observed
consequences which lessen the adaptation or adjustment of
the system,"
la this context if we consider that the member carries
out certain actions as a participant In the process of
representing constituents and supporting the alias of a
certain party in the legislature his actions may be regarded
as helping to maintain that system, i#e* his actions are
functional. If his actions are directed towards other ends
to the detriment of his former behaviour the system will not
be maintained* I.e. his actions will be dysfunctional. Unless
some alternative ways are found of satisfying the previous
needs then the political structure will have to be reformed
or some way will have to be found of eliminating the need
altogether.
Robert X, Merton,
Free Press of Glencoe, few York, 1957* PP* 21-81*
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feelings, as on the flag issue in the Conservative Party*
The party member who rises and. trumpets die own unique
views as did Winston Chorehill, in almost solitary opposition
to his own party, is a very rare phenomenon in Canada,
Douglas Fisher, informed, courageous and enterprising
though he was in pursuing 'importaut national issues, refused
to interest himself in external affairs.

He asserted *his

people’ were not interested in. that subject and many members
would agree,

Where are no kudos to be won in becoming a

foreign policy critic and the penalty of following it would
be diversion .from the topics which seem more politically
rewarding to the ambitious politician,

M,P*s tend to reflect

the attitudes of the majority of the general public in
having fairly stereotyped opinions of foreign countries.

In

this pageant there is light and darkness and to view the
world as such provides cathartic release for pent-up emotions.
The comprehensive and objective study of these countries
would upset these comfortable images and therefore in most
cases it is not attempted.
We have pointed out some shortcomings of the selection
process as far as creating internationally oriented members
is concerned,

John Porter points out that there is also a

weakness of the system in developing political skills and
building up what Corry terms ”a corps of recognized
party leaders with long experience in Parliament and in
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Porter believes that in Canada we do not have

na well patterned and stable career system leading, eventually
to leadership rolesn in politics*

This has been due to the

fact that politics.has too frequently been regarded as
Man interstitial stag© in a career devoted to something els©,"3^
Thus instead of following a model career from party member, to
candidate, to back bencher, to junior minister, to minister,
in steps with a gradually increasing skill in i>olitics and
increasing ability to represent and articulate the values of.
society, too often there lias been the drafted political
leader brought in directly from another career*

We have only

to examine the composition of the present liberal Cabinet
to see how administrative skills and the needs of federal
representation have taken, precedence over political experience.
With this type of system there is not such a strong incentive
for the brilliant, youthful individual to follow' a political
career the hard way by climbing the political ladder step
by step,

Instead he would be advised to concentrate on

another career from which as an established figure h© could
launch his political career.
Without these elements in the political career
it is unlikely that the political system becomes
sufficiently differentiated to be a system of
social power strong enough to make claims on
behalf of til© total society. Where the political
career is unstable and taken up for an interstitial
IP

A, Corry, Democratlo flMfflPJ3^aaniL.jand:P.Qlltlffiiu
University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 19*f6, p. 33.
13
* tiota PF teri
University of
Toronto Press, Toronto,
P*Wo,
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period only, during a career devoted to some
thing else, the political system will, probably
be strong in administration and weak in creativity.
Th© liberals, particularly, have been accused of building
the administrative government in which the temperament and
abilities of the civil servant have usurped those of the
politician.

This has resulted, according to John Meisel,

In the political ineptitude of the liberal government, due
15
directly to their disregard for the arts of politics*
When we examine that small and select company of
members who specialize in international problems wo can
immediately recognize th© symptoms which have been suggested
above.

The leading spokesmen in external affairs have boon

in the House of Commons for relatively short periods of time
the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for External
Affairs and th© loader of the Opposition excepted*

Wallace

Hesbitt was first elected in 1953 and was a parliamentary
assistant in the latter years of Mr. Diefenbaker’s govern
ment, but is now chief Conservative spokesman,
and It*. Douglas customarily speak for the W.D.P*

Mr,

t-rewin

They

were both elected in 1962, although Mr, Douglas can look
back to the experience he had as a young saaii In the Federal

•^Jahnt Me is el, "Recent Changes in Canadian Parties" an Address delivered to the Association canadienne-francaise
pour l*Avaneeiaent dec Sciences, Montreal, Movember 5, 1965,
P.1*, unpublished*
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- i 139 * Parliament from 1936 to 19M* before he returned to lead
the C.C.F, in Saskatchewan. It?* Thompson who speaks for
th© Socreds and IS*. Cauoette

who speaks for the Creditistes

have also only been there since 1962.

Committee Chairmen

have on the whole been short-lived as chairmen, and also
relatively inexperienced in th® Commons*

John Matheson

th® last Chairman of the External Affairs Committee was
elected in 1961 and became Chairman la 1963.
Chairman, Mr. Dube, was elected in 1962,

The present

Of the present

committee of twenty-four only two members were elected
before 195$ and five before 1962*

With such a limited

experience in this sphere it is small wonder that the
members lack the assurance to tackle th© officials of the
department in any fundamental way,
The weakness of the members of Parliament is not
solely .in the dimension of political experience, but also
in the whole realm of international affairs.

There were

few whose professions, education or interests had given
them any extended exposure to other countries or to any
but the most cursory acquaintanceship with international
problems.

Th© experience of Robert Thompson who spent

some years in the service of the Emperor of Ethiopia is
very exceptional.

If we look at their educational background

a small number had economies and politics in their university
training.

In view of the novelty of most international politics

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

*» i lh-0 « *•
courses in Canadian universities it is quite unlikely that
many had any training in that particular subject#

The

great majority of those active in this sphere are lawyers#
This makes for the generalist in politics with a facility
for analysis of problems but possibly a limited capacity
for getting the ’feel * of other cultures#

Unlike the

parliamentary traditions of Western Europe and Japan,
Canada has never seemed to favor the academic or the civil
servant in politics with the exception of th© rare individual
who is drafted into the top level#
If members or potential members participated in the
study of international problems with such other interested
groups as academics, th© press, civil servants and th©
general public, they might attune themselves not only to
International problems but to the thinking of these other
groups#

There is however very little intercommunication

between M.P.s and these.groups#

In th© last ten years

hardly a dozen members of Parliament have been members of
the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and

possibly only half of that number have at any time played
an active role in that orgaaization#

In the Ottawa Men's

^ I n the last seven years examination of the C#I.I.A,
annual reports reveal that the following members of Parliament,
past and present, have occupied various executive positions in
th® C.I.I#A. *
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Branch of th® C.I.I.A*, which is vary active and has had
frequent meetings, good speakers and study groups, M.P.S
have hardly ever p a r t i c i p a t e d . T h e same lack of interest
Is shown la the United lations Association, although more
members have a nominal membership for the sake of appearance.
The nature of Ottawa as a capital with less then metropolitan
pretensions also restricts M.P.s from wider contacts, unlike
the opportunities of members of the legislature In Paris,
London or Tokyo.

M.P.s make little use of th© social inter

course which is available in Ottawa, partly from their
preoccupation with their more strictly parliamentary duties
and partly from lack of inclination.
Those members who are appointed as delegates to
international conferences are afforded a means of broadening
their horizons in external affairs.

These visits have the

potential of assisting members in developing a more out
ward orientation and emancipating them from a total pre
occupation with their own parochial affairs.

Walter Gordon, Mitchell Sharp, Bud Drury, Marvin Gelber
(Liberals) 5 Roland Michener (conservative) ; Andrew Brewln
(N.D.P.), In 196*4- the C.I.I.A. held a western and eastern
Canadian-American assembly. In the western assembly the
only participants were Davie Fulton and Howard Green both
Conservatives. In the eastern assembly there were Mitchell
Sharp, Andrew Brewln, Heath Macquarrie and Jean Marchand,
l?Based on an interview with a former ©ember of the
executive of the Ottawa Men*s branch of the C.I.I.A.
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The information gained at these conferences can give an.
added dimension to a meraber*© contributions and contacts
made on these visits may prove to be useful sources for
future consultation.
Canadian parliamentarians now customarily participate
in the following international meetings on a regular basis *
the Inter-Parliamentary Union, th® NATO parliamentarians,
the Commonwealth parliamentary group and the CanadlanAraerican parliamentary group..

Members also attend meetings

of the United Nations and occasionally other international
organizations as delegates if they are members of th©
government party or as observers if they are opposition
members •
The benefits from this international exposure have
not been as great as they might have because of the turnover
of members and the lack of any lengthy experience obtained
by any particular group.

The visits are too often regarded

as ‘junkets* and as a reward for faithful party support or
as a good thing that must be shared around.

In th© past

th® briefings have not been as good as those of other
delegations and Canadian representatives have not stood
out.

Too often members seem to have returned with their

prejudices re-confirmed rather than their minds broadened.
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• * 1^3 t Interviews revealed that few members had m y contact
with th© faculty of Car let on or Ottawa Universities, oily a
select few were invited to diplomatic receptions and cocktail
.parties and few belonged to clubs or associations where
they might be expected to socialize with officials of the
department of External Affairs,

There was a positive distrust

and antipathy on the part of some M.P,s towards External
Affairs officials and such terns as 'striped pants brigade*
and *a bunch of mandarins* were used to describe them*

The

feeling seemed mutual for conversations with some of the
officials revealed that many officials believed M,P*s
were completely ignorant of foreign affairs and that their
efforts to pronounce on them were rather ludicrous if not
1H
dangerous*
Unlike most of the other departments of
government, M.P,*s had little occasion to contact the
Department of External Affairs on official business.

Most

of their problems with external matters went to the

discussion with a former senior official of
the Canadian government revealed what seems to be an
important strand of thought among government officials,
although it is quite Impossible to establish how significant
it is in th© absence of empirical studies. The official
quoted and endorsed the opinion expressed by Walter Lippraan
h?ok
Mentor,Toronto,1963.
In this book juippman deplores what he feels has been the
destructive and wrong-headed influence which has been
exerted by public opinion at critical junctures in his
country's diplomatic history. "The people have imposed a
veto upon the judgements of informed and responsible
officials,” p. 2k,
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- * iMf t Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration, the Passport
Office or the Ministry of Trade and Commerce.

M,P.s were

often at a loss as to where particular inquiries had to go
and it was up to the ministers executive assistant to
direct them to the proper department.
The configuration of relationships outlined above
deals largely with the situation up to the present time.
It would be unrealistic to assume that this situation will
persist or that there are not forces serving to alter it
at the present time.

It might be that we shall soon have

a new generation of members of parliament educated in the
post-war era, coming from urban, cosmopolitan backgrounds
whose focus is less parochial and jejune than the older
generation*

Possibly Me*. Warren Allmand (liberal) of

Motre-Dame-de-Grace, Montreal may be a forerunner of this
group*

He was elected in 1965 and mad® his maiden speech

in the debate on external affairs in February of 1966.
In this speech he asserted that he regarded this field
as one of the greatest importance and he said that h© had
been attracted to political life because of his interest
in international

affairs

H£* member ship in the Liberal

party had been partly influenced by the exploits of It*.
Peax*son on the international stage when he had occupied
the position of Secretary of State.

Mr. Allmand is on the

19Canada, House of Commons Debates. February 3, 1966,
p. 662.
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Standing Committee for External Affairs and although only
a novice has not been content to let the hall be taken by
senior party or opposition members., he asked questions and
gave his views on a wide range of topics during committee
hearings.

During his short period in the House he has also

spoken, or asked questions, on China*s admission to the
Uhifced nations, on the Company of Young Canadians, defence
expenditures, United nations peace-keeping and on external
aid twice*

Mr* Allmand is only thirty-four and. his back

ground is that of an urban lawyer who received his education
at St* Francis Xavier, McGill and the University of Paris *
One has to go back to the thirties to the young
Paul ifertin to view a similar type of young man, but whereas
Paul M u r t in was a rarity in his party, it seems that with
the present developments in Canada that Ms?. Allmand will
not be an isolated exception.

Our press, our educational

system must inevitably follow the trail of interests which
now touch all continents*

Through the United Nations, and

through the Commonwealth, Canada is now a participant in
questions which at one time we should have viewed as
distant observers.

The existence of a more informed and

more alert public opinion will inevitably lead to some
restrictions on the freedom of action of the minister and
his department in the domestic context.
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- 5 i*+6 * D, C. Watt has described the "dominant climate of
opinion" as "the general state of opinion, which limits

20

actions and imposes criteria by which they are judged."

Parliament and the members as individuals can play their
part in this public opinion if they can articulate it and
harness it by the us© of their contacts with the people and
their political skills.

If they neglect this role they may

be by-passed and the government m y act from a type of
plebiscitary confirmation through the press or some form
of polling technique*

If the members wish to remain a

vital part of the process of ‘feed back* to the government
they must become more proficient than they have up to the
present.

20I).C. Watt, Personalities and Politics* University
of Hotre Dame Press, 1965, p. 55.
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Tfw rol# of ths mmh®F of parlis sent iaf to sows
rntmt) dsteroinod by th® societal, pressures outside of the
House of Coonon**

fte© m i nipix

s of the functioning of

the political parties are also to be found in the wider
political system*

flits chapter will explore and assess

tli© nexus of relationships vhleh the party has with the

electorstot party traditions and their regional disparities!
and the various special interests and their influence*
It will also dwell on the special * refating function
attempted by the extra-parliamiatary parti and assess its
efficacy*
flic political party should not be regarded as just
a funnel whereby tbm opinions and feelings of the electorate
nr© gathered in and relayed upwards to the decision inkers•
As Blagraa 1 tries to show there it t dynenilc interaction
between party lendersf their 'followers and the various
segments of public opinion*

the construction of the party

platform and the way in which it is iapleasntsd in external
• i lh? t •
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and ether matters is greatly affected fey the m y In which
it (the party) carries oat Its otter functions to the
political system*
The political party*s most m n i f m t function is to
ispotuyfco the oleetion of candidates to office and to mobilise
the support of voters behind them*

The exigencies of

sttesptlag to goto political potter through the electoral
process to a particular society t o a strong bear tog cm the
platform* the personae! and the organization of each party*
to order to s m together a majority in a country such as
Canada it is Imperative that a political .party constitutes
itself to such a way that it m n m s h m m m

grant a

variety of diverse groups t o e d on stratification, regionaltos, religion* ethnicity, economics and traditions.

The

demands of electing candidates to a country so diverse and
reglonalised ae Canada haa imposed, a strong brokerage element
to all parties that have national pretensions*
The necessity to attain as wide a consensus as
possible among a multiplicity of divers© interests militates
against the efforts of the national parties to create coherent9
rational programnea based upon a eleareut set of philosophical
principles*

W® therefore m y look to vain for parties which

have ideologically pore platfaros that adtaer© consistently to
socialism* liberalism or conservatism*

Although the Canadian

parties lack Ideological definition they are not motivated
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solely by opportanis«*

A political party cannot appeal to

ell; it asset| if it is to attain a modicum of stability*
attract a loyal clientele %
values and a aras*

projecting certain recognisable

Over a long period of tine part tea evolve

•table tra&itioos and myths*

0&«a»la*ielly the misfortunes

of political war tore may cause a political party to make a
•harp taro bat too inertia of its traditional association#
have a tendency to ffeipea down the capacity for change,
to this perspective the “vision*1 of a hiefanbetan* or the
“lew Oeaiisa" of a Banaett seam like temporary aberratlsns
rathe? than beacons to guide the party along new paths*

lb® difficulty of obtaining a national consensus and
also of supporting a strong* responsible purlin notary
goveruaeiit has imposed burdens on the two traditional parties
with which they have not been able to H a d the resources
to ©ops*

the eruption of third* fourth a M fifth parties

has been caused by the inability of the two party system to
represent' the desires of all regions and groujss*

The

•uppertore of these neweeaers have felt that what the
traditional parties ©fibred was to© Island or that an
Insufficient outlet for their aspirations was offered*
we try to apply the above analysis to the ©gemination of
party attitudes to foreign policy w© find a set of
conflicting tendencies at work*

Because three of the

parties ** the liberals* Conservatives and 8*D*P» » are
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notional in tha scope of their organisations, they tend to
have m

underlying agreement about anjew? policy themes.

However, ttm differences in origin, traditions, aemtoership
and support tend to give cacti party a fa ir ly distinctive

emphasis* Both the Scerede sai the Creditlot© perties
©re nor® pertleularlat in their * k m p and tend to
represent a fhirly narrow and fmroehlaX saction of Interests
la foreign affairs, particularly the latter party#
the development of eultl-psrtlsn in Canada has
await that there is a w such lot® obfuscation of the
issues of foreign policy and that ©ash party is able to a
greater extent to listen to its inner voice m d

bring forth

sens points la which its particular stance is unique*

Mother factor tending to emphasis* this trend 1# the
apathy of the voter generally to nest nstters of foreign
policy*

this a l l w e acre freedon for the interested party

militant® to press their pelisles and have then adopted by
the party*
t o sewr extent the three .national parties are
coalitions of regional Interests b u t each party is not
c3'apo»od of fche « » » regional interests*

All th© parties

are weals in son® regions and strong in other®.

At the

present tie© the liberals are strong federally in i i m
Bast) particularly In Ontario* Quebec and Newfoundland#
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The Conservatives ©re strong in the Prairies and parts of
the Jtariiiswi*

Tim

is strong in British Columbia

and aatae urban regions and raining regions of Manitoba
sad Ontario*

There Is aa Inner struggle within the .parties

to keep ttieir plat fora® open to raessages which will appeal
to the areas la which they mm w » %

bat the presence of

strong fares* within their ratal® firon other areas assay tend
to d r a w then oat*

The troleo of the JPreirles any find it

difficult to get a hearing in the federal liberal Party at
the present tios*^ As a result of n&tl-partlsts and regional
representation within the parties we «ay find that the
.parties speak with no clear national voice m external
matters but only re-echo the deeands sad feelings of certain
groups or areas.

%otwitte tanking the apparent success of the western
wing of tbs astlsnal Mteral Party in obtaining s o m of its
d em n ds at the Hatlone! liberal Cooventieu at Ottawa*
October 1066, a region which is not represented in the
Cabinet beea-use of the absence of elected aeebers t z m that
region, is likely to i m m & weakened voice in the party.
The vest** success in routing the Ctardon faction of the
liberal P a r t y is due nor# to its association with the
Influence of Mitchell Steep who has the confidence of tho
eastern business groups, than to any intrinsic sewer in
their mm group.
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ft© Americans la?3 progressed further than Canada
towards what seas observers term the "nationalisation of
polities *"

fits spread of Industrialism and urbanism and

the concomitant i »er m m a n t s la cennmleatian have blurred
regional and loeal differences .in many areas*

lit the nationalisation of &aerleaa «ultnre loeal
ways of life, loeal Idontlfloations and pride,
m m loeal political folkways, yield their
place* Xaer ©©singly, the m m political symbols,
the same political issues and appeals, the m m
politim l personages dominate Amor lean politics*2
urbanism promotes this trend fey cresting masses of
voters with weakened loeal loyalties and thus helps to
crust© the foundations for a nation-wide political organ
isation resting directly o« the constituents, .Instead of

a eonfederatlen of regional leaders*

The electoral focus

on one dominant leader has encouraged this trend*

T h is

t o cos has besoms more marked in recent years in both

Canada and -ireat Britain, although they both lack the
presidential system of direct election of the leader fey
the people*
In the U*S.A* nationalisation of polities has had the
effect of spreading polarized two-party polities to more
sections of the nation*

Loeal third parties or former

Little, Braun & Go., Boston, 1

p713>*
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- ? 153 * aa@*pupty domination s m m to b© declining*

Xhe fl.D.P,

ami sota® of Its intellectual apologists such as Sad Ilor©witxf
t e w teea hoping far, sad © M o r s lag, s m ti a possible tread
for smm tins*

T tm j claim that oar present system obfuscates

debate aa a left-right coatlaiwa and sncoorsges cleavage
along regional lines*

This ispedw national unity and

setose it difficult for a asaoiagitol and lnforaed exchange
3
of opinions asamg tte attentive pitoltc*
Although Canada has not yet reacted tte stage which
has b&m reached in tte 1J.S.A. s w

observers find, evidence

of treads in that direction*
Although class voting ims a
ctincreased in t
t
e
19**5~6X perite, tte social foundations which
imply aa increase of ©lass polities are feeing
laid. Canada is feee«iag aura urbanised and
Industrialtz®&t particularly in sane of tte
provinces that tew© ted defiant politics Although t m data m m available on tte changing
elaas bases, certain inferential evidence was
given. More "seeularieed” persons exhibit more
class voting, and class voting is higher in
arteii ureas. If ftetter ©tenses t©ward urban*
iz&tioa and secularisation c m be predicted as
Qostee ate tte iteritiia© Provinces continue to
Industrialise t h m possibly class voting in
Canada will rise.*
Because of tte' pv«eat uncertain standing of tte Canadian.

3(iad Hsrowlts,
pa p«r delivered at the EPlCccmforerie©, for onto, J®*@t1966.
Si. Alford, 'ttaiiadat Par© Ion Class Polities,”
Cai»dlfta...aaalfttg* ed. B. Blistea at al., p. 323*
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political parties it is not easy to discern any clear
debate an tte tesie principles of oar foreign policy*
listori©ii3J.yf eeeb of the parties tea embodied certain
fenteneieet traditions and eapheees on foreign affairs
bet to son®, degree sany of the® Have beeoae irrelevant
to oar ©imaged situation since the Mar*
m m

Party attitudes

not easily changed because they are established deep

.la our political culture.

At the w r y founding of

Confederation in I36?t relations vlth Britain and the
U*S*JW end tte implications cjn Caaedian aatonoogr were
eardinel eoRSideratlem end eentiime to be so*.

fte liberals hare always been w m m prone to emphasise
tte feet that Canada Is a Korth American nation and to
promote Canadian autonony S t e o m 3reat Britain*

they have

always ted more strains of anti^«)narehio&lt republican
eentiaeot in their rentes and thus have been m m ®
of Aaarieen seines and ln&osnces*
t e w always M M

receptive

fte Conservatives

»or# ©aphasia on British traditions and

m i n e s and t e w at various tiass feared and resisted tte
possible extension of American influence into Canada*
ftelr position tea always seemed aoare pronounced
when these parties were la opposition than when they forraed
tte % m m w m m & n

As g u w t i M t s they tended to soften tte
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position they took i» opposition and draw nearer to the
policies of their opponents*

Tte Mortals were quite

critical of teedooeld*s netioisal policy of protecting
domestic Canadian industry fey .protective tariffs acid were
reluctant to endorse W o extravagant imfcicm*toiiiMi»g
railways policies*

As a governaaiit they retained tho

tariffb and indulged ia an orgy of railway building at
the beginning of this eantnry*
The If11 election was partienlarly indicative of
the bias of the two parties*

TWe external issues dominated

the election j that of a reciprocity treaty with the U.3.A.

sad the qtKestien of Canadian naval defence*

The Liberals

urged the need of Canada's building its own navy and pushed
far a renewal of reciprocity la trade with tte United States*
fte Conservatives stated that Canada could beet ask# a
worthwhile contribution to Canadian defence by tasking a
financial contribution te the Royal navy*

Tte theae they

really developed was tte nationalistic fear of American
domination sowaod up in tte slogan "No truck or trade with
tte XssMcees”*
Tte themes still play an important part in Canadian
party polities feat with added complications*

la regard to

defence w© viewed tte spectacle of Cosumrva lives and Hew
Democrats resisting A m P i m m

pressures for Canadian acceptance

of certain nuclear weapons .in tte 1162 elections as against
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tlbereX toe&s&enee that v @ a t a s a M carry
miss to the 'l»d*A*
&f %&„

mm ttmmlt u m t *

% e CotiaesTO&tiree h a w also mcfe exieti

4aaU»feI«t of Caocdieui ia&wtry la the X?3? election

tot while ifi office $ b H e & to ila tasjCTt cboat itt aod faiied
la their a&eh veuotecl e&teasgA to onifcea Ibb of Caaaus'e
trod* f t * the 9*s#iw to tfreefc Brlfeia*
Sear#® tlnsa4 now believer the* aeitiam* the fciUirela
not the Ceaeervetieoe at® beeloelly Jntererted la prajsatiae
aatiim&lletl& eeaooate polieiea la iv* tioa to the ilalteA
State® because of the decline of ilK?
&:mm$ Qiimdimi

mlmamt

elltee sad & »e ;?&&& o f a corporate

hletetehy «itfi n eoatlaanteX outlook*
the m t h m

* » still l eawe

phenoiMeoa of Walter iopaoat e forear

Mber&l Ftneoee

o re&her laoaly battle

within fits party far -s»a®«ros -fee protect
tod&poudeoee*
In the w m %

gq

©soaoesie

With the aaeeyjdaaey of the tMSIsisss oloawit
A & roaasertion of the

baslasss

djeaaasW# ia the Ccneenrettv* f*trty9 ffnl believes that
the era

of a C m m m m t l m

ratlociallet p iill* o p ! . ^ will

tmm

m n i & i m d uai they will, J-o just ee eantiooiitGllat sa the
fcikH&mXe*

5

fills theelo «|? praTO to {fee overly rxisf-iasiatic*

bat, it is difflealt to m m

hoe the Caoeerveilwee eaa

4 M M M A M M M > m riiiii^in M n ra ivtiM M nn > raiii 'jN nM lW M W m m n M ran w cin rH 'iinC fiT iV J

wte»g© IrfMit- Laaant far & i.te.tiaiu iteClellaiK! &nd

Stewart t toronto* 1 Is 7f m * *1*5$ S

i s*
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• t 157 t realistically hop© to build an electoral m , } ority i n the
future unless they battle the liberals for the support
of tte s a w business elites which t m m - tended to give
woot support to the Liberals*
fib® C.C.F* and tho&r successor the ff.D.P* have
always drawn m

a different strand in foreign policy from

tbftt of the Liberals and Conservetires*

Many of the early

leaders were of direct British stock and they toolc as their
eoKttple and iaspirsbim the evolutionary social is is of the
British Labour Party*

to the l>30*s they r@ma.ined suspicious

of Britain as an iaperielist fewer and heartily desired no
ftarml c w m s l t m n l of Canadian support of Britain in a European
war*

I n some respects they reeesbled the American isolationists

of that .period*

Wien Britain faced doreeny the call of blood

was too strong end with th® exception of Woodworth, the
C.C.F. leader, th# C.C.F, supported the entry of Canada into
th® war at Britain’s side*
Sine# tte war the C*€*F* and tte H«D*P« have been
drawn towards, but never completely captivated by, &
''socialist" foreign policy*

6

Such a policy would presuaably

imply tte extension of tte ideals of a socialist brotherhood
of » » fro® tte national to tte international level*

This

^Kenneth Ifcffeuglit, n k Socialist Foreign Policy,"
£*•* M i c h a e l Oliver, Toronto
University Pres®, Toronto, 1-161, p.* 2*K>.
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has expressed Itself c o n c r e t e l y in a dislike of ailltary

alliances* strong support for disar-mtaent, especially
nuclear, support for the malted nations as an agency f o r

p o l i c y disputes and mintalning peace, extension o f econotaic
aid t o developing areas & M starong support of a -mlti-raclal

eoenaixeealth as an expression of interim timiali® a in the
norld»

Shese ideals are not foreign te tins other parties,

bat they h a w been. pursued b y the

with greater

eptlstsa and seal*

t h e leadership* laeladiag aoet of the parlianeatary
party* has always been aore eatttlens than the militants la
the party, and this has ceased a noticeable rift in the party

at t i m e *

O n the question of Oksarma re-araamnt* 'derma

saabership la iif:
0 and Canadian participation in M t o and

KCRAO thare have been strong dieagreeamits* In 1 9 % ©t
wo
the Begins Convention of the C •<*«?* a resolution was
p a m e d which as da it party policy to press far a Canadian
withdrawal firaaa M ? 3 »

this m s not liked by east of the

leadership which noticeably soft-pedalled the issue la
Ibrllamnt*

At the Founding Convention of the h«d«p* in

Ottawa la I960 the leadership m & e resolute efforts to
sac- that the prsvieos policy m s defeated and that support
of K&¥0 oaniaership for Canada again became official policy*
On© of the chief arguments used was that a cosamitaient to
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withdraw froa It&fO would be a heavy a W s t s n e around the
party*a s m k at election time*
Today tte party s m m

to be united an a clear and

die timet policy based m & nationalist Canadian independence
■Millet* would detach itself from support of American foreign
policy at»d would deaoaetvate this by recognising China and
condensing the tf«d* intervention in South Vietnam.

While

still not urging a withdrawal frota tlAftJ the party reraains
sceptical of it as a military alliance and Meats to expand
econoale eeoperatloa through KAfO machinery.

It prefers

Canada#s defence effort to be concentrated in a aobile
defence fore© to be teed principally to support 0.1* peaee*
keeping efforts*
A m rte m ts m

ftere it- above all a strong current of anti-*

in tte party, which is a compound of anny things

but it is largely grounded in an antipathy to individualistliberal-bustriess-ethoc which party members believe is tte

active farce of American society,
Tte excursion into tte foreign policy attitudes of
three national parties in Canada was attempted to establish

just what c o m m ground there is among parties ate what is
tte basis of their differences*

ftere is one view on foreign

policy which states that ”th© objective requirements of tte
national interest place- certain irremovable limits upon any

statteaan seeking to forsalat® foreign policy**

This view

point suggest® that foreign policy rests on such determinants

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

- i 160 t »
as historical traditions* geographical locality m d
national interests and that irrespective of the regim

in

power these stubborn and perauieat realities can only be
i
g
n
o
r
e
dmtsnation** peril*?
Another viewpoint prefers to see foreign policy a®
an expression of an ideological eons tract, which emanates
frost the dominant ontloak of the leaders, or can b# clewed

m m oat pat of t ha political spatee which will be strongly
affected by the nature of that system*.
The approach see- lakes la formulating foreign policy realist or idealist - will affect strongly one’s desires to
take issue with the prewaillag foreign policy and create a
new and comprehensive alternative which fits one’s vim# of
the world m r e completely*

Tim left has always put its faith

in ideas of refers of the international situation and disdained
the argument that they were disregarding the limits Imposed by
geographical and historical factors,

the right has been

prone to eondeen the left for its utopianism and emphasised
the enduring realities of the international seen®.

Clearly

the two sides state two estrones and the actual shaping of
policy lies somewhere between the two*

The durable factors

sot broad U n i t s within which the choices of foreign policy
« y be made and within which the domestic straggle is fought oat.
f Sannetii W* Thumps on, "Theories and Problems of foreign
Policy," foreign Policy In ftarldPOUtifts* ed*t Hoy C.ifecridis,
£ = & • i a i r r a r i h E f i ^ ^
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- i l6l : We have seen that in the past there was a dichotomy
in our foreign policy debates between a pro-American autonomy
stance and a pro-British imperial involvement,

The changing

power positions of Britain, tJ,S,A, and Canada have made this
irrelevant and there is need now for a new dichotomy to
produce the most productive debate on fundamental principles.
The internationali st- pro-U,N , and. third world view versus
the pro-Aiserlcan security view is the cleavage that seems to
be developing.

That we do not have It clearly presented at

the present time is due to the fragmented nature of our
party system and the numerical weakness of the left's
representation In parliament.
The improvements in communication, increasing urban
ization, an expansion of higher education, increased travel
are producing a more sophisticated public opinion on external
affairs.

This public opinion is likely to be ranged along a

spectrum from the most utopian-internationalist to the most
hard boiled advocates of real politik.

The opinions held

by these people arise from an interaction of their own
psychological bent, their socialization into the political
system and a rationalization of their self-interests.

Thus

each individual will have his own unique view of the inter
national situation.
The task of our parties is to develop opportunities for
these individuals to articulate these opinions and aggregate
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then into mnegeeble *1 teraetive policies which they can
display before tte electorate.
o n ly

By sc doing they will not

he helping to educate the electorate in foreign policy

issues they will toe w i n g these Issues to promote Canadian
unity through the dowoXofmot of a national outlook cm the
w o r ld ,

The

productiveness of tte defeats in parUaiasat will

depend to a large extent so the offsetivoneo* with which the
parties are reelly in touch with whatever active centres of
opinion there are and also to what extent they are able to
e m k m tte latent interest of tte such larger layers beyond.
There is m e m sign that tte parties are becoming tier© aware
of this, as tte next section on tte extra-parliamentary organisstlon of tte- .party will hope to show.

tte . y m e l m m m t .of.flatty M L l o H a .
Bn tte discussion in Chapter I of tte role played
toy public opinion in tte- fwi»tion of foreign policy it
w s suggested that tte officials of tte Department of
External Affairs and tte senior geveraaent leaders have
considerable scope to seise policy unfettered by a strong
and persistent attention free public opinion,

to tte

degree to which issues and decisions have seeded to be
remote and coaplex, tte public has h e m indifferent and
willing to allow tte initiative to be taken by tte
influential elites*
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As Canada las t m m drawn to participate ears actively
in world affairs sad as the tarsus of eonmnieation have
served to extend the awareness of ©vests la the world out
side, more and

m om

layers of the public are able to

observe that their interests ere Involved*

There have been

persistent densafts daring the last fifty years far a greater
degree of deaoerecy in foreign policy*

fhe Progressives

tittered It In the twenties, Woodworth awl the- C*C.F*
in- the thirties and today in the sixties the Young liberal
radicals and the followers of M l too 6asg> in the Conservatives
are all u r g i n g a greater degree of participation in shaping
party goals m

the part of the general membership of the

party*.
the political parties have always been responsible
for gathering ideas and ileaauds frost the east widespread
eleaaoits of the population, and arranging c o m p r o m i s e s a m o n g
various groups end regions*

M y

in this way could a

sufficiently wide base be attained to support a mjority
government*

this process m s , for the m o s t part, carried

on Informally at the vary top level of Interaction between'
gowerxuasat leaders, influential public figures and the
leaders of powerful associations*

The national parties,

outside of the parlieeentery parties, m m

extremly loosely
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organised with only the m m t sh@te.lif elesttats of organ
isation between the .grass roots and tte esntre»
Although Canadian parties have been influenced fey tte
elements off a detmeratle structure in tte African parties,
It was only with tte a p p m m m e of the CJ*C#F. In tte X130*s
that Canada witnessed the rise off a political party which
avowedly set out' to ao&el itself on the m s s wishership,
democratically structured, left-wing parties of Western
Europe*

ffhe snpreaae governing body of the C.C.F. and its

aoceeesor tte I.B.P. is tte national convention, held ©very
two years.

It is- responsible for laying down imjor policy

proposals, electing or emfirming tte national leader and
electing tte national council* which is the suprene party
organ between eonventlone*
Until recent years neither tte Literals nor tte
Conservatives s»d® any strenuous efforts at establishing an
extensive grass-roots structure which was linked with tte
central party organisation by asaas off regularly held
conventions and democratically elected governing organs*
ffhese parties have fe«©» aore in tte nature of vhat Ouverger
calls *cadref parties.
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fins esdr© p u t t y eorvospartds to a different
eoneepilaat the grouping of notabilities for
tte preparation of elections * conducting
campaigns and «&afcatotog contact with the
candidates* iaflmoatial persons, la the first
place* whose name, prestige* or connections
eas provide a backing for the candidate and
secure Iiisi votm ? experts* in. the second
place* she Senas hew to handle the ©lectors and
h m to organise a campaign; last of all
3
flnaneiars* who can bring the sinews of war.
the electoral function seeasad the- soet manifest
and the formal party organization hardly acknowledged say
naed to give the rank and H I ® supporter any channel to
exert his inflnanee on policy*

If public opinion expressed

Itself to large generalities* it m s through group
representation* through tte press and perhaps tte indi
vidual neater of parUnseat*
Aeeountshllity of tte leader and tte elected
representatives to tte parties at large have recently
become pressing issues to tte l i t e r a l and Conservative
.parties* as m u examination of their 1966 national
conventions will later show*
■Superfieigllj It teeoed that a certain degree of
aeeooatebillty has existed for asm© tlae*

Xte Liberals

held tte first national party eaovsntion to 1393*

1

leading neuBpapar eaawmted at tte tins*
'""ni

1' ’"W
",r'1i
'
1""J
"‘ ""1'1'T'-1
-""ii-iinnir'-TTr1■-f-irmirn°H&uriee Duverger* Political Parties. Selene©
Editions, dote Wiley* Sew iffife* 1963* p* oft*
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A party convention such m
that fee be held
at Ottawa recognises tte right of every asater
of the party to a voice in the aatelng of its
policy , * * II is is srtent that it shell be
as large as ,1s eacmmleat* and shall be freely
chosen sad thoroughly rpreseatative of tte
great body of Literals#*
flic 01ebe*s eacpeetation of degsoemtle partlelpetUn
fey tte rank sad file did net mteriellge, for it tips act
until 1962 that tte Liberal* held another ec«iveatiasaf
atter tte® for tte selection of a party .leader*

Mowat

tte Liberal Treadear of ttitario aey have realised tte real
value of

in peoeatlag perty unity wten he hoped

that n m m here would go teas with their politiesI faith
stroagtteoad ate their political seal quietened*** after

10
the 1893 eottwntioo#

Leadership eoEiventlaQS of both tte Conservatives
end the Liberals have teen iapo*tant stages when party

attitudes and pregraaoee were reassessed*

Pickersgill

could elalji that tte 1919 convention which m d o Mackenzie

H a g Liters! leader eat oat a prograsaas* which taapped out
a course, which lasted King his long career as Canada9s
sast dorablo prlfia-iilnister*^-

These -aeetings have on

*lflraafa>-JHfllMu Jfcy 9* 1393*

v„i
rU IfllrlM*..
b , r ,
x
g U-I*
University of
X9vO«

p

a oronto

dress,

„
a or onto,

* Zj *
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tte whole set the tone and laid oat gener&X objectives
rattier than specific alas which the parties felt obliged
to realise*
She Liberal convention of X9LS which elected
St* Laurent m s MfeermX leader and the Conservative
convention of 1956 which m & & John Olofenbakar party
loader, typify what conventions sa&st ia tte past*

fte

Liberals had teen in. office thirteen years by llL-3 and had
developed a strong administratis* cabinet arid a close
liaison with tte civil service*

Stey relied on tte civil

service to feed them with information arid ideas and on
their cl w e relationship with many Liberal provincial
governments and tte elected representatives to give them
'feedback* on the currants of public opinion*

The ljfcS

convent!cm m s held to cemont support behind tte chosen
heir St* Laurent and give him a good send off in [its new
role as Prime Minister*

Although a great deal was made of

making tte. Convention as large and as representative as
poesible9 and of requesting rank and .file participation
through resolutions, the Convention really failed to
develop enar true upsurge of feelings mad opinion f r o m tte
party baas*

tte debates were dominated by authoritative

statements fi?o« ministers and island resolutions coached in
tte most general terms which were inevitably unanimously
approved*

Broete-CXaxioa introduced a resolution on
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external affairs t sloilar to the pletituaes M e t d a m
In tli® speech fstam tlie H h P o m $ mid accompanied fey a brief
eulogy of tte conduct of ex tonal affeirs by St. Laurent
and

Mmkmmi®

H iig *

There was no defeat© on t h is re s e X u tim

and it gained unaainous approval*

fti© tie® all attod to

this topic la %hm three d & $ session m * apprasisaately
12
fifteen slngies*

She Conservatives in 195© tent to greot lengths
to cartstract a uneh ser® ©1aberate prograit»ie than the
Liberals bed la 19%8*
need to develop « e

Being in opposition they felt the
detailed ;polieies.

Mr. Die fatifea&ert

one© elan ted leader, proceeded to disregard tte whole
programs mad turned to h i s - m m personal sources far
inspiration la his campaign,

He clearly felt at that

titae, that lie would select fros the convention pr©grains®
only wfsa.t he feels appropriate in his reading of tte
public O m m x u d M and party support*
Xhls situation is tte Conservative and liberal
parties trould earns© no surprise to such students of elite
theories as Michelst llaaateiat and rayaoad Araa.

They

suggested that la any lar§© and complex society

national
literal »tera£ioist S f i m . l f i #

3
3

John Meisel, wfte Farsnlation of tte Liberal and
Conservative Pro.gras«s in tte 195? Canadian Election.M
ateL. Political ,dcieaco.
Vol. XiVI| I960.
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desecrecy can only be r m w m m si ta tlee * not
direct- and that the
am a
ittorlfy who clearly possess .greater political
power than those whom they represent, since
ill# influence o f the latte? t is confined to
pessins judgement at f&irly long i n t e i ^ l s ,
upon the set ivities of the minority**™
f&ebel* eo&fltined in particular tbs structure and
operation of the Socialist parties of Western Europe

which declared theaselves wedded to the concept of grass
roots party democracy*

He fetes! that these parties were

dominated by an ollg&rotiieai structure in which leaders
dominated followers because of their expertise# control
ofer m m m n i m t t m and mastery of the arts of politics*
Bobert Mstefeensle in his study of the British parties
ecnfSrs»d Michel** findings# claiming that the labor
party leaders were no mare o p e n t o rank and file control
than were the Conservative leaders, despite the Labour
Party** apparently tench sore democratic structure*^
Canadian party leaders ftawe always been prone to
suggest that the real element o f cnomocracy lay .not so such

in their accountability

to. a deaioeratleally structured

party# but in their responsiveness to the people es a

whole*

It is noticeable that m e n after the great

lkt

Battoaare»

l
o
o
d
o
o
#1
9
6
6
# p* 1
1
6
*

WMAMA.. SmtefaL* Pelican#

„ ,
MeiCeasie*
2nd Bditioa# heinneean# London#1963# P*
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upsurge of demands far a greater voice of the whole party
la paliey and leadership in 1966, th© liberal and Con
servative leaders saacl© It el ear that the Contention
decisions were only guidelines to be acted upon fey the
parliamentary group its and when they deetned appropriate*
Evca the C*e*J'*f which bee nade great play of its

*democratically* decided Convention and national council
decisions daring debates In the House, has qualified its

obligation to the estra^parll&iigentary party*

Coldwell

the C*C*F* leader stated at th® 19**3 national convention *
What we should adopt should be regarded, as a
raialmuai we Intend to carry oat as tin® and
circumstances permit. that and the wwiaer of
fulfil Intent wait fee left to the Judgeaaut of
the parliamentary grcup whose activities will
fee assessed fey the Canadian electorate to whom
in the final analysis under ottr democratic and
parliamit&rxsysto they sosi always fee
res pons ible**®

It would seem that those who hold that th© main democratic
responsibility incurred fey political leaders is to allow the
public to pass judgement m
time mere or I m n

their policies frors tin© to

accept an elitist theory*

They believe

that the people can only be governed fey their represent
atives and that the only guarantee of popular restraint
is competition for power among different elites*

16i\.
brnia
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- t 171 t implication they would seem to reject til® not loo that It
is possible or desirable to allow aors participation by
the people m

a whole to political, social and economic

decisions.
these t w o v l m m

were clearly discernible among both

the participants in ant noanBntators tut the 1966 liberal
party national e m a a t l o n .

fro® the young, radical group*

led by such people as Murk ftteOtilgea, Andrew Thompson
and femliae Jewett there earn© the suggestion that the
ties w m

rip© for fall neeotintabillty of both the national

leader and the parXlaasntary party to the national con
vention.

Its policies were a clear mandate to the party

and it ist u p to the leaders to explain to the party as
a whole any lack of action span convention proposals at
a future meeting.

2h the 1966 convention the party, on

the whole, did a©t wasfe to eoonlt their leaders to any
proposals which eight later .seen very oneracts.

fhey did,

however, a ffir a their mnaaiscHis apjjroval of the proposal
for a fir*s-»trads ores eafaraeing the whole of forth
Anarles.

This was preeoted so enthusiastically that

there could he no doubt as to its mndatory fiat, t r m
the convention viewpoint.
Haay sceptical comments were mads about the
feasibility of a convention of around 2000 delegates, which
might devote less than an hour to the discussion of a major
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policy proposal, arriving at any sound and well considered
policies for the party*

The Globe and Mail compared the

m n t h e of anxious discussions which preceded the Treaty
of Warn* with the bland and expeditions approval of a
proposal which m s

fraught with just as naay difficulties

as the proposals to develop a West era European free trade
area* W f
It is clear that la response to deep-seated changes
which are occurring in the Canadian political syste%
arising out of the current tcehno&egieal revolution,
CSoad&aa parties are hawing to adapt theoeelve* or fee©
the prospect of progressive obsolescence*
pronged attach*

O n the m m

They fee© a two

hand is the educational and

©owunieatians trassferaatloii which is drastically affecting
the attitude® of ear cltisens, particularly those below
forty*

4s ifcrs'lmll t^ae&uhan has pointed out we are now

living in a world which afford* uaporalled opportunities
for participation in it*® public sector of humB.ii relation
ships.

"The instantaneous daily interplay of huaan awareness,

regardless of distance and tlaa, creates a m m situation
far Mankind***^

So longer are we completely Insulated by

^ S l d s e and Hhil, "Off the fop of their Heads,"

•mortal. * W * 7, Ort«*«r 13, 1366.
>ferstell Maebuhan, "Public and Private Sectors
in the Else trie A , « / paper delivered to the Ifetianal
,.0Bk.CftCTudlaa..qflBla* W r m l m teton, SeptetSar « 2 ,
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• i 173 * distance, ignorance and tin® ftom events and peoples who
forosply lay beyond the periphery of our imagination*

It

is probably ao coincidence that the close and intensive
coverage of the war in Vietnara by oar communications aedla,
especially television, has developed aa intense and anxious
interest m

the part of CtaBadtaas in a sector of the world

in which we have hitherto not been Involved, to any degree*
the other change to which eur parties must respond
is th© 'Oashrconiag of govcnuMat activity in all spheres,
especially In extercel affairs*

this is concomitant with

an enariseus Increase in th® demands placed upon the govern*
m n t t reflected .in the ever-increasing .flow of eomaanieatiens which It m e t handle and respond to*
We see that there la, am a result of the two trends
jaeatieiaed*: a great heightening of the intensity of the
relationship between the government and th® .people*

If

the goveniacnt and oar politics! parties are not to be
overvhslasd there is need for the services of an inter
mediary which mxi filter, analyse and aggregate the oyriad
deoandt and present then in s o m
form,

hind of ordered, coherent

this task has been traditionally performed by our

political parties and the question arises as to whether
this function can fee effectively handled by th® political
parties as they .have operated op to th© present tins®.
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Of late it has become eooiaonplaee to have criticlsras
of the "horse and buggy" nature of the political side of our
govenunat, ©specially t a l i a a m t *

X’he criticisms would

seen to be equally valid for the structure of our political
parties* Although there are m m

si?$ns that efforts are

being antds to make parties acre effective instruaeuts fear
processing opinions end eeamzilty aspirations*

If in

eaceaine briefly the functions of the party as they apply
to the political process In general and Its inpact on
foreign policy in particular* we slight assess what is
being dune and vhet gore night be done*
In the first place, parties formulate prograaass
of gevensecnt policy, including foreign policy, which
they present to the electorate for approval*

In their best

fere these p r o g r a m * should evaluate our long run needs
and m p out coherent and intelligible policies to
realize these a i m *

She parties should ideally display

a long-run vision which lochs beyond the mere reaction to
current eontlnganciee and the short tm m thinking which
all too often is the foundation of the conduct of the
officials within the Departaent of Sxtcnaal A ffairs #
I n ox*dei* that parties can adequately develop such
programs*®® there is a need to go b e y o n d the occasional
convention*

the parties -mist develop contacts with sad

integrate the thought® ef those groups and individuals who
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envisage what the long t**a needs of Canada might

be la the » « M eontext*

The study conference end the

consultation council of sympathetic expert* are examples
of atteapt* being trade by the parties to explore long term
treads*

The i960 Kingston Conference of the liberal

Party was m significant watershed In the attempts bypar ties to involve a « M «

orbit of experts la pointing out

nmr directions which the party atght take*
impressive array of talent

Among the

led there was Professor

y a w s Sayrs discussing defence and psace-lceeplng forces*
fUehael BarKw&y on Canadian independence, Professor m r r y G.
lofmseii on External Beouooi© Relations and historian Frank
GhderhlU. s a w i n g tip his impressions of the impact of the
la

whole eonfersnee*

The Conservatives held a similar

conference at Fredericton in 196**, with an equally formidable
array of expertise*
These ©conferences could act be eons trued as beving
a direct ingest on party policies; they were not intended
to*

Del ton Gasp stated in bis introductory remarks at

Fredericton thst the Conference represented
aa effort to getbev a representative group of
CcNoserwetlvee for the purpose of c o m m m lca.ting in
Lm*4 ffeilshaa's phrase, "an an intellectually '
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adventurous level,f* with those with specialized
jmflwledge relating to the m i t e
fields
indicated by the Conference agenda*2®
The tope mast be that ideas, life© yeast v oaet
liberated &?Bong .party nsembers will leaven the bread and
stionXafee ass tlUnfcing*
Cooveatlaae are sow act the iapronptu affairs they
Stas Liberal Convention of 1966 canvassed the

once were*

constituency associations tor well thought out resolutions,
and both the Variant Liberals and the .Liberal youth had
prior «s©ebihgs to thrash out what their approach would be
at the aaia convention*

All delegates were presented with

a list of the resolutions to be discussed and a set of
scholarly pipers on the various topics prepared by leading
experts

to

the field*

workshops m

Dissuasions were told in

mmHor

the various areas, including one on defence

and foreign affbirs, and another on trad© policy*

The

.press reported that wish of the debate was lively and
informed and it yam not wholly a setter of eulogising party
leaders*

21

Xn the process of shaping a pXatfbra and

canvassing electoral support, parties in Canada inevitably
act m

brokers drawing together various groups and regions

under the uahrella of son© coaproals© progr&ane*

The

Camp, Introductory Eenarto, national
Conference on C m m M m Coals, o % eit*

21

Anthony Vestell, "Ideas are Mare lapartant than
Votes,» fllohs and..Hail* Saturday, October 15, 1166.
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- t 177 » party that taka* too rigid and doctrinaire a position
stand® a ehane* of alienating powerful segments without
who®© support there is precious little ©banc© of gaining

power.
The preblea for the leader and the parliamentary
group is to be able to reflect In their stance in the House
of Commons an accurate erossHMetioii of the views of the
w h d © country, when their representation may fee heavily
skeveft t s v i s m m

section or cue dominant influence,

All

parties have felt this deficiency end in a way the convention
serves as a corrective to give the party the Image of being
open to influences flroa all regions- and groups.

Although

the Liberals are deficient in western mriban they made
such of the western r©presents tion at their convention.
Similarly the

without Qiiebee re preseatat ion in the

C a n o n * t have jfaeteveft * Quebec leader and seen to it that
Quebec representative* were present in strength in the
national executive,
fh© most veaarlceble effort was irade by the Conser
vatives la the twenty-seventh parliament to ensure that
the aetrepolltaa urban areas still had access to the
highest eouneils of the party, when they failed to elect
one eeadMKr free Toronto, W m t w & n l or Vancouver in the
1965 election,

Alvin Ifeadlton took steps to set up special
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policy ecoa&ttees of well educated professional and
business people to giro advice to the .party on key problem
which would arise in the House*

The idea seemed sound feat

only the coaesittee in Toronto ever really functioned well
and since- the Mefeateter-Caap fracas there has been a
hiatus between the parlisaoatery

aad « * parliamentary

segments of the party*
The efficient jwrftoraeiiee of the brokerage function
requires that strong ©ad continuous limes with all the main
streams of thought across the country b@ forged and it will
require many innovative devices such as that of Alvin
Huttltsn to develop them.

Without this balance the personal

idiosyncrasies of the party leader or the weighted bias
of m m

particular region m

group are likely to influence

the type -of foreign, .policy urged fey .-any particular party*
From the point of vlm

of national unity and the most

profitable fora of delete it is better that parties link
similar views across the country, than that they .pit one
region, against another.

This has happened on certain

occasions, notably the two conscription crises,, with
disastrous eeaesqpenece far national cohesion and a lira
foreign policy*

m m we see that the integrative -and educations!
functions of parties are best performed if their machinery
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- j 179 i is developed in. such a m y that they can encompass within
their raahi all regions and m a y .points of view,

This

doss not necessarily m * & all joints of view for this eon
result In a prograjsMi that .is so topi® and purposeless
that it fells to generate any eathnaiasai or give any clear
guidance as to what our foreign policy shoild be*

there

should be s o w polarisation of viewpoints in. the parties so
that is the dabate the public will have the opportunity to
obtain all sides of the question and at least haw® the
opportunity of eontng to s o w rational decision.
it the present tins this polarisation s m m

to occur

within, rather than between parties, at least as regards
foreign policy*

It was noticeable that at the Conservative

convention, resolutions p m .pared m

ah odes ia and China

took no.re radical positions than the views presented by
s o w of the pevlleaMHBtary spokssnsa* •Within the liberals
there was & clear division between the c ontinentn 1ists «
strong in Western Caneda, and the nationalists led by
Walter Sordeo*

the attest by the liberals to contain

both viewpoints within, the party, in the fear that they
m y be outflaittoad m

the left, m y well lead to a

pusillanimous policy, which is, in effect, no policy*
la conclusion it should b© acknowledged that while
the party interest in foreign policy la definitely growing
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It is still lev l» its saliency in the over-all party
prograanes.

Parties are ssiltlwpurpaae organisations and

saay oeafesrs and supporters of partis* are ready to su&~
amrge their reservation* about foreign policy or give it
aloost no attention beeaase their ideas of party goals lie
elsewhere*

this allows a great latitude to the leaders and

the interested elites to simp® a m h

of the party policy in

this regard without being subject to the pressures which are
present In nany other policy a r m s *
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CHAPTER ?
THE ROLE OP THE HOUSE OF COMMONS; ASSESSMENT
The conceptualization of the political process
adopted in this thesis is that of a political system in
which there is a continuous interaction of all the parts,
A change in one of the parts produces a reaction in all
the other parts.

Another consequence of viewing the

political process as a system is that It is seen to be
unsatisfactory to examine the working of political
structures, such as the House of Commons, away from their
whole context - political parties, public opinion, opinion
leaders and the media of communication.
The House of Commons * role in external affairs is
only partly a resultant of the interplay of forces within
that Institution,

To a great extent the capacity of the

opposition parties and the individual member to play a
role in external affairs is conditioned by the external
activities which have been discussed in the two previous
chapters.

How the deficiencies in the performance of the

parties outside the House of Commons and how the situation
of the House of Commons itself in its relationships with
- : 181 r -
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the executive affects the Commons handling of external affairs
is the subject of this chapter*

The performance of the House of Commons in external
affairs is only a special case of its general performance,
taking into consideration the unique factors which relate
to external affairs*

It is not overstating the case to

say that the institution of Parliament, especially in those
countries which follow the Westminister model, has faced a
crisis of its existence in recent years*

A spat© of books

and articles urging reform of Parliament has been matched
by equal concern by Parliament itself to at least discuss
1
reform, even if little is don® about it*
The two trad
itional tasks of Parliament scrutinizing legislation and
controlling the expenditures of public moneys are being done
iMuch more has been written on the need for Parlia
mentary reform la the United Kingdom than in Canada. Three
works which have received a wide circulation are:
hange or Decay, The Conservative Political Centre, London,
9oj .*
Bernard Crick, The Reform of Parliament. Wledenfeld and
Kelson, London, 19ok» '
Andrew Hill and Anthony Mhiehelow. What's Wrone with

f

mnaiati?. Penguin, London, 1964.
Much less has been written in any comprehensive way on
the reform of the Canadian Parliament, Forthcoming works by
Thomas A* Bockin and Pauline Jewett promise to look at the
problem. Three articles which describe changes which have
already occurred and discuss the need for further changes are:
Trevor Lloyd, "The Reform of Parliamentary Proceedings", in
The Prosneet of Chang®. (Ed.) Abraham Hotstein, McCraw Hill,

K S t o 7 196 5*'
Donald rage, "Streamlining the Procedures of the Canadian House
of Commons.1
f#11963-1966,................. .

P Q U U m l J £ M 9 . 9 4 , .xxxilf, lo* I,

^auiineJewett,'The Reform of Parliament", Journal of Canadian
Studies. Vol. I, Mo, 3, November, 1966*
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less and less effectively.

2

The whole question has been

raised as to just what functions Parliament does serve
and how well is it fulfilling them.

In this thesis we

shall focus these general questions cm the sector of
external relations-.
In this era of enormous and complex government
activity it is quite unrealistic to expect a body so
unspecialized, so inexpert, so overburdened, and so diverse
as a legislature to devise and formulate detailed programmes
of expenditure or to initiate policies.
suited to administration.

These are the tasks

The legislature as the popular arm

of government may be expected to undertake appropriately the
following tasks: the aggregation and articulation of opinion
from all segments and interests in the population 5 the
education of the public through effective debate which
unearths meaningful information and elucidates important
principles ; to check on and criticize government performance;
and to evolve a consensus on some basic harmonizing principles
on which the whole nation can unite.
The aggregating process is ostensively achieved by
the political parties in their attempt to create platforms
which will rally to them the widest possible support,
^Bernard Crick, 00- eft.. pp,1*— 5 says “Parliament does,
indeed, spend too much time on criticizing the inevitable and
far too little in examining the submerged processes of admin
istration and influence from which the pinnacles of legis
lation emerge - let alone what happens afterwards," This, of
course was written about the United Kingdom Parliament; it
could equally apply to the Canadian Parliament,
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- : 18k- i This involves tying to the party a diversity of groups
and individuals, who can sufficiently reconcile their
differences to allow the party to evolve a stable programme
based on a consensus of their views*
Our consideration of party programmes lias shown
that the parliamentary leadership does not always feel
bound by these convention programmes, and particularly
feels the need for flexibility to meet the exigencies of
.any particular time or situation*

Continuous pressures

play upon the parties in Parliament from group® and
Individuals outside*

Within Parliament the pressures from

the members are exerted cm the leadership of the party to
take certain directions*
In the realm of external affairs the pressures seem
to be considerably lighter than for most other areas of
government activity, thus allowing the leaders considerable
latitude to shape party policies as they see fit.

Con

ventions lay down very broad guidelines which allow
considerable room for interpretation and do not cover
many new situation® which arise between conventions.
Pressure groups can be very active in fields of
special interests where economic well-being is in question.
They concentrate their attention on the government, at
least in the first instance, and on the opposition if the
government is likely to prove obdurate.

On more remote
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questions which may have significant long term impli
cations for Canada,, such as the Viet Ham war, or Rhodesian
independence, pressure groups are less active and influential*
Groups active in this sphere are the more altruistic groups
who appeal to the idealistic sentiments of the members
of Parliament and the general public*

They often saturate

members with their literature but are either preaching to
the converted or get a deaf response*

As far as pressure

group activities are concerned it is important to remember
that at most they can only hope to influence members to
speak in caucus, or to move a minor party in their favor.
Because parties are disciplined, pressure groups cannot
hope to influence an individual member’s vote or get a
member to oppose the policy of his leader in the House*
Discussions with members revealed that it was
very rare for constituents to be concerned about external
issues in their correspondence with members*

The bulk

of letters in normal times which touched on the subject

were deemed to have been written by ’cranks*.

In times of

crisis many more letters were written, especially to the
leading parliamentary figures.

Subjects which did arouse

considerable correspondence in recent years were the
Middle East crisis of 1956, the nuclear weapons dispute of
1962 and recently the war in Viet Ham.

These letters
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- : 136 : probably have little effect on the views of members but
their volume can stimulate the interest of the member.
By far the most significant source of opinions and
views about the world for M*P,ts would seem to be the press.
Those who spoke in debates quoted at length from their own
local press 5 leading Canadian papers such as the Globe and
Mail. Winnipeg Free Press. Ottawa Journal and Le Devoir .•
and magazines such as Mr*cleans. Saturday Might and Atlantic
Monthly.

The more informed members or leading party spokes

men turned to slightly more sophisticated sources such as
the London Tims, the Mew York Times, the London Observer.
The Guardian and the London Economist.

Hardly any member

quoted serious works on International Affairs or original
documents.

The more informed member used the sources for

information and used these sources in a critical way.
Most members took opinions second hand from these sources
and retailed them without questioning them.

Insofar as

there is a regional variation in the press in its treatment
of foreign affairs this is usually reflected in the views
of the members who purvey these opinions from the regional
press.
Quebec

This is particularly noted in the case of the
who are more likely to quote La Presse or

Le Soleil, rather than the more urbane and intellectual
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- J 187 J The party caucus is traditionally a sounding board
for grass roots opinions as channelled through the members
from their constituents.

In the face of a back-bench

rebellion on a particular issue most ministers will attempt
to reach a compromise.

The common sentiment seems to be,

particularly in the government caucus, that party policies
are usually revealed to the caucus after they have been
revealed to Parliament.

There is then little chance to

reverse a policy without making the government seem to
be making an ignominious retreat.

Only in the C.C.F, and

the H.D.P. has there been full discussion of party policies
on external problems prior to making a statement in the
House,

the Liberal and Conservative caucuses external

relations rarely figured as an important topic exeept in
crisis situations such as Suez, the nuclear weapons and
the Cuban missiles.

One informant stated that the main

business of caucus were matters having a ’political* impact
and external affairs rarely had any such impact.
The committees of the House of Commons on External
Affairs and Defence could serve as aggregating agencies for
informed and influential opinions not originating from the
government .

In the case of the Standing Committee on

External Affairs little use has been made of the power to
send for ’persons and papers* other than from government
sources.

A seemingly useful precedent was set in 19^6
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when representatives of both the Arabs and the Jews in the
Palestine dispute appeared before the committee and presented
their cases*

Except for expert testimony regarding treaties

this precedent has hardly ever been followed since.^
Suggestions have been made to have expert witnesses testify
or submit briefs, but the chairman has always managed to
deflect these requests mi the grounds of lack of time and
pressure of other business.

Almost the sole source of

authoritative comment on policy has been the minister*
Facts concerning Canada’s foreign policy operations come
almost entirely from senior civil servants*
The Special and now the Standing Committee on Defence
has been considerably more free-wheeling in unearthing facts
and opinions.

It has interviewed a considerable number of

serving officers, both Canadian and NATO, in Ottawa and at
various locations in the United States and Western Europe.
Many visits have been made to Canadian defence Installations
in Canada and overseas and there has been an opportunity to
witness at first hand Canadian defence operations.

Former

^In April of 1967 the Standing Committee for External
Affairs agreed to make a new departure in their proceedings
by inviting independent witnesses to give evidence. They
agreed to invite three witnesses who could give them first
hand information about South-East Asia. These witnesses were
Charles Taylor, former Globe and Mail correspondent in China;
James Barrington, formerly BurmeseAmbassador to Canada
and Hebert Thompson, Social Credit Member of Parliament who
had recently returned from a South-East Asia tour. Globe and
Mall. April l*f, 1967.
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serving officers and independent experts such as John
Gellner have also appeared before the Committee.

Special

studies by outside defence critics were also solicited for
the Committee's information.

There seems little doubt that

a much wider spectrum of informed opinion has been presented
to this Committee than to the External Affairs Committee.
The educational function of the House of Commons
depends very largely on the same factors which enable it to
be an effective critic and scrutineer of government policy.
The public can understand and appreciate Canadian foreign
policy only to the extent that the government is forced to
make a comprehensive explanation and defence of all its
aspects at reasonably frequent intervals.

The elucidation

of these principles of Canadian foreign policy will depend on
how effectively the opposition can erect an alternative
structure based on expertise and adequate information.
The actual clash on foreign policy falls far short of the
desired level.
The weaknesses a r e ; firstly, lack of opportunity,
and secondly lack of ability through a dearth of information
and expertise.

As the chapter on Commons procedures

demonstrated, the opportunities to discuss external relations
in the House of Commons are extremely limited.

It is mainly

confined to a short debate on the estimates and the occasional
debate on

crisis situations.

The debate is largely taken
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- : 190 : up by leading party spokesmen and rank and file members
rarely get to speak, so there is little incentive for them
to prepare any material or pay any long run attention to
these questions*

The crowded legislative schedule of the

House affords scant opportunity to indulge in the luxury
of bringing up external affairs more often,
More serious than the lack of opportunity is the lack
of ability, for a more obvious ability would create its own
opportunity.

The opposition speakers have to face the well-

briefed government benches with very inadequate information
and preparation.

Their sources are usually only newspaper

reports with little background in depth on any problem.
The spokesmen for the opposition parties and the ordinary
member have little time for research and no one to do
research for them in this field.

It is then little wonder

that most speeches are glib, rambling and superficial with
little real penetration or coverage of any problem to which
they are addressed.

There is considerable sniping but little

in the way of a devastating, comprehensive attack based on
sound documentation.
The practises of the House do little to foster greater
expertise and interest in external affairs.

The tradition

of secrecy in our government means that ministers go to great
lengths to conceal information from the opposition.

Requests

for information and the tabling of documents either meet
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- : 191 : evasive answers or quite frequently downright refusals
to grant the information, on the grounds that it is sensitive
and jeopardizes our relations with friendly countries if
publicized*
To be fair, few opposition members have the knowledge
or art to put really searching questions which would reveal
more information.

The method of appointment to committees

and delegations has not in the past built up a corps of
experienced and knowledgeable members.

Committees have

been appointed for the session, and not the parliament,
and substitutions have been frequent.

Thus the opportunity

to build up a long tenure on a committee,as is afforded on
Congressional committees in the U.S.A., is absent in Canada.
Appointments to international delegations and to the United
Hations are awarded somewhat in the manner of treats for
good boys, or on the basis that everyone must share in a
good thing.

There is no concern for appointing only those

who have shown a consistent interest in external affairs
and have a record of good service on the Standing Committee.
There is Insufficient time for committees to meet
frequently and too often in the past there has been a
spate of sparsely attended feverish meetings to get the
estimates through before the end of the session.
recent concentration on policy and the dropping

The more
of the

practice of examining expenditures in detail has led to
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some improvement in the substance of the discussions*
Civil servants still seem quite busy and every effort seems
to be made to cut down the length of time which they must
devote to appearing before committees.

Committees can

thus do no more than skate over a wide area without really
probing any sector in depth.
The Defence Committee has been better in many respects
than the External Affairs Committee, possibly being less
bound by precedents and having more of a focus to its
activities in considering the re-organization of Canada*s
defence forces.

The Defence Committee has had greater

continuity, more Interested and zealous members, more
frequent meetings and a remarkable esprit de corps, which
the unification fracas may have frayed somewhat*

The

comprehensiveness and overall quality of the reports
issued by the Defence Committee, and the informed con
tributions made by its members to House debates attest to
its vitality and success in providing an education for its
members, and helping to Bake the opposition more effective
critics.
An important requisite for the preservation of
national unity is the development of a consensus on foreign
policy.

An extreme cleavage, such as existed between pro

western and pro-communist factions in several West European
countries after World War II, can jeopardize national unity
and create political deadlock.
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- * 193 * *
Canada has been faced with this problem on several
occasions In the past when the French, in particular, have
resisted what they deemed was a policy subservient to
British interests.

After World War IX multi-lateral

party opinion was far more unified on foreign policy.
Even the C.C.F* viewed the Soviet Union as a potential
threat and were willing to allow Canada to participate in
I.A.T.O, and the Marshall Plan.
Mackenzie King had believed that the best way to
preserve consensus was to throttle discussion and preserve
his freedom of action by concealing his hand until ready
to play it.

After World War II Parliament would no longer

consent to being treated like this and there was Mich more
discussion.

Ihere was really very little attempt at

encouraging the growth of a bi or multi-partisan policy by
the government’s attempting to take the opposition into
their confidence as did the President of the U.S.A.

King

did appoint all party delegations to San Francisco and the
opposition leaders were briefed by the Secretary of State
at the time of the spy trials la Canada and the Korean War.

b

During the Diefenbaker administration serious rifts
appeared over some fundamental questions of Canadian external
If
Source of this information a personal interview.
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- : 19*4- t relations ; over Canadian-TJ.S, relations, over British
membership in the Common Market and most bitterly over the
acquisition of atomic weapons*

Mr* Pearson seemed to

believe that Parliament could do a better job of promoting
a foreign policy consensus if it had more information and
had more opportunities to investigate these problems in
depth.

On coming to power It*. Pearson set up the Special

Committee on Defence and for a time it seemed to live up
to his prognostication by developing a high degree of harmony.
The thesis behind Mr. Pearson*s argument seems to be that
there are certain problems which Canada faces which can be
solved best by an objective analysis of the relevant inform
ation.

Too much of bitter altercations is the result of in

adequate data and insufficient study of the problem.

Canada*s

latitude to manoeuvre is extremely limited and a full
investigation of the problem will reveal this.
As if to bear this out the Defence Committee seemed
to be proceeding along a fairly smooth path towards uni
fication as a solution to Canada’s soaring defence expenditures.
The explosive reaction from some senior officers, serving
and retired, signified the political dynamite inherent in
this issue and the previous aim of harmony in the committee
dissolved.
Adequate discussion should reveal differences in
details and even as to ends to be aimed at, but at the same
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time discussion could profitably harmonize views as to the
methods to be used in establishing a foreign policy,
Gabriel Almond has stated the problem thus,
A democratic discipline and a democratic consensus
do not call for full and continuous agreement.
What they require are a rational statement of the
alternatives and a consensus as to the mode of
s&ection among them, A homogeneous training in
this kind of policy analysis might contribute
to the development of a common language among
various elite sectors, a common method of problemsetting and problem solving,?
In external relations the problem of creating *a
common language* has been complicated by the fact of one
elite sector - the Department of External Affairs - being
so clearly dominant and free from the influence of the
sector we are considering - the House of Commons,

Apart

from the natter of expertise and ability, the reason for
the lightness of legislative control is that rarely does
foreign policy hold a position of saliency in the total
political conflict.

Governments are usually elected on

the basis of their stand on quite different issues, and the
cutting edge of political conflict usually concerns domestic
policies.
The conception of the Commons as a whole being
marginal to the locus of real decision making because of
the existence of a *power elite* which is drawn from the top

?Gabriel Almond, American People and Foreign Policy,
P» 235*
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- : 196 : ~
layer of business, the civil service and possibly the
academic community, is overdrawn*

C. Wright Mills in the

case of the United States depicts a consensus obtained from
the common Interests of such a *power elite*, which then
proceeds to gain popular acceptance by manipulation of the
populace through the most refined techniques of the public
relations and advertising fraternity*
The officials of the Department of External Affairs
do form a fairly cohesive elite based on training, selection
and organizational goals-*

Behind a curtain of semi-secrecy

and expertise they attempt to screen out intruding scrutiny*
They must, of course, conciliate pressures and demands from
other agencies both within and without the government, but
this they carry on as a sovereign body, negotiating and
bargaining as an equal, and not as a subservient organ*

This

procedure applies to the bulk of continuing foreign policy
problems.

6
The House of Commons has intruded during periods of

crisis when popular emotions arouse it to action.

Because

% u c h is the pace of change and so great has been the
growth of functional relations with other countries and
International Organizations that this conception of the
Department of .External Affairs may no longer be accurate,
A great deal of the work of the Department is now acting as
a liason between other departments of government and their
opposite numbers in other governments and specialized agencies.
Technical expertise is now so important that the generalists
of ’External Affairs’ are forced to lean ever more heavily
on the specialists of the various departments in the shaping
of policy*
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- i 197 i of the lack of preparatory groundwork, the voice of the
Commons has seemed, shrill, emotional and destructive in its
impact.

In other words a language completely different

from that used by the permanent officials.
It is not to be expected that members of Parliament
can or should mold themselves in the pattern of the officials.
They are responsible to different demands and were schooled
in a very different milieu.

What might be expected is that

a much more profitable dialogue take place between the
elected representatives and the professionals of the
Department of External Affairs.
The ideological tone of political conflict in Canada,
as in most other western democracies lias been considerably
softened.

The different parties are much more united in

their over-all alia® than they were twenty years ago, and the
clash over principles tends to be replaced by a clash over
means.

One political scientist speaks of the "development

ft»Offi polities to administration, from principles to
7
techniques,'*
There is, therefore, less reason now why Parliament
should be seen as a preparation for the hustings, or that the
role of the opposition should be to accentuate conflicts by
appealing to myths and millenial aspirations.

^Herbert Tingsten, The Problem of Democracy. The
Bedminster Press, New Jersey, 1 9 6 5 , p. 19o.
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Parliament can play a much more constructive role
in the establishment of a feeling of Canadian national unity
by increasing its effectiveness as a communications centre
for Canadian foreign policy*

Such a process of social

learning could foster the political integration of Canada.

8

This entails keeping all channels open to ideas and information
on foreign policy, especially for the unorthodox and novel,
which is not as readily entertained by the officials of the
Department.

Ill influential elites and interests should

have their views exposed and aired before the forum of this
natlon*s most representative body*

Conflict between the

officials of the Department and other influential elites
should also be set before the Commons, so long as this does
not involve sensitive agreements or matters of security.
Based upon much more extensive information and much
greater involvement, opposition parties are not necessarily
going to agree with the foreign policies of the government
they .may, however, have a much greater appreciation of the
limited range of manoeuvre which this country has, a much
greater cognizance of the significant items of contention
and a much greater ability to contribute to a smooth
continuity in Canada*s foreign policy, should they have
the opportunity to form the government*
Til-1 mil.uiir

, i.r. ir:../:n n r:rm n ;T r:-r

:r.-i

°fh© communications approach to political integration
has been set forth bv Karl Deutsch. The Nerves of Government.
The Ere® Press, lew York, 1966. pp.
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CHAPTER VI

A DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY FOR CANADA: NECESSITY OR POSSIBILITY

Social scientists who have lavestigated social class
and power, and voting behaviour have generally concluded
that the popular understanding of, and partiepation in,
the political process is much less than some of the trad
itional democratic theorists have postulated*

Such studies

as have been done would tend to indicate that the degree of
popular interest and involvement in external affairs has
been even lower*^
Mhny political thinkers have not deplored this,
believing it to be right and necessary that those who
neither know nor understand other nations should avoid
disturbing those who have the responsibility for con
ducting their eountry*s external relations.

Locke gave

the classic statement of the case ;
What is to be done in reference to foreigners,
depending much upon their actions and the
variation of designs and Interests, must be
left in great part to the prudence of those who

- * 199 t -
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- s 200 : have this power committed to them, to be
managed by the best of their skill for the
advantage of the commonwealth.2
Though demands for a greater role for Parliament and the
general public have been made since the 1920*s, the attitudes
of successive governments have fairly closely corresponded
with the views of Locke#

It has been relatively easy in

Canada to keep external affairs in the hands of a small
elite of elected officials and senior members of the
Departments of External Affairs and Defence because this
country being a relative novice on the world stage lacks
any deeply rooted institutions or traditions for dealing
with foreign affairs.

The development of such traditions

and institutions has been handicapped by the regional frag
mentation of our political culture and the lack of any
clear, positive Canadian identity*
The present nature of international relations
and the development ofa global community is far different
fro® that in which Canada’s political institutions evolved.
The onrush of technology is turning the world into a global
village, in which the factors of time and space, which
hitherto provided both a physical barrier against the
intruder and a mental cushion against the impact of novelty,
o
John Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government.
Ch. XII, p. 1V7.
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are in the process of being annihilated,

The fact of our

Interdependence the complete inability of the state to
guarantee our security from external threat, and
instantaneous communication and feedback with all parts
of the global environment are evidence of the onrush of
a world community*

The adjustment of our attitudes and

the development of our political Institutions have clearly
lagged behind the above-mentioned processes*
Many writers on international affairs are attempting
to establish what these trends imply for world security, the
creation of a global community and the dec is ion-making process
within the state.

They all foreshadow startling changes

from our present arrangements,
John Herz discusses the disappearance of the
protective shell offered by the nation state in view of
the potency and range of the new weapons and their impli
cations for the survival of the nation state.
Students and practitioners of international
polities are at present in a strange predicament....
Me are no longer sure about the functions of war
and peace, nor do w© know how to define the national
interest and what its defense requires under present
conditions. As a matter of fact, the meaning and
function of the basic protective unit, the "sovereign"
nation state itself have become doubtful*3

3John H. Hers, "Else and Demise of the Territorial
State," World Polities.. DC, July 1957, P. **73.
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Alastair Taylor conceives of the transformation
which is taking place as a change from a "two-dimensional"
relationship to a "multi-dimensional" relationship.

The

Hobbes-Locke concept of the state as a unit occupying a twodimensional plot, independent of all other states and
absolute in sovereignty is changing to the concept of the
state occupying three-dimensional space, being interdependent
and adhering to "field" forces governing all states.
Ours is no longer a rectilinear, Euclidean
environment of disparate phenomena positioned
Independently in Newtonian, infinite spice
and possessing the characteristics of separate
indissoluble atoms, as classical physics held
in the last century; ours is a curvilinear
environment in which all phenomena are at
once multi-dimens ional, interacting, and multirelational, in accordance with Einstein’s
relativity. It is, in effect, an environment
of continuous feedback.^
W. Barton now considers that the impact of what
he calls "world consensus" and nuclear stragegy are so
great that the only constructive role which the state can
play is not to protect its people against the international
environment but to order national life to conform with
the requirements of the changing international environment.
"Governments are required, in the interests of peace and

^Alastair M. Taylor* "Multi-Helationality in Foreign
Policy," Min__.C,urrents_.In Hodern Thought* Vol. 22, No. 3,
January-February, 1966, p. 58.
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security, to contract out of the traditional role of govern
ment in the modern State - protection of interests threatened
by foreign changes - and actively to engage in promoting
5
adjustment. •"
The concomitant of such a transformation of the role
of the state is an allegiance to a higher-1han-national
cause.

The traditional habits of national loyalty, which

gave the state sufficient cohesion to fulfil its protective
role, are now anachronistic*
National allegiance in the parochial sense
today points the way toward destruction, the
doom of all nations - including one's own.
Allegiance to universal let aims points the
way to a better life, to a new security, to
g
the survival of nations - including one’s own.
It is one thing to point out the trends in the
direction in which we believe the world to be heading; it
is quite another to bring attitudes into line with these
trends, so that we can make the necessary adjustments in
international and national institutions.

A glance at the

contemporary international scene makes it quite clear that
'

"

l'^'r,r-'r:mnrTrr" 1
...

J. W. Burton, International gelations t A General
Theory. Cambridge University Press, da mD rldge,1965, p . 265*
„
H. Hers,
JM,.
Age. Columbia University Press, New York, 1959, p. 3^8.
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the dyadic, ego-centred, national-interest manner of thinking
is still dominant*

The super-powers - the U*S.A. and the

U.S.S.R* - tend to view most external issues in t e r m of
their Ideological conflict.

Economic aid, security agree

ments, the United Nations organization have been used,
primarily, as instruments to promote strictly national
policies.

The small powers and the new nations tend to be

so weak, that they are often consumed with their pre
occupation with one over-riding interest, notwithstanding
their frequent avowal of ♦non-alignment*.
The countries which naturally lean towards, and
have the greatest proclivity for, universalist aims are
the so-called "middle-powers", of which Canada is one.
These countries are able to find a higher degree of latitude
in the economic as well as security sphere if they seek the
widest possible international linkage, rather than one
confined to any narrow grouping or one great power.
fits fairly well into this middle category.

Canada

Alastair

Taylor has commented.
As a Middle Power, Canada finds nulti-relationality
almost invariably preferable to a two-termed
relational construct. Hence Ottawa*s enthusiasm
for international peacekeeping, and active Canadian
efforts at universalizing the organization^
membership.?

^Alastair M. Taylor, op. cit.. p. 63.
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- * 205 * In the argument which has recently broken out in
Canada between the proponents of nationalism and continents
alisai, Mr* Pearson has pronounced a curse on both houses
and declared "Canada should never prefer isolationism or
G
continentalism to broad-based internalionalism”*
It a m m

clear that while some of the Canadian elite

realize what is happening and are steering Canada towards
global policies, there is a considerable gap between their
thinking and that of other segments of the population*
The only way in which Canada can consistently follow
universal aims without fear of a popular veto at some
crucial stag© is to develop a greater degree of involve
ment among the attentive layers of public opinion*

Without

it we cannot go about encouraging the higher supra-national
loyalty that was spoken of, or make the necessary adjust
ments of domestic policy*

Canada is now too involved with

the rest of the world to attempt to compartmentalize
external and domestic policies and differentiate between
them in the degree of popular participation.

The popular

arm of government and the political parties are in the
process of adjusting to the changing conditions of world
order.

What further changes might assist this adjustment

will now be considered.

% t o b e and Mill. April 3, 196?.
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the changes which might affect democratic influences
in external affairs can be considered at three different
levels.

First, what might foe designated the situational

level, those changes which occur outside the political
system as such, but greatly affect its conduct such as
education, communication., the formation of voluntary
associations etc*

Second, general changes in the political

institutions themselves, such as restructuring of parties,
reform of parliamentary and administrative procedures.
Third, those changes specifically aimed at the handling of
foreign policy issues within the political institutions,
Very little study has been conducted into the impact
which the great educational and communication changes are
having on political attitudes.

That there is an impact

is evidenced by the random insights of Marshall McLuhan
and the obsession of the *!lew heft* for greater ’parti
cipation*.

The noted political writer Peter Newman recently

had this to say.
The communications revolution is not just a
matter of new techniques. North America lias
become a society whose consciousness has been
substantially transformed by the electronic
revolution; it has overturned the traditional
patterns of thought and behaviour. The young
people - who m k e up half the electorate - do
not, according to ffcLuhan, ’’look for ways of
relating themselves to the world, they demand
instead a participation mystique.9
% e t e r Newman, ’’Pearson Loses Fight to keep the Lid
on Ottawa Secrets,” Toronto Star. April 1, 196?.
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It Is probable that the capacity and the opportunity
for much greater numbers of people to become involved in
what the government is doing, and in what happens outside
Canada1® borders, will be the result of these great
technological changes*
One of the results of greater awareness and higher
educational levels in the electorate is going to be a
demand for more information and a more sophisticated type
of information than they have been accustomed to getting.
Already we are witnessing a discussion of the possibility
of televising the House of Commons proceedings, of having a
kind of Parliamentary Journal which would contain a digest
of Parliaments main activities and of upgrading the information sections of government departments.

10

It was previously suggested that Canada has until
recently lacked any traditions or institutions used to
dealing with foreign affairs.

A generation of experience

in world affairs has now elapsed since Canada first seriously
took an interest in the rest of the world.

Autonomous

institutions uniting Canadians with specific interests in
international relations are beginning to develop and thus
lead to the creation of elites interested in external affairs

^Pauline Jewett, "The Reform of Parliament,M Journal
of Canadian Studies. Vol. I, Mo. 3, November 1966, pp. Il-ip.
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outside of the government*

For example a Conference on

Peacekeeping was held at Queenfs University in February 1967
which brought together representatives from academic life,
the military, the Department of External Affairs, the United
Nations Secretariat, Journalism and the Canadian Institute
of international Affairs.

Such a conference accords recog

nition to the idea that valuable cross-fertilization can
occur from contact with groups outside the sphere of
government.

This type of activity is likely to expand.

The social changes which have only been hinted at
here will impose a burden upon the political structures
until they find
changes*

souk?

kind of congruence with the social

The task of developing this congruence will

depend upon our political creativity*

Those institutions

which fail to meet the demands placed upon them will
become anachronisms and be disregarded in favor of other
channels.
John Porter in discussing democratic participation
states
Given the complexities of .modern societies it is
unlikely that widespread participation can develop
without very great changes and institutional
experimentation. If power and decision-making
Mist always rest with elite groups, there can at
least be open recruitment from all classes into
elites*
Canada is a new society, and should have
had great opportunities for institutional innovation,
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bat so far it has bean incapable of taking a
lead in the changes and experimentation
necessary for mare democratic industrial
societies*^
One of the great strides which could be made is to
broaden and strengthen the so called middle layer of
politics - the backbencher, the party official, the
constituency leadership, the convention delegates.

This

implies making the political party a ranch more vital fore©
than it lias been.

It has to be converted into something

more than an election machine, lubricated for action every
three or four years, then left to rusticate until the
next frenzied burst of activity*
Such a change means acknowledging the party as a
continuously functioning part of the political system and
providing the sinews for its wider role.

The political

party could play a much more extensive part in developing
policy and continuously educating the public.

This would

demand a widespread grass-roots membership, party offices
across the country, a large and active party bureaucracy
engaged in research and information activities, frequent
conferences, study sessions and policy conventions.

If

such changes were brought about the party could more
realistically perform the task of relaying grass-roots

11
**John Porter, The Vartleal Mosaic. University of
Toronto Press, Toronto, 1965, p. 55a*
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opinion to the party and serving it as a source of ideas
and expert advice.

Such a venture is likely to prove

costly, but it is the price to be paid for breathing new
life into our political parties.

The political parties

have advanced some distance towards these goals and if
the reforms now being discussed are implemented, the
parties will advance even closer towards them.

12

An earlier section dealt with the deficiencies of
our Members of Parliament in their ability to play a role
in external affairs*

The limitations from which they

suffered can be subdivided into two main areas; limitations
because of the role they are expected to play under the
existing system and limitations on the capacity of the
typical member as engendered by the system.
It was earlier shown how the average member tended to
be very constituency oriented, spending almost half of
his time dealing with routine constituency problems.

The

removal of some of this burden from the member could free
him so that he could spend more time reading, discussing,

12

'

Among the recommendations of the Committee on

Election Expenses there were suggestions that certain

subsidies and services be provided to candidates who
qualified and encouraging political donations by tax
concessions. Report of the Committee on Election Expenses.
.1..
1
..... ......
Queen’s Printer,t
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attending meetings and travelling.

In other words

allow him to better prepare himself to deal with policy
matters.
The creation of an "ombudsman", to whom constituents
could channel complaints could relieve M.P.*s of a task
which they find burdensome and which from their training
13
and role they cannot always handle effectively,
A great
deal of the routine political work, party-fence-mending
and liason work might be don© by an executive assistant,
which a group of members might share,

At present members

only have stenographic help from the public service and the
very minimum of help from the meagrely staffed party head
quarters.
Besides help with their routine duties, members could
also greatly enhance their effectiveness if they had help to
compos© speeches from trained researchers,

Many members have

the ability to utilize and present quite sophisticated
analyses of policies if they are able to obtain information
which is prepared to their specifications.

They do not

have the time and expertise to investigate and synthesize
scattered materials in bulletins, digests, texts and learned
journals,

^Donald Eowat, "Why We Heed an Ombudsman," in Politics
Canada. Second Edition, Paul Fox (ed), Hcdraw Hill, Toronto,
1966, pp. 279-28^,
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Frequent suggestions were made to the writer of
this thesis that we should, here in Canada, emulate in a
limited way the Legislative Reference Service of the United
States Congress*

This institution attached to the Library

of Congress develops bulletins, digests and translations
1^
which it deems useful to Congress*
It may put these out
in anticipation of needs, or in response to a particular
request.

The Parliamentary Library has initiated a limited

service of this kind, but, from complaints recently heard,
it does not see® to have completely satisfied the demands
of members*

Having been Initiated, however, it m y be

expected that its role will be gradually expanded as was
the service to Congress*
The provision of the above-mentioned services to
members will not alone ensure their greater effectiveness
in policy matters.

A substantial proportion of the present

members would be unable to take much advantage of these
facilities, either from a lack of inclination or a lack of
ability.

The educational qualifications and academic

training of many members Is Improving but there is still
the previously noted anti-intellectual bias of many politicians
in Canada.

This will diminish of its own accord with time

ll*William Hampton, !,The Facilities of the Library of
Congress,” in The Reform of Parliament« Bernard Crick,
Doubleday Anchor, le w fork, x9o>, p p . 239-2^7.
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as more urbanized, cosmopolitan representatives replace
those of a more traditional bent from small towns and rural
areas*

Redistribution and increasing urbanization will

assure this.
The break-down of the suspicion of members in regard
to intellectuals and experts from the press, the universities
and officialdom could be accelerated if there was more inter
change between them.

The establishment of more associations

and groups which discuss government policies and hold
conferences on certain areas of policy could bring them
more in contact*

It must also be made easier for members

of the above professions to enter political life for a
period and later re-enter their profession without loss of
position, or prestige*

The University of 'Toronto has framed

regulations for its faculty along these lines to facilitate
the entry into politics of its faculty members.
Members need more exposure and experience in various
spheres in

contact with members of the Civil Service*

The

nomination of a member as a delegate to a conference, a
foreign delegation or a tour of inspection should be an
acknowledgement of his specialization, experiences and
interest in a subject and not just as a reward for faithful
support of the party.

The opportunities for such

participation should be -multiplied whenever possible and
the participants should be given the best possible briefings.
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- : 21*f * So far we have been discussing how M.P.fs might b©
made more effective in relation to their extra-parliamentary
duties*

When we com© to look at their role within parlia

ment we ran into the problem of parliamentary procedures
and functions*

In the spate of recent discussion of

parliamentary reform the main emphasis seems to have been
on streamlining its procedures so that it can get more
done, pass more legislation, have the estimates expedited,
diminish obstructions of business and so forth*

Less

attention seems to have been paid to assessing 3ust what
parliament1© role can be, besides a rubber stamp, in the
mid-twentieth century.
The main reforms discussed and implemented, at least
on a trial basis, have been geared to eliminating unnecessary
delays, arranging time limits on debates and gaining more
time for parliament to deal with government business.

These

are really only short-term proposals which can increase
governmental capabilities but possibly only leave parlia
ment in a weaker position than ever*
The only really significant reforms can be those
that will re-structure the whole of parliamentary procedure
in terras of what members can effectively do, rather than
what they foriaalistieally do.

As Bernard Crick noted of

the British Parliament t
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- i 215 i Parliament spends too much time criticizing
the inevitable and far too little in examining
the submerged process of administration.1?
Parliament's real task Is to convey a flow of demo
cratic impulses on to the administrative process 5 it should
lay bare, criticize, scrutinize, and publicize.

The almost

ritualistic sham of voting supply, and passing legislation
which is never altered or defeated under normal cireuostances
deflects from rather than adds to the essential functions.
The recent efflorescence of committee activity in
the Canadian House of Commons seems to point the way to
the more effective application of Parliament's tin®.

The

Commons itself should become a clearing house for the
reports of committees which should concentrate on revealing
the background of pressures and influences behind the shaping
of public policies.

The whole of the outside world which has

such a vital interest in what the government will decide
must be brought into a dynamic relationship with these
committees, in their power to send for persons and papers
and adjourn from place to place.

The members must be on

the pulse of this process and not mere by-stenders watching
it pass by.
An obstacle which will have to be overcome if a
greater role is going to be played by committees is the

3-%ernard Crick, op. cit., p. 5.
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excessive addiction to official secrecy, and the use of
the dogma of ministerial responsibility to shield & multitude
of matters from parliamentary scrutiny*

It has already been

mentioned how the government has consistently held back a
great deal of information from the Commons t refusing to
table documents, giving evasive answers to questions, not
allowing officials to testify on policy before committees,
not allowing *in camera* meetings of the External Affairs
Committee,

In feet all the oligarchic features of bureau

cracy satirized by Parkinson are to be found, whereby all
those on the inside are anxious to remain undisturbed by
those who are on the outside#
Brian Chapman, an expert on European administrative
systems, is convinced that the parliamentary inhibitions
against scrutinizing official behaviour is disastrous.
The view that parliament must rely for its
information on the facts the minister chooses
to put forward is not widely held in Europe,,,,
one test of a democratic government is the
extent to which information on Important issues
is made freely available to parliament and the
public* Public administration in private is
a remnant of more autocratic days and is ,
gradually disappearing in Western Europe.
The doctrine of ministerial responsibility is a
constitutional precept that protects officials by assuming

Brian Chapman, The Profession of Government.
George, Allen and
p*T 291*
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that they are servants of the Crown and the minister, and
not the state.

Adequate control is assumed in parliamentary

control of the minister*

Crick maintains the doctrine has

been misused in Britain to refuse any examination of the
17
m e made of a minister *s powers*
This applies equally to
Canada where any suggestion that a committee could have pro
fessional staff to advise it, and do research for it has,
until recently, been rebuffed*

Also any suggestion that

civil servants should answer for policy to committees has
also been rejected*

Adequate control of administration

demands that parliament should be refused no information
which does not threaten the political control of parliament#
Chapman also believes that the ’’problem of bringing home
responsibility to the particular individual official is
ift
fundamental to the control of the public administration*”
It is suggested here that committees be given far
ranging powers to investigate and question, to call for
studies, to adjourn froia place to place, to deal with
security matters in closed sessions and to draft all such
reports as they desire*

The status and influence of the

^Crick, £e„t. cit;.*, p. 20^*
Chapman,

op*

cit*. p . 208.
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committee will be closely related to the calibre of their
personnel and the quality of their reports*

The minister

will still be responsible for policy and will accept or
reject committee recoramendations as he sees fit*

If he is

wise he will treat committee suggestions on their merits*
The point is that if he rejects committee recommendations
the minister and his department will have to make an
adequate defence of their own position in public view*
There will be far less opportunity for condescension and
obscurantism than there has been until now*
The development of the role of the House of Commons
in relation to external affairs depends upon, and is
intimately linked with, the re-appraisal and uplift of the
performance of the Commons with regard to the whole spectrum
of government activities*

That is why the major suggestions

have related to general parliamentary reform and not specifi
cally the activities which touch on external affairs.

Within

the framework of the above reforms there are some specific
objectives which might be attempted.
In the past record of both the Defence Committee
and the External Affairs Committee there was considerable
attention given to departmental administration*

The earlier

defence committees were appointed specifically to examine
defence spending.

This is the type of housekeeping job

which is important, but which diverts attention from policy.
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- * 219 : Such a task should be left to the Public Accounts Committee
and the Auditor General.

This would still not preclude

the Defence Committee from considering the broad question
of whether or not we are pursuing the type of defence
policy we can afford and whether we are *getting the biggest
bang for our buck.*
It should be possible to give more coherence and
cogency to Commons debates on foreign policy if they were
held at fairly regular intervals and were focussed on
definite areas, rather than continue with the rambling,
diffuse debates of the past.

If the committees of the House

dealt with specific areas of policy according to a previously
agreed agenda, and at fairly regular intervals issued reports,
these reports could then be debated in the full House.

Rele

vancy could be strictly enforced by the Speaker who would
confine debate to the matters contained in the report.

A

general debate concerning Canada’s basic posture to the
world could be held on the final report.

The opposition

and the government should still be able to Initiate a debate
m

emergency questions.

The practise of making statements

on all important conferences, followed by brief questioning,
Is a practise which should be maintained.
Suggestions regarding the conduct of committees have
already been made.

The role of the committee should be

seen as that of a special handmaiden of the House, armed
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- s 220 : with greater expertise and experience than the House itself
it should probe and expose the roots of Canada*s foreign
policy and render a readily assimilatable account of it to
the House and the general public.
Besides giving an intense scrutiny of our current
policies the committees could usefully sponsor long range
thinking about our future course of action and the way
in which the deeper, underlying trends in the international
sphere m y be expected to influence Canada.

It is notice

able that relatively little of this is done in the Depart
ments of External Affairs and Defence, they are too pre
occupied with reacting to the exigencies of the moment.
The committees could hold hearings on special problems
such as world population growth, multilateral aid, peace
keeping forces etc.

They could ask experts from many countries

to testify and also solicit special studies on these problems
utilizing their own research staff, academic and other associ
ations! groups and individuals.

Edited version of testimony

and other studies could be prepared for distribution to the
general public, the news-media and educational institutions.
The whole objective would be to build up an attentive public
which thought about and entered into a discussion of Canada’s
role in the world.

Without this there is a danger that in the

long run our Departments of Defence and External Affairs can
fall into complacency and arrogance, supreme in the confidence
that they alone know and can determine the course we are to
take.
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